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CONTEXT OF DISCOVERY VERSUS CONTEXT OF JUSTIFICATION AND THOMAS KUHN

  • PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE
Part of the Archimedes book series (ARIM, volume 14)

Abstract

Let me begin with a convention. I will refer to the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification as “the DJ distinction” (where I may note, for potentially misled younger readers, that this “DJ” has nothing to do with the music business). This paper is based on an older paper of mine (Hoyningen-Huene 1987). In the present paper, I will first recapitulate some of the topics of the older paper, and will contribute further considerations. Subsequently, I will discuss Thomas Kuhn’s ideas about justification in science. Thus will be clarified, in which sense precisely Kuhn opposed the DJ distinction. This is noteworthy, because in the 1960s and 1970s, many philosophers concluded from Kuhn’s opposition to the context distinction that he just did not understand what it was all about (and they inferred from this that he was just too uneducated as a philosopher to be taken seriously).

Keywords

Decision Procedure Theory Choice Epistemic Norm Logical Empiricism Basic Sentence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer 2006

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  • PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE

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