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Digital Signatures Do Not Guarantee Exclusive Ownership

  • Thomas Pornin
  • Julien P. Stern
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3531)

Abstract

Digital signature systems provide a way to transfer trust from the public key to the signed data; this is used extensively within PKIs. However, some applications need a transfer of trust in the other direction, from the signed data to the public key. Such a transfer is cryptographically robust only if the signature scheme has a property which we name exclusive ownership. In this article, we show that the usual signature algorithms (such as RSA[3] and DSS[4]) do not have that property. Moreover, we describe several constructs which may be used to transform a signature scheme into another signature scheme which provides exclusive ownership.

Keywords

Hash Function Signature Scheme Random Oracle Discrete Logarithm Valid Signature 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Pornin
    • 1
  • Julien P. Stern
    • 1
  1. 1.Cryptolog InternationalParisFrance

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