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Is the Verification Problem for Cryptographic Protocols Solved?

  • Giampaolo Bella
  • Cristiano Longo
  • Lawrence C. Paulson
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3364)

Abstract

Experience gained in the formal verification of cryptographic protocols is discussed. Many protocols have been analysed successfully thus far, but emerging goals may raise new challenges. However, existing formal approaches appear to be sufficiently scalable.

Keywords

Smart Card Security Protocol Trusted Third Party Cryptographic Protocol High Order Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Giampaolo Bella
    • 1
    • 2
  • Cristiano Longo
    • 2
  • Lawrence C. Paulson
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer LaboratoryUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK
  2. 2.Dipartimento di Matematica e InformaticaUniversità di CataniaCataniaItaly

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