Secure Password Authentication for Keystroke Dynamics

  • YeongGeun Choe
  • Soon-Ja Kim
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3683)

Abstract

Keystroke dynamics is an intelligent data processing technique of analyzing the user’s habitual typing patterns to identify him. Keystroke dynamics combined with password authentication has been widely used as a means to enhance user authentication system. However, the user authentication system’s security does not rely solely on the keystroke dynamics. To guarantee a high level of security, more secure password authentication is needed. The design and development of a secure password authentication protocol for keystroke dynamics is discussed in this paper. We propose a new efficient password authentication protocol that is secure against all types of attacks considered in the paper. We also show that our two-party protocol is extended to a three-party protocol, where each user only shares a password with a trusted server. As a result, our protocols with keystroke dynamics can provide a secure and intelligent means of authentication and access control of computer users.

Keywords

Discrete Logarithm Problem Dictionary Attack Perfect Forward Secrecy Password Authentication Keystroke Dynamic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • YeongGeun Choe
    • 1
  • Soon-Ja Kim
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate school of Electronic Engineering, Computer Networks Lab.Kyungpook National UniversityDaeguKorea

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