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Selecting Theories and Recursive Protocols

  • Tomasz Truderung
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3653)

Abstract

Many decidability results are known for non-recursive cryptographic protocols, where the protocol steps can be expressed by simple rewriting rules. Recently, a tree transducer-based model was proposed for recursive protocols, where the protocol steps involve some kind of recursive computations. This model has, however, some limitations: (1) rules are assumed to have linear left-hand sides (so no equality tests can be performed), (2) only finite amount of information can be conveyed from one receive-send action to the next ones. It has been proven that, in this model, relaxing these assumptions leads to undecidability.

In this paper, we propose a formalism, called selecting theories, which extends the standard non-recursive term rewriting model and allows participants to compare and store arbitrary messages. This formalism can model recursive protocols, where participants, in each protocol step, are able to send a number of messages unbounded w.r.t. the size of the protocol. We prove that insecurity of protocols with selecting theories is decidable in nexptime.

Keywords

Atomic Formula Predicate Symbol Cryptographic Protocol Stage Theory Protocol Step 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tomasz Truderung
    • 1
  1. 1.LORIA-INRIA-Lorraine, France, Institute of Computer ScienceWrocław UniversityPoland

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