A Formal Analysis of Fairness and Non-repudiation in the RSA-CEGD Protocol
Recently, Nenadić et al. (2004) proposed the RSA-CEGD protocol for certified delivery of e-goods. This is a relatively complex scheme based on verifiable and recoverable encrypted signatures (VRES) to guarantee properties such as strong fairness and non-repudiation, among others. In this paper, we illustrate how an extended logic of beliefs can be helpful to analyze in a formal manner these security properties. This approach requires the previous definition of some novel constructions to deal with evidences exchanged by parties during the protocol execution. The study performed within this framework reveals the lack of non-repudiation in RSA-CEGD and points out some other weaknesses.
KeywordsSecurity Protocol Security Property Exchange Protocol Fair Exchange Versus Erifications
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Alcaide, A., Estévez, J.M.: Formal Analysis of the RSA-CEGD protocol. Technical Report (January 2005)Google Scholar
- 3.Denning, D.E.: The Limits of Formal Security Models. National Computer Systems Security Award Aceptance Speech (October 1999), Available online at http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/award.html
- 6.Kailar, R.: Reasoning about accountability in protocols for electronic commerce. In: Proc. IEEE Symp. Security and Privacy, pp. 236–250. IEEE Computer Security Press, Los Alamitos (1995)Google Scholar
- 10.Kremer, S., Raskin, J.F.: A game approach to the verification of exchange protocols - application to non-repudiation protocols. In: Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS 2000) (July 2000)Google Scholar
- 11.Kremer, S., Raskin, J.F.: A Game-Based Verification of Non-Repudiation and Fair Exchange Protocols. Journal of Computer Security 11(13), 399–429 (2003)Google Scholar
- 14.Schneider, S.: Formal Analysis of a Non-repudiation Protocol. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (1998)Google Scholar
- 16.Zhou, J., Gollman, D.: A fair non-repudiation protocol. In: Proc. 1996 Symp. on Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, USA, pp. 55–61. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (1996)Google Scholar
- 17.Zhou, J., Gollman, D.: Towards verification of non-repudiation protocols. In: Proc. 1998 Intl. Refinement Workshop and Formal Methods Pacific, pp. 370–380 (1998)Google Scholar