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Optimal Asymmetric Encryption and Signature Paddings

  • Benoît Chevallier-Mames
  • Duong Hieu Phan
  • David Pointcheval
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3531)

Abstract

Strong security notions often introduce strong constraints on the construction of cryptographic schemes: semantic security implies probabilistic encryption, while the resistance to existential forgeries requires redundancy in signature schemes. Some paddings have thus been designed in order to provide these minimal requirements to each of them, in order to achieve secure primitives.

A few years ago, Coron et al. suggested the design of a common construction, a universal padding, which one could apply for both encryption and signature. As a consequence, such a padding has to introduce both randomness and redundancy, which does not lead to an optimal encryption nor an optimal signature.

In this paper, we refine this notion of universal padding, in which a part can be either a random string in order to introduce randomness or a zero-constant string in order to introduce some redundancy. This helps us to build, with a unique padding, optimal encryption and optimal signature: first, in the random-permutation model, and then in the random-oracle model. In both cases, we study the concrete sizes of the parameters, for a specific security level: The former achieves an optimal bandwidth.

Keywords

Signature Scheme Random Oracle Security Parameter Security Notion Decryption Oracle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Benoît Chevallier-Mames
    • 1
    • 2
  • Duong Hieu Phan
    • 2
  • David Pointcheval
    • 2
  1. 1.GemplusFrance
  2. 2.ENSParisFrance

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