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Extended Description Techniques for Security Engineering

  • Guido Wimmel
  • Alexander Wisspeintner
Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 65)

Abstract

There is a strong demand for techniques to aid development and modelling of security critical systems. Based on general security evaluation criteria, we show how to extend the system structure diagrams of the CASE tool AUTO FOCUS (which are related to UML-RT collaboration diagrams) to allow modelling of security critical systems, in particular concerning components and channels. Both high-level and low-level models of systems are supported, and the notion of security patterns is introduced to provide generic solutions for security requirements. We explain our approach on the example of an electronic purse card system.

Keywords

Security Engineering Graphical Description Techniques Software Engineering Requirements Engineering Security Properties Design Patterns Security Patterns Formal Methods CASE AutoFocus UML-RT 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guido Wimmel
    • 1
  • Alexander Wisspeintner
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für InformatikTechnische Universität MünchenMünchenGermany

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