Game of Timing in Gas Pipeline Projects Competition: Simulation Software and Generalized Equilibrium Solutions
Many models of energy market development and decision-making processes take into account the competition between energy suppliers, and the theory of games is an appropriate tool to study these problems.
This chapter is devoted to numerical analysis and modification of the game-theoretical gas market model developed by Klaassen, Kryazhimskii, and Tarasyev. We describe a software G-TIME elaborated for this purpose and the results of a simulation and sensitivity analysis on the data of the Turkish gas market. The last section deals with the notion of a generalized Nash equilibrium, which seems to be useful for taking risk and uncertainty into account. The research is based on approaches and methods developed in [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Gross Domestic Product Nash Equilibrium Point Generalize Nash Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium Solution
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Arrow K.J. and Kurz M., Public Investment, the Rate of Return and Optimal Fiscal Policy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1970.Google Scholar
- Hofbauer J. and Sigmund K., The Theory of Evolution and Dynamic Systems, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988.Google Scholar
- Intriligator M., Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1971.Google Scholar
- Klaassen G., Roehrl R.A. and Tarasyev A.M., The Great Caspian Pipeline Game, Proc. IIASA Workshops, May 2001.Google Scholar