WAR: Wireless Anonymous Routing

  • Matt Blaze
  • John Ioannidis
  • Angelos D. Keromytis
  • Tal Malkin
  • Avi Rubin
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3364)

Abstract

There have been many efforts to anonymize traffic in traditional point-to-point networks. However, these techniques do not map directly onto wireless systems because the two types of networks have different properties. For example, whereas in wired networks adjacent communication links must know each others’ addresses, wireless networks broadcast messages. Thus, an adversary may be able to obtain global information about network traffic. On the other hand, a wireless receiver’s identity may not need to be known to anyone.

We introduce Wireless Anonymous Routing (WAR).We describe a threat model for WAR and compare it to its wired counterpart. We show that traditional anonymity protocols are either insecure or perform poorly when applied to the wireless model, and we describe new protocols that preserve security with better performance.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Chaum, D.: Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM (CACM) 24, 84–88 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Ostrovsky, R., Yung, M.: How to withstand mobile virus attacks. In: Proc. of the 10th annu. ACM symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing, pp. 51–59 (2001)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Canetti, R., Herzberg, A.: Maintaining security in the presence of transient faults. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1994. LNCS, vol. 839, pp. 425–438. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Herzberg, A., Jakobsson, M., Jarecki, S., Krawczyk, H., Yung, M.: Proactive public key and signature systems. In: 1997 ACM Conference on Computers and Communication Security (1997)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Beimel, A., Dolev, S.: Buses for anonymous message delivery. J. of Cryptology 1, 25–39 (2003)CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 453–474. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Universally Composable Key Exchange and Secure Channels. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 337–351. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Reed, M., Syverson, P., Goldschlag, D.: Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC) 16, 482–494 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Zhou, L., Haas, Z.J.: Securing Ad Hoc Networks. IEEE Networks 13 (1999)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Deng, H., Li, W., Agrawal, D.P.: Routing Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. IEEE Communications 40, 70–75 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Zhang, Y., Lee, W.: Intrusion Detection in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks. In: Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom), pp. 275–283 (2000)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Albers, P., et al.: Security in Ad Hoc Networks: A General Intrusion Detection Architecture Enhancing Trust Based Approaches. In: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Wireless Information Systems, held in conjunction with the 4th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems (2002)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Marti, S., et al.: Mitigating Routing Misbehavior in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In: Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom), pp. 255–265 (2000)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Bellardo, J., Savage, S.: 802.11 Denial-of-Service Attacks: Real Vulnerabilities and Practical Solutions. In: Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 15–28 (2003)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Raymond, J.F.: Traffic Analysis: Protocols, Attacks, Design Issues and Open Problems. In: Proceedings of the International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, pp. 10–29 (2001)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Venkatraman, B.R., Newman-Wolfe, R.E.: Transmission Schedules To Prevent Traffic Analysis. In: Proceedings of the 9th Annual Computer Security and Applications Conference (ACSAC) (1993)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Venkatraman, B.R., Newman-Wolfe, R.E.: High Level Prevention of Traffic Analysis. In: Proceedings of the 7th Annual Computer Security and Applications Conference (ACSAC) (1991)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Hajek, B., Radosavljevic, B.: Hiding Traffic Flow in Communication Networks. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Military Communication Conference (MilCom) (1992)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Guan, Y., Fu, X., Xuan, D., Shenoy, P., Bettati, R., Zhao, W.: Efficient Traffic Camouflaging in Mission-Critical QoS Guaranteed Networks. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 31 (2001)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Guan, Y., Li, C., Xuan, D., Bettati, R., Zhao, W.: Preventing Traffic Analysis for Real-Time Communication Networks. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Military Communication Conference (MilCom) (1999)Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Gulcu, C., Tsudik, G.: Mixing E-mail with BABEL. In: Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, pp. 2–16 (1996)Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Pfitzmann, A., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: Isdn-mixes: Untraceable communication with very small bandwidth overhead. In: GI/ITG Conference: Communication in Distributed Systems, pp. 451–463 (1991)Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Kung, H.T., Bradner, S., Tan, K.S.: An IP-Layer Anonymizing Infrastructure. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Military Communication Conference (MilCom) (2002)Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Kung, H.T., Cheng, C., Tan, K.S., Bradner, S.: Design and Analysis of an IP-Layer Anonymizing Infrastructure. In: Proceedings of the 3rd DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition (DISCEX), pp. 62–75 (2003)Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Goldschlag, D., Reed, M., Syverson, P.: Onion routing for anonymous and private internet connections. Communications of the ACM (CACM) 42, 39–41 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. 26.
    Syverson, P.F., Goldschlag, D.M., Reed, M.: Anonymous connections and onion routing. In: Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (1997)Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Fasbender, A., Kesdogan, D., Kubitz, O.: Variable and Scalable Security: Protection of Location Information in Mobile IP. In: Proceedings of the 46th IEEE Vehicular Technology Society Conference (1996)Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Reiter, M.K., Rubin, A.D.: Crowds: Anonymity for web transactions. ACM Transactions on Information System Security 1 (1998)Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Wright, M., Adler, M., Levine, B., Shields, C.: An analysis of the degradation of anonymity protocols. In: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) (2002)Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    Wright, M., Adler, M., Levine, B., Shields, C.: Defending anonymous communications against passive logging attacks. In: Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2003)Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    Felten, E., Schneider, M.: Timing attacks on web privacy. In: 7th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (2000)Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    Freedman, M.J., Sit, E., Cates, J., Morris, R.: Introducing tarzan, a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer. In: Druschel, P., Kaashoek, M.F., Rowstron, A. (eds.) IPTPS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2429, p. 121. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. 33.
    Jiang, S., Vaidya, N.H., Zhao, W.: Dynamic Mix Method in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Military Communication Conference (MilCom) (2001)Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    Jiang, S., Vaidya, N.H., Zhao, W.: Routing in Packet Radio Networks to Prevent Traffic Analysis. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Information Assurance and Security Workshop (2000)Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    Agrawal, D., Kesdogan, D.: Measuring Anonymity: The Disclosure Attack. IEEE Security & Privacy 1, 27–34 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matt Blaze
    • 1
  • John Ioannidis
    • 1
  • Angelos D. Keromytis
    • 2
  • Tal Malkin
    • 2
  • Avi Rubin
    • 3
  1. 1.AT&T Labs – Research 
  2. 2.CS DepartmentColumbia University 
  3. 3.Johns Hopkins University 

Personalised recommendations