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Abstract

After the previous considerations based on the economic analysis of law, the backbone of the theoretical framework of this work is substantiated in the theory submitted by Scott Shapiro in his book Legality (2011) where he adopts Michael Bratman ’s suggestion that we are all “planning agents .”

“We are all planning creatures” (Bratman 2001, p. 203).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 120).

  2. 2.

    Lessig (1998, pp. 661–691).

  3. 3.

    Michael Bratman is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Stanford University. His work focuses on moral philosophy and the philosophy of action including many issues related to human agency and practical reason.

  4. 4.

    Bratman (1984, pp. 375–405).

  5. 5.

    See Audi (1973, pp. 387-403), Beardsley (1978), Churchland (1970, pp. 214–236).

  6. 6.

    Bratman (1984, pp. 375–376).

  7. 7.

    Bratman (1984, pp. 379–380).

  8. 8.

    Velleman (1991, p. 277).

  9. 9.

    Bratman (1999, pp. 1–2).

  10. 10.

    Bratman (1999, pp. 2–3).

  11. 11.

    Canale (2013, p. 19).

  12. 12.

    Alonso (2008, p. 78).

  13. 13.

    Bratman (1999, p. 3).

  14. 14.

    O’Hagan (2001, p. 393).

  15. 15.

    Bratman (1999, p. 3).

  16. 16.

    Mohan (1990, p. 89).

  17. 17.

    See Fischer (2005, p. 217) (ed).

  18. 18.

    Mohan (1990, pp. 89–90).

  19. 19.

    Bratman (1999, p. 3).

  20. 20.

    O’Hagan (2001, p. 393).

  21. 21.

    Tuomela (2014).

  22. 22.

    Bratman (2014a).

  23. 23.

    Bratman (2014a), Westerlund (2015, pp. 822–836).

  24. 24.

    Bratman (2013, 2014b).

  25. 25.

    Bratman (1992, pp. 327–331).

  26. 26.

    See, generally, Searle (1983, 1995).

  27. 27.

    See, generally, Gilbert (2006).

  28. 28.

    Searle (2010, pp. 46–47), Searle (1990, pp. 401–416).

  29. 29.

    Bratman (2013, 2014b).

  30. 30.

    Bratman (2013, 2014a, b).

  31. 31.

    Gilbert (1990, pp. 1–14).

  32. 32.

    If you fail to give me what I have a right to through your promise, I have the standing, as your promise, to rebuke you on that account. Similarly, should you threaten to break your promise, I have the standing, as your promise, to command or insist that you act as promised, and thus pressure you to perform.” The work of Margaret Gilbert , see Owens (2012, p. 50).

  33. 33.

    Gilbert (2007, pp. 31–49), Gilbert (2000), But see Sheeney (2002, pp. 377–394).

  34. 34.

    Gilbert (2007, pp. 31–49).

  35. 35.

    Bratman (2013, 2014b).

  36. 36.

    Bratman (2013, 2014b).

  37. 37.

    See, generally, Wend (1975) (ed).

  38. 38.

    Bratman (2014a, pp. 10–11).

  39. 39.

    Bratman (2014a, p. 11).

  40. 40.

    Bratman (2014a, p. 15).

  41. 41.

    Bratman (2013, 2014a).

  42. 42.

    Bratman (2013, 2014b).

  43. 43.

    Bratman (2013, 2014b).

  44. 44.

    Bratman (2013, 2014b).

  45. 45.

    According to Bratman: “The limitation is that my focus will be primarily on the shared intentional activities of small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric authority relations within those groups, and in which the individuals who are participants remain constant over time.” See Bratman (2014a, p. 7).

  46. 46.

    Bratman (2014a, p. 8).

  47. 47.

    See, generally, Coleman (1998).

  48. 48.

    Coleman (1988, 1998, pp. 95–120).

  49. 49.

    See, generally, Hart (1997).

  50. 50.

    See, generally, Dworkin (1986).

  51. 51.

    See, generally, Austin (1832, 1869).

  52. 52.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 12–13).

  53. 53.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 118 et seq).

  54. 54.

    Stone (2011, p. 7). Stone actually believes that Plan Theory does not pertain only to the field of analytical legal positivism , but rather extends and even thrives in the context of natural law. For a full recount of positivism and the separation of law and morals, see Hart (1958, pp. 593–629).

  55. 55.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 195).

  56. 56.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 205, 179 et seq).

  57. 57.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 168).

  58. 58.

    See, generally, Canale (2013, pp. 1–126).

  59. 59.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 309).

  60. 60.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 124, 140).

  61. 61.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 139, 200, 275).

  62. 62.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 170–173, 213–214, 217, 309, 312, 337–339, 348).

  63. 63.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 134).

  64. 64.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 118 et seq).

  65. 65.

    Pino (2013, pp. 187–188).

  66. 66.

    Ferrer Beltran and Ratti (2013, p. 182).

  67. 67.

    See, generally, Easterbrook (1994, pp. 61–70).

  68. 68.

    See, generally, Murray, Methods of Interpretation: Comparative Law Method, Report of Mr. Justice John Murray, President of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice of Ireland, Actes du colloque pour le cinquantiéme anniversaire des Traité de Rome, pp. 39–47.

  69. 69.

    Pino (2013), Chap. 9 with further references.

  70. 70.

    Pino (2013), Chap. 9 with further references, Shapiro (2011, pp. 335 et seq).

  71. 71.

    Dworkin (1986, p. 380).

  72. 72.

    Dworkin (1986, p. 308).

  73. 73.

    Dworkin (1982, p. 182, 1996a, pp. 29–46), Levinson and Mailloux (1991, p. 271) (eds).

  74. 74.

    Samuel (2013, p. 102).

  75. 75.

    Bontekoe (2004, p. 24).

  76. 76.

    Dworkin suggested that “judges are like authors jointly creating a chain novel in which each writes a chapter that makes sense as part of the story as a whole.” For an in-depth rundown see Dworkin (1996b, p. 10). For a better treatment see also Wacks (2015, p. 147, 2014, p. 59), Culver (1999, p. 183) (ed), Samuel (2014, p. 183), Berns (1993, p. 149), Darian-Smith (2013, pp. 136–137).

  77. 77.

    Dworkin (1975, pp. 1057–1109).

  78. 78.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 307).

  79. 79.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 307).

  80. 80.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 278).

  81. 81.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 282–307).

  82. 82.

    Shapiro (2011, pp. 282–307).

  83. 83.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 310).

  84. 84.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 348).

  85. 85.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 348).

  86. 86.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 311).

  87. 87.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 311).

  88. 88.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 311).

  89. 89.

    See, generally, Raz (1999).

  90. 90.

    See, generally, Shiner (2005, p. 57).

  91. 91.

    Pino (2013, p. 191).

  92. 92.

    Pino (2013, p. 134).

  93. 93.

    Pino (2013, p. 139).

  94. 94.

    Howells (2006, pp. 715–728).

  95. 95.

    Stewart and Hyysalo (2008, pp. 295–325).

  96. 96.

    Hallersted (2013, p. 35).

  97. 97.

    Osorio et al. (2012, p. 201), Antikainen (2011, p. 189).

  98. 98.

    Nauwelaers (2011, p. 474).

  99. 99.

    Hallersted (2013, p. 35).

  100. 100.

    Hallersted (2013, p. 36).

  101. 101.

    Agogue et al. (2012, pp. 1–31).

  102. 102.

    Hallersted (2013, pp. 36–37).

  103. 103.

    Dalziel and Parjanen (2012, p. 120).

  104. 104.

    See Stewart and Hyysalo (2008, pp. 295–325).

  105. 105.

    I will expound these thoughts in Chap. 7, which focuses on Behavioral Law and Economics and Nudge Theory .

  106. 106.

    Bridgeman (2009, p. 343).

  107. 107.

    Shapiro (2011, p. 41).

  108. 108.

    Lessig (2006, pp. 120–137), Appendix, pp. 340–345.

  109. 109.

    Lessig (2004, pp. 121–173).

  110. 110.

    Lessig (2006, p. 123).

  111. 111.

    Lessig (2006, pp. 314–340).

  112. 112.

    Lessig (2004, p. 122).

  113. 113.

    Lessig (2006, p. 341).

  114. 114.

    Boudriga (2009, pp. 21–23); see also, generally, Zwicky et al. (2000).

  115. 115.

    Lessig (2004, pp. 112–123).

  116. 116.

    Lessig (2006, p. 81).

  117. 117.

    Lessig (2006, p. 81).

  118. 118.

    Lessig (2006, pp. 342–343), see also, generally, Reidenberg (1998, pp. 553–593).

  119. 119.

    Lessig (2002, p. 121), Lessig (1999, pp. 501–546).

  120. 120.

    See Hustinx (2010, pp. 253–255), Cavoukian (2012).

  121. 121.

    Bianco et al. (2008, p. 8).

  122. 122.

    Sharaf and Djemame (2015, pp. 177–191).

  123. 123.

    Schote (2012, p. 63).

  124. 124.

    Sharaf and Djemame (2015, pp. 177–191).

  125. 125.

    Bridgeman (2009, pp. 341–342).

  126. 126.

    Bridgeman (2009, p. 343).

  127. 127.

    Bridgeman (2009, p. 344).

  128. 128.

    Bridgeman (2009, p. 344).

  129. 129.

    Bridgeman (2009, p. 344).

  130. 130.

    See Ilearian, XSD Form Features.

  131. 131.

    See, generally, Corvelle (2013) (ed), Asher (1984).

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    Dr. Marcelo Corrales Compagnucci

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Corrales Compagnucci, M. (2020). Plan-Like Architectures. In: Big Data, Databases and "Ownership" Rights in the Cloud. Perspectives in Law, Business and Innovation. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0349-8_5

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