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Efficient Anonymous Roaming and Its Security Analysis

  • Guomin Yang
  • Duncan S. Wong
  • Xiaotie Deng
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3531)

Abstract

The Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model uses resuable modular components to construct indistinguishability-based key exchange protocols. The reusability of modular protocol components makes it easier to construct and prove new protocols when compared with other provably secure approaches. In this paper, we build an efficient anonymous and authenticated key exchange protocol for roaming by using the modular approach under the CK-model. Our protocol requires only four message flows and uses only standard cryptographic primitives. We also propose a one-pass counter based MT-authenticator and show its security under the assumption that there exists a MAC which is secure against chosen message attack.

Keywords

Authenticated Key Exchange Anonymous Roaming 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guomin Yang
    • 1
  • Duncan S. Wong
    • 1
  • Xiaotie Deng
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceCity University of Hong KongHong KongChina

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