Abstract
Game theory is a potential tool to model strategic decision-making environments such as terrorism. Modeling the conflicting strategies of the terror groups and the suppressor governments or military, requires decision-making with a comprehensive estimation of the opponent’s behavior. This estimation is crucial for the formulation of efficient counterterror policies. This paper presents a sequential phased solution for military and government bodies to estimate the behavior of terror groups and plan own strategies accordingly by employing a game theoretic concept called subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The proposed solution is composed of five phases of counterterror combat. Each phase consists of iteratively repeated four different processes of action: negotiation, training, elimination, and rehabilitation. Our system recommends selection of an appropriate process by using fair or greedy strategies to maximize suppressor benefits and help ending the terror conflict.
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Srivastava, S.R., Meena, Y.K., Singh, G. (2020). Subgame Perfect Equilibrium-Based Framework for Counterterror Solution Modeling. In: Somani, A.K., Shekhawat, R.S., Mundra, A., Srivastava, S., Verma, V.K. (eds) Smart Systems and IoT: Innovations in Computing. Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies, vol 141. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8406-6_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8406-6_21
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