Qualitative analysis of dependability argument structure

  • Mark A. Sujan
  • Shamus P. Smith
  • Michael D. Harrison


Argument Structure Flight Level Safety Case Support Pattern Diverse Evidence 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark A. Sujan
    • 1
  • Shamus P. Smith
    • 2
  • Michael D. Harrison
    • 3
  1. 1.University of YorkYork
  2. 2.University of DurhamDurham
  3. 3.University of Newcastle upon TyneNewcastle upon Tyne

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