Game of Timing in Gas Pipeline Projects Competition: Simulation Software and Generalized Equilibrium Solutions

  • Arkadii Kryazhimskii
  • Oleg Nikonov
  • Yaroslav Minullin
Part of the Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games book series (AISDG, volume 8)


Many models of energy market development and decision-making processes take into account the competition between energy suppliers, and the theory of games is an appropriate tool to study these problems.

This chapter is devoted to numerical analysis and modification of the game-theoretical gas market model developed by Klaassen, Kryazhimskii, and Tarasyev. We describe a software G-TIME elaborated for this purpose and the results of a simulation and sensitivity analysis on the data of the Turkish gas market. The last section deals with the notion of a generalized Nash equilibrium, which seems to be useful for taking risk and uncertainty into account. The research is based on approaches and methods developed in [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].


Nash Equilibrium Gross Domestic Product Nash Equilibrium Point Generalize Nash Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium Solution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Birkhäuser Boston 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arkadii Kryazhimskii
    • 1
  • Oleg Nikonov
    • 2
  • Yaroslav Minullin
    • 3
  1. 1.Moscow State UniversityRussia
  2. 2.Urals State Technical UniversityRussia
  3. 3.International Institute for Applied Systems AnalysisLaxenburgAustria

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