Formal Analysis of a Fair Payment Protocol

  • Jan Cederquist
  • Muhammad Torabi Dashti
Conference paper
Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 173)

Abstract

We formally specify a payment protocol described in [Vogt et al., 2001]. This protocol is intended for fair exchange of time-sensitive data. Here the μCRL language is used to formalize the protocol. Fair exchange properties are expressed in the regular alternation-free μ-calculus. These properties are then verified using the finite state model checker from the CADP toolset. Proving fairness without resilient communication channels is impossible. We use the Dolev-Yao intruder, but since the conventional Dolev-Yao intruder violates this assumption, it is forced to comply to the resilient communication channel assumption.

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Copyright information

© International Federation for Information Processing 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan Cederquist
    • 1
  • Muhammad Torabi Dashti
    • 1
  1. 1.CWIAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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