Multiagent Resource Allocation in the Presence of Externalities

  • Paul E. Dunne
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3690)


In studies of settings concerning the allocation of a finite resource collection among a set of agents it is, usually, assumed that each agent associates a value with each subset of resources via a utility function that is free from so-called externalities, i.e. that these values are independent of the distribution of the remaining resources among the other agents. While this assumption is valid in many application domains, it is, however, by no means universally so. Thus, one can identify a number of circumstances wherein an agent’s assessment of a given subset is dependent not only on the elements of this set but also on the context in which it is held, i.e. on the resources owned by other agents. In this paper a general model for considering resource allocation settings with externalities is presented and its properties reviewed with reference to a select number of issues that have been widely-studied in externality–free settings.


Multiagent Resource allocation Computational Complexity 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul E. Dunne
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceUniversity of LiverpoolLiverpoolUK

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