Secure Data Management in Trusted Computing

  • Ulrich Kühn
  • Klaus Kursawe
  • Stefan Lucks
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
  • Christian Stüble
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3659)

Abstract

In this paper we identify shortcomings of the TCG specification related to the availability of sealed data during software and hardware life cycles, i.e., software update or/and hardware migration. In our view these problems are major obstacles for large-scale use of trusted computing technologies, e.g., in e-commerce, as adopters are concerned that the use of this technology might render their data inaccessible.

We propose both software and hardware solutions to resolve these problems. Our proposals could be easily integrated into the TCG specification and preserve the interests of involved parties with regard to security and availability as well as privacy.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ulrich Kühn
    • 1
  • Klaus Kursawe
    • 2
  • Stefan Lucks
    • 3
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
    • 4
  • Christian Stüble
    • 4
  1. 1.Deutsche Telekom LaboratoriesTechnical University BerlinGermany
  2. 2.ESAT – COSIC, KU LeuvenBelgium
  3. 3.Theoretische InformatikUniversity of MannheimGermany
  4. 4.Horst Görtz InstituteRuhr-University BochumGermany

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