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Improved Security Analyses for CBC MACs

  • Mihir Bellare
  • Krzysztof Pietrzak
  • Phillip Rogaway
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3621)

Abstract

We present an improved bound on the advantage of any q-query adversary at distinguishing between the CBC MAC over a random n-bit permutation and a random function outputting n bits. The result assumes that no message queried is a prefix of any other, as is the case when all messages to be MACed have the same length. We go on to give an improved analysis of the encrypted CBC MAC, where there is no restriction on queried messages. Letting m be the block length of the longest query, our bounds are about mq 2/2 n for the basic CBC MAC and m o(1) q 2/2 n for the encrypted CBC MAC, improving prior bounds of m 2 q 2/2 n . The new bounds translate into improved guarantees on the probability of forging these MACs.

Keywords

Random Function Structure Graph Message Authentication Code Cryptology ePrint Archive Fast Software Encryption 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mihir Bellare
    • 1
  • Krzysztof Pietrzak
    • 2
  • Phillip Rogaway
    • 3
    • 4
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer Science & EngineeringUniversity of California San DiegoLa JollaUSA
  2. 2.Dept. of Computer ScienceETH ZürichZürichSwitzerland
  3. 3.Dept. of Computer ScienceUniversity of CaliforniaDavisUSA
  4. 4.Dept. of Computer Science, Faculty of ScienceChiang Mai UniversityChiang MaiThailand

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