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Is There Downward Causation in Chemistry?

  • Robin Findlay Hendry
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 242)

Keywords

Physical Theory Dependence Relation Special Science Mental Causation Downward Causation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robin Findlay Hendry
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of DurhamDurhamUK

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