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Pattern-Matching Spi-Calculus

  • Christian Haack
  • Alan Jeffrey
Conference paper
Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 173)

Abstract

Cryptographic protocols often make use of nested cryptographic primitives, for example signed message digests, or encrypted signed messages. Gordon and Jeffrey's prior work on types for authenticity did not allow for such nested cryptography. In this work, we present the pattern-matching spi-calculus, which is an obvious extension of the spi-calculus to include pattern-matching as primitive. The novelty of the language is in the accompanying type system, which uses the same language of patterns to describe complex data dependencies which cannot be described using prior type systems. We show that any appropriately typed process is guaranteed to satisfy a strong robust safety property.

Keywords

Type System Authentication Protocol Security Protocol Cryptographic Protocol Type Annotation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Federation for Information Processing 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christian Haack
    • 1
  • Alan Jeffrey
    • 2
  1. 1.DePaul UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Bell LabsLucent Technologies and DePaul UniversityUSA

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