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A Formal Analysis of Fairness and Non-repudiation in the RSA-CEGD Protocol

  • Almudena Alcaide
  • Juan M. Estévez-Tapiador
  • Antonio Izquierdo
  • José M. Sierra
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3483)

Abstract

Recently, Nenadić et al. (2004) proposed the RSA-CEGD protocol for certified delivery of e-goods. This is a relatively complex scheme based on verifiable and recoverable encrypted signatures (VRES) to guarantee properties such as strong fairness and non-repudiation, among others. In this paper, we illustrate how an extended logic of beliefs can be helpful to analyze in a formal manner these security properties. This approach requires the previous definition of some novel constructions to deal with evidences exchanged by parties during the protocol execution. The study performed within this framework reveals the lack of non-repudiation in RSA-CEGD and points out some other weaknesses.

Keywords

Security Protocol Security Property Exchange Protocol Fair Exchange Versus Erifications 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Almudena Alcaide
    • 1
  • Juan M. Estévez-Tapiador
    • 1
  • Antonio Izquierdo
    • 1
  • José M. Sierra
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceCarlos III University of MadridLeganés, MadridSpain

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