Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first century world

  • Michael C. Munger


Voting procedures nowadays are anachronistic on two counts: the technology of recording and counting votes often is outmoded and too much is expected from the mechanisms of democratic choice. Even if votes always and everywhere were counted perfectly, election outcomes would still be arbitrary since no collective choice process can divine the “general will”. The crucial line in any state is the one dividing private decisions from collective decisions. Democracy is part of the package for nations freeing themselves from totalitarianism’s grip, but it may be the last, rather than the first thing that should be added to the mix.


Public Choice Majority Rule Vote Procedure Public Decision Electoral College 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael C. Munger
    • 1
  1. 1.Departments of Political Science and EconomicsDuke UniversityDurhamUSA

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