Integrating Human Factors in the Design of Safety Critical Systems

A barrier based approach
  • Bastiaan A. Schupp
  • Shamus P. Smith
  • Peter C. Wright
  • Louis H. J. Goossens
Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 152)


Human factors contribute to risk in safety critical systems. However, current approaches to integrating human factors issues in the development of safety critical systems appear not fully sufficient. In this paper a new approach is proposed based on a technique from chemical engineering risk analysis called Safety Modelling Language (SML). SML provides a way to conceptually design risk reduction based on barriers. The approach further helps to design and implement safety barriers. The approach is demonstrated using a case in which human factors play an important role from the medical domain.


Human Factors Design Safety Barriers Methods Risk Risk Reduction 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bastiaan A. Schupp
    • 1
  • Shamus P. Smith
    • 1
  • Peter C. Wright
    • 1
  • Louis H. J. Goossens
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of YorkHeslingtonUK
  2. 2.Department of Technology, Policy and Management, Safety Science GroupDelft University of TechnologyBX Delftthe Netherlands

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