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Authenticated Query Flooding in Sensor Networks

  • Zinaida Benenson
  • Felix C. Freiling
  • Ernest Hammerschmidt
  • Stefan Lucks
  • Lexi Pimenidis
Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 201)

Abstract

We propose a novel mechanism for authentication of queries in a sensor network in case these queries are flooded. In our protocol, the base station appends an authenticator to every query, such that each sensor can verify with certain probability that the query is sent by the base station. Implicit cooperation between sensor nodes during the flooding process ensures that legitimate queries propagate quickly in the network, whereas the propagation of illegitimate queries is limited to only a small part of the network.

Keywords

Sensor Network Sensor Node Wireless Sensor Network Hash Function Node Density 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Federation for Information Processing 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zinaida Benenson
    • 1
  • Felix C. Freiling
    • 2
  • Ernest Hammerschmidt
    • 1
  • Stefan Lucks
    • 2
  • Lexi Pimenidis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceRWTH Aachen UniversityGermany
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of MannheimGermany

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