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Why Are (Most) Laws of Nature Mathematical?

  • Mauro Dorato
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 4)

Keywords

Physical System Theoretical Term Theoretical Entity Nature Mathematical Supervenience Thesis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mauro Dorato

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