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Tierra y Libertad: The Social Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America

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Léon Duguit and the Social Obligation Norm of Property

Abstract

Latin America has been caught for centuries in a vicious cycle of land consolidation and land reform; the issue perennially resurfaces since concentration of land and associated resources results in conflict.’ Latin American nations are among the world’s leaders when it comes to the inequality of land distribution. Land reform, or agrarian reform, as it is more commonly referred to in Latin America, is hardly a new phenomenon. As we will show, the need to develop a policy to redress the consolidation of lands by a powerful few and redistribute it in the name of equity and development has its pedigree in Greco-Roman times. In Latin America land reform began in colonial times and has persisted through the present, resisted by elites who benefited from the largesse of the colonial powers. In the colonial era, the land and its resources was all the crown could offer to the conquistadors, colonial elites, and to the church. As a result, the newly independent states immediately entrenched a resistant, wealthy class of latifundistas, or large landed estate holders, setting the stage for a legacy of revolution and attempts at land reform.

This chapter is republished with the kind permission of the Tulane Environmental Law Journal (Thomas T. Ankersen & Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad: The Social Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America, 19 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 69 (2006)). (http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/277).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Mo gives the Gini coefficients a means to measure land inequality for East Asia, Latin America, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and South Africa (Mo 2003, 181). These show that Latin America has the most unfavorable Gini coefficient at 81.3%. For a more precise breakdown of land inequality according to country, see Jazairy et al. (1992, 416–417). The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality in distribution. It ranges from zero to one; the closer to one the value is, the greater the inequality (Thiesenhusen 1995, 9).

  2. 2.

    Land reform has been defined as “a change of the tenancy structure under the guidance of the state and motivated by peasant pressure” (Sanchez 2003, 25). Another generally accepted definition is that land reform means “the redistribution of property or rights in land for the benefit of the landless, tenants and farm labourers” (Adams 1995). Agrarian reform is actually a much broader term than just land reform and includes a plethora of “rural development measures, such as the improvement of farm credit, cooperatives for farm-input supply and marketing, and extension services to facilitate the productive use of the land reallocated” (Adams 1995, 1).

  3. 3.

    Noting that in early Greek societies, the state frequently reapportioned land to take account of changing demographics.

  4. 4.

    While the Roman model of property has often been lauded as the origin in the western tradition of private property, even during Roman times property concepts were already considered issues of public interest (van der Vyver 1985, 134).

  5. 5.

    Even prior to the Roman reforms, the Greeks went through early reform efforts (Tuma 1965, 20–27). However, information from the period is suspect, thus leading to uncertain value of analysis of it except in the most general terms (Tuma 1965, 20). Still, in general terms, Tuma adduces the evidence to indicate that in ancient Greece, economic changes resulted in concentration of land ownership and the serfdom of many formerly free farmers, leading to demands for redistribution of land (Tuma 1965, 21–23). Upon his election as archon, or chief magistrate, in 594 B.C., Solon understood the potential danger of the growing unrest of the serfs (Tuma 1965, 23, 243). Solon thus enacted reforms eliminating existing debts, eliminating serfdom, and eliminating the ability to mortgage one’s freedom to secure a debt (Tuma 1965, 23). These and other reforms of Solon did not substantially affect the distribution of land (Tuma 1965, 24). The failure of Solon’s superficial reforms postponed but did not avoid revolution (Tuma 1965, 25).

  6. 6.

    Approximately from 510 to 367 B.C. (Nicholas 1962, 3).

  7. 7.

    Early additions to the land of Rome were incorporated into the city proper as ager romanus or the public land of Rome (Stephenson 1973, 10). However, after a certain point of growth, land added to Rome was no longer considered a part of the city proper and the ager romanus. Rather newly acquired land became part of the agerpublicusor was given to colonies or the “municipia” (Stephenson 1973, 10).

  8. 8.

    While ager publicus possessed by the patricians theoretically remained public land and the patriarchs held such lands subject to the right of the state to eject them, the fact that the patriarchs had possessio of the property gave them a right over the property superior to that of other private parties (Stephenson 1973, 18). In fact, with regard to other private parties, the rights of one with possessio enabled that person to rent or sell the land like a fee-title owner (Stephenson 1973, 18).

  9. 9.

    Latifindo is the Spanish word for laufundium. Latifundium is a Latin term that literally means a large private estate of real property (Garner 2004, 898). Latifundo has been adopted as a legally significant term of art in Latin American land policy. For example, Venezuela defines a “latifindio” as any uncultivated or idle rural land that exceeds 5000 hectares (Presidential Decree No. 1546, Official Gazette of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, No. 37,323, Article 7, 9 Nov 2001).

  10. 10.

    This book gives the date of the Lex Cassia as 268 B.C. This is a typographical error as the correct date is 468 B.C. See Hornblower and Spawforth 1996, 301.

  11. 11.

    Licinius, despite a hundred years of failures of agrarian reform, pushed this law regardless of its draconian effect on the wealth of the patriarchs. Licinius thought he could unite the rich and poor plebeians by simultaneously presenting another law that would give plebeians increased political representation and power. This was designed to appeal to the rich plebeians that preferred to be “upstarts among the patricians rather than leaders among the plebeians” while the land reform and distribution would appeal to the poor (Stephenson 1973, 37–40). But this strategy failed and the patricians united in opposition. Finally, after many years of continuing political struggles, Licinius managed to get the laws passed (Stephenson 1973, 40–44). The laws, however, failed to have their intended beneficial effects as compliance was virtually nonexistent and the rich got richer as the poor got poorer.

  12. 12.

    Ironically the law seems to reward those who wrongly appropriated ager publicus for private use by granting private ownership to the occupiers of up to 500 iugera of ager publicus (Stephenson 1973, 69–70, 73). An iugerum equals about 2500 square meters (Wieling 1997, 21 n 25).

  13. 13.

    Noting the similarities in socioeconomic and land tenure structures between the Spanish and the Aztecs at the time of the Spanish conquest.

  14. 14.

    Of course “all” here means males of a certain level of social and political status.

  15. 15.

    See infra Part 2.2.2.

  16. 16.

    Noting that the Spanish took advantage of the ayllu structure rather than destroying it.

  17. 17.

    A hacienda is a “large landed estate, an ‘economic entity devoted to supplying local markets with both grain and animal products’” (Mirow 2000, 45).

  18. 18.

    Noting that often large blocks of land would be given in a single grant if a block of land was already organized under the Inca landholding system. Powelson also notes, however, that while land ownership was concentrated, use of the land was not so concentrated (Powelson 1988, 237–238).

  19. 19.

    Hill also notes similarities between Maya and Spanish landholding systems such as the commoners’ usufruct rights being limited to tracts under cultivation (Hill 1992, 50).

  20. 20.

    In the Yucateca.

    Maya region of Southern Mexico the sociopolitical-tenurial unit was known as the cab, but possessed similar characteristics to the chinamit (Ouweneel 2003, 89; citing Restall 1997).

  21. 21.

    Encomiendas and repartimientos resembled another Spanish tradition from the “Reconquest” period in Spain: the adelantado. During the Reconquista, when the Moorish invaders were repelled, those that pushed to the frontier and took control of land were given special fights, the adelantado, often military in nature, to govern that land. The adelantado was a typical medieval institution (Ots Capdequi 1946, 12). This was essentially the same type of reward that would be given to the explorers and conquerors of the New World even though the concept of adelantado had already ceased in Spain (Ots Capdequi 1946, 12; Powelson 1988, 201).

  22. 22.

    Such a divorce between official law and reality was common during the colonial period of Latin America (Ots Capdequi 1946, 6–17; Palomino 1996, 39) (noting that the Spanish were unable to effectively enforce Crown laws protecting the Indians from abuses of the encomenderos).

  23. 23.

    Noting this dynamic in Argentina.

  24. 24.

    Noting that in 1529 Pizarro received authorization to conquer Peru along with authority to allot lands, apportion the indigenous population, and appoint public officials.

  25. 25.

    A repartimiento was not itself title to land, but rather an expectation of title if certain conditions were met (Ots Capdequi 1946, 38–39).

  26. 26.

    Noting that the authority of conquerors to make grants represented the influence of medieval Spanish feudalism that was already extinct in Spain.

  27. 27.

    Encomenderos sought increased political autonomy, for example (Palomino 1996, 39).

  28. 28.

    Noting that settlers pressed the Crown to make encomiendas entailed estates.

  29. 29.

    See, e.g., Hormaeche, § 3 (citing Gibson 1990, 157–188; Busbin [no date]).

  30. 30.

    The Spanish Crown’s concern with the growing power of the latifundio owners echoed the problem of the Roman state more than a millennia before:

    If private individuals acquire very large amounts of land the resulting economic power tends to become transformed into political power. The ownership of land turns into lordship over the land, the owner of the land assumes the functions of the state and becomes a power factor which threatens and limits the authority of the state (Wieling 1997, 22).

  31. 31.

    Noting policy decreeing smaller grants of land to avoid the problems of latifundios.

  32. 32.

    Ots Capdequi (1946), 70 citing Recopilación de las Leyes de los Reinos de Indias 1680 as a codification of the Royal Decree of 1591, Libro IV, titulo XII, Ley 14.

  33. 33.

    Composición was a reaction both to the Crown’s need to begin generating revenue through land alienation rather than giving it away and as a way to address the reality of extensive illegal occupation of land (Sato 1976, 9–10). Thus, the composición envisioned an assessment of lands, payment of a fee for lands not legally belonging to the possessor, and issuance of title (Sato 1976, 9–10; Ots Capdequi 1946, 68–73).

  34. 34.

    See, e.g., Recopilación de las Leyes de los Reinos de Indias 1680 as a codification of the Royal Decree of 1591, Libro IV, titulo XII, Ley 14: “Por haber Nos sucedido enteramente en el señorio de las Indias y pertenecer a nuestro patrimonio y corona real los valdios, suewlos y tierras, que no estuvieren concedidos por los señores Reyes nuestros predecesores, o por Nos, o en nuestro nombre, coviene que toda la tierra, que se posee sin justos y verdaderos títulos, se nos restituya, según y como nos pertenece.” [“Because we are the successors in seigniorality [dominion] over the Indias [New World], the Indias are now part of our patrimony and our Royal Crown owns all vacant areas, soils and land that were not granted by the kings that were our predecessors or in our name or by Us; thus, all lands not held by virtue of a true and just title issued by one of these authorities must be returned to Us as it is our land.” trans: Thomas Ruppert].

  35. 35.

    Corruption often included grants of lands by cabildos or city councils (Sato 1976, 6–8).

  36. 36.

    A hacienda is “large landed estate, an ‘economic entity devoted to supplying local markets with both grain and animal products’” (Mirow 2000, 63).

  37. 37.

    Haciendas were large areas (usually from 1,000 to 100,000 hectares with an average of 3,000 hectares) possessing many different types of agricultural land and activities that an absentee landowner managed and cultivated through hired management (Simpson 1937, at 489–490). Haciendas were often largely self-sufficient and housed a permanent labor force (Simpson 1937, at 489–490). However, both of these attributes have changed as large farms have become more mechanized (Thiesenhusen 1995, 8). One common way for hacendados to ensure that the resident labor supply, usually composed of Indians, remained on the hacienda was to loan money to the laborers or require that they only purchase in script at the equivalent of the company store, thus utilizing laws of debt peonage to bind Indian laborers to the land (Simpson 1937, 16–17, 38–39).

  38. 38.

    In Spanish: utilidad pública.

  39. 39.

    Emphyteusis is “A lease contract for a long period of time, subject to the terms of the lease contract, and generally giving the lessee the full use and benefit of the leased real property, on condition that the lessee does not substantially compromise the real property and alters it only by adding constructions, works or plantings that increase its value in a lasting manner” (Duhaime.org 2018). Furthermore, this perpetual leasehold may be alienated or inherited and may not be taken back by the “owner” as long as the leaseholder pays the rent (Wieling 1997, 20–22).

  40. 40.

    This, of course, does not consider the vast forests of the Brazilian Amazon, which remained beyond the reach of colonization and Brazilian land policy until the second half of the twentieth century.

  41. 41.

    Comparing treatment of private property during colonial times with the Social Function Doctrine of modem times.

  42. 42.

    Noting that the Mexican Revolution was in part a result of the division of society into a miniscule landowning class and a very large landless class.

  43. 43.

    For examples of expressions of the continuum, see Hendrix (1995), 5–6, Boyle (2001), 673 n 74 quoting Montgomery (1984); cf. University of Minnesota (2018).

  44. 44.

    This may describe some, but not all, indigenous conceptions of property. The famous quote “[t]he Earth does not belong to man-man belongs to the Earth,” is often cited as evidence of this indigenous view of land. Interestingly, this quote has been erroneously attributed to Chief Seattle. See, e.g., the entry in Snopes.com at https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/chief-seattle/.

  45. 45.

    “[T]here is no such phenomenon as absolute private ownership of productive property in any known economic system” (UNHCR 1993, 479).

    The prototypical example of “inviolable and sacrosanct” private property rights, Roman law, also had property rights limitations that have not been properly appreciated in many analyses of Roman property law (Alfaro 1980, 11–15; citing Margadant 1956; Bustamante 1967; Petit 1966; de Camps y Arboix 1953, 30; Brenes Cordoba 1963, 24; Planilo 1955, 98).

  46. 46.

    The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization defined “allodial” without reference to taxes or eminent domain powers of the state and whether or not these are compatible with the concept of allodial tenure (UN Food & Agriculture Organisation 2003, 143).

  47. 47.

    For examples of a website promoting allodial title, see, e.g., https://theconstitutionalresourcecenterdotcom.wordpress.com/the-right-of-the-citizens-of-teh-several-states-to-hold-title-in-allodium/. In addition, many websites advertise services to help property owners in the United States secure “allodial” title to land. See, e.g., http://www.freedomforallseasons.org/AllodialLandPatentReports/DO%20YOU%20HAVE%20ALLODIAL%20TITLE%20ON%20YOUR%20PROPERTY_html.htm.

  48. 48.

    Charles E Curry Co v Goodman, 737 P2d 963, 965 (Okla Civ App, 1987) (finding without merit a contention of “allodial freehold” immunizing a property from foreclosure); County of Dane v Every, 131 Wis 2d 592 (Wis App, 1986) (finding that the Wisconsin Constitution’s declaration of all land in the state “allodial” does not eliminate the state’s authority to impose property taxes); Dunn County v Svee, 143 Wis 2d 209 (Wisc 1988).

  49. 49.

    Defining allodial and allodium.

  50. 50.

    Regalía means “royal privilege” (American Heritage Spanish Dictionary 2005), or “a good of the Crown” (Ots Capdequi 1946, 21). The name was also given to a concession from the Crown (Godreau and Giusti 1993, 407). The concept of Regalia came from feudal times and stated that, upon conquest of an area by the Crown, all land belonged to the Crown (Molintas 2004, 290; Ots Capdequi 1946, 21, 27).

  51. 51.

    Interestingly, while the United States is seen as a prototypical example of the “property-rights” model, the country from which the U.S. states fought for its independence, England, seemed conflicted on which model it followed in the Colonies. England sometimes advocated the “property-rights” model ideal that allowed settlers to claim land for themselves without an express grant from the state; on other occasions, the state insisted on the regalia model and ultimate ownership of all lands always resting in the Crown, thus leading to the requirement of an express grant to have a valid title claim (McNeil 2002, 481–484; Treanor 1985, 697). Furthermore, even the United States has utilized the regalía concept of land in U.S. colonial endeavours (Molintas 2004, 284).

  52. 52.

    See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.

  53. 53.

    Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico) Article 27: “La propiedad de las tierras y aguas comprendidas dentro de los limites del territorio nacional, corresponde originariamente a la Nación, la cúal ha tenido y tiene el derecho de transmitir el dominio de ellas a los particulares, constituyendo la propiedad privada.” [“The land and waters within the national boundaries belong originally to the Nation, which has and continues to have the right to transmit ownership to individuals, thus constituting private property” trans: Thomas Ruppert]. The Constitution of Bolivia presents another example: “Las tierras son del dominio originario de la Nación y corresponde al Estado la distribución, reagrupamiento y redistribución de la propiedad agraria conforme a las necesidades económico-sociales y de desarrollo rural.” [“Property is under the dominion of the Nation and the state holds the responsibility for distribution and redistribution of agricultural property according to socio-economic and rural development needs.” trans: Thomas Ruppert] (Constitution of Bolivia (Bolivia) Article165).

  54. 54.

    See, e.g., South Carolina Constitution Article XIV § 3: “The people of the State are declared to possess the ultimate property in and to all lands within the jurisdiction of the State; and all lands the title to which shall fail from defect of heirs shall revert or escheat to the people”; Wisconsin Constitution Article9 § 3: “The people of the state, in their right of sovereignty, are declared to possess the ultimate property in and to all lands within the jurisdiction of the state; and all lands the title to which shall fail from a defect of heirs shall revert or escheat to the people.”.

  55. 55.

    Noting that the guarantees of individual rights against state action make sense in the context of the late eighteenth—and early nineteenth-century struggle against the plenary political power of nobles, lords, aristocracy, and ecclesiastic authorities.

  56. 56.

    “I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in [the state of nature], and remain so, till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society” (Locke 1690, Chap. II § 15).

  57. 57.

    Jean Jacques Rousseau agreed that labor was a critical part of establishing property rights, at least in the absence of anyone with legal title (Rousseau 1762, bk 1, Chap. 9).

  58. 58.

    “The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting” (Locke 1690, Chap. IX, § 124).

  59. 59.

    Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789, Article 17.

  60. 60.

    Section 544 of the French Civil Code reads: “Property is the right of enjoying and disposing of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by the laws or statutes.”.

  61. 61.

    United States Constitution Article V.

  62. 62.

    The conception of private, individual property as an inviolable natural law right was not, even as far back as the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, unchallenged by opponents. For example, the philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau opined that all real property ultimately resided in the state since, as part of the social contract, each person delivered his or her person and goods to the state; the state then protects the rights of the possessors of property as depositories of the public good (Rousseau 1762, bk 1 Chap. 9). John Stuart Mill, in regard to property, said that “no exclusive right should be permitted in any individual, which cannot be shown to be productive of positive good” (West 2003, 35 quoting Mills JS). Mills and other utilitarian philosophers viewed property as something created and “permitted” by the state. Closer to home, Henry George during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century argued:

    In the very nature of things, land cannot rightfully be made individual property. This principle is absolute. The title of a peasant proprietor deserves no more respect than the title of a great territorial noble. No sovereign political power, no compact or agreement, even though consented to by the whole population of the globe, can give to an individual a valid title to the exclusive ownership of a square inch of soil. The earth is an entailed estate—entailed upon all the generations of the children of men, by a deed written in the constitution of Nature, a deed that no human proceedings can bar, and no proscription determine (George 1884, Chap. VIII, 45).

    George even said that “private property in land … never arises from the natural perceptions of men, but springs historically from usurpation and robbery” (George 1884, Chap. IX, 50).

  63. 63.

    Many commentators have noted that the 1804 Napoleonic Code represented the pinnacle of individualism and protection of those with property while ignoring the needs of the larger society and those without property (Garea 1997, 168; Alfaro 1980, 5).

  64. 64.

    Schneiderman (2000, 92); Sentencia C-204/01 § VII.16 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2001).

  65. 65.

    The concept of social function is not unique to Spain or Latin America. Germany has a similar concept in its constitution and Italy has the idea of social concept in its civil code (Hendrix 1995, 5, 8 n 41). In Indonesia, “social function” is rooted in the constitution and the belief that “[l]and is seen as the fundamental provider of food, shelter and clothing-rights that are guaranteed in the constitution and national philosophy” (Thorburn 2004). Several other European nations and Japan also recognize the Social Function Doctrine.

  66. 66.

    While some might initially feel that the Social Function Doctrine represents the demise of private property or a “slippery slope” towards its destruction, many have advocated the Social Function Doctrine specifically as a way to protect private property from destruction. Among these count the Catholic Church (Alfaro 1980, 34, 39, 41); and Leon Duguit (Alfaro 1980, 55). In fact, the U.S-led Alliance for Progress in the 1960s in Latin America actively promoted agrarian reform in Latin American countries as a way to deal with social inequalities that had great potential to spawn expanded communism in Latin America; domestic enabling legislation in many Latin American countries that enabled such U.S.-supported land reform to occur included the Social Function Doctrine as a foundational justification for the land reform (Alfaro 1980, 85–88).

  67. 67.

    These include Spain (1931); Weimar Republic (1919); Chile (1925), and Colombia (1936) (Marinkovic et al. 2004).

  68. 68.

    United States Constitution, amend V.

  69. 69.

    See, e.g., Haw. Housing Auth. v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 241 (1984) (stating that “where [expropriation] is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.” A “public purpose” in U.S. jurisprudence regarding expropriations may include the government taking land from a private party for use by another private party as long as the primary motive behind the expropriation is the benefit to the public). See, e.g., Kelo v City of New London, 843 A 2d 500, 522 (Conn 2004) (noting that “public use” refers to the advantage gained by the public rather than strictly referring to public possession, use, or occupation and that economic development alone may serve as a sufficient “public purpose” as that term is used in the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution). Upon appeal of Kelo, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the broadest possible interpretation of “public use” (Kelo v City of New London, 125 S Ct 2655, 2669 (2005)).

  70. 70.

    Constitution of Argentina (Argentina), Article 17; Constitution of Bolivia (Bolivia), Article 22; Constitution of Chile (Chile), Article 19(24); Constitution of Costa Rica (Costa Rica), Article 45. The question of what qualifies as “public use” is very broad; this breadth may be part of the reason that few international claims have focused on this aspect of expropriations (Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 1987, § 712).

  71. 71.

    See, e.g., Constitution of Colombia (Colombia), Article 58; Constitution of Guatemala (Guatemala), Article 40; Constitution of El Salvador (El Salvador), Article 106.

  72. 72.

    The Constitution of Bolivia (Bolivia), Article 7 states that “[t]oda persona tiene los siguientes derechos fundamentales, conforme a las leyes que reglamenten su ejercicio: … i) A la propiedad privada, individual y colectivamente, siempre que cumpla una función social” [“Each person has the following fundamental rights according to the laws that regulate their exercise …. i) to private property, either individual or collective, as long as the property serves a social fumction.” trans: Thomas Ruppert]. Article 22 further states that “[s]e garantiza la propiedad privada siempre que el uso que se haga de ella no sea perjudicial al interés colectivo … . II. La expropiacion se impone por causa de utilidad pública o cuando la propiedad no cumple una función social.” [“Private property is guaranteed as long as its use does not harm the collective interest … . II. Expropriation may occur for reasons of public utility or when property fails to serve a social function.” trans: Thomas Ruppert].

  73. 73.

    Haw. Housing Auth. v Midkiff, 467 US 229 (1984) (Upholding constitutionality of a Hawaii law that takes title from lessors and transfers it to lessees as a way to decrease severe land ownership concentration that was deemed detrimental to the public).

  74. 74.

    Constitution of Brazil (Brazil), Article 184; cf Constitution of Colombia (Colombia), Article 64 : “Es deber del Estado promover el acceso progresivo a la propiedad de la tierra de los trabajadores agrarios, en forma individual o asociativa … con el fin de mejorar el ingreso y calidad de vida de los campesinos.” [It is an obligation of the State to promote progressive access to land for agricultural workers, either individually or in association … with the goal of improving the income and quality of life of the peasants.” trans: Thomas Ruppert].

  75. 75.

    See, e.g., Constitution of Argentina (Argentina), Article 38 (social function was subsequently eliminated in 1956 with the readoption of the 1853 constitution with reforms); Constitution of Bolivia (Bolivia), Articles 7.1, 22, 165 (doctrine originally introduced in article 17 of the 1938 constitution); Constitution of Brazil (Brazil), Article 5(0)XXIII; Constitution of Ecuador (Ecuador), Article 30 (added in article 183 of the 1946 constitution); Constitution of Chile (Chile), Article 19(24); Constitution of El Salvador (El Salvador), Article 103 (added in article 137 of the 1950 constitution); Constitution of the Republic of Honduras (Republic of Honduras), Article 103 (social function added in article 157 of the 1957 constitution); Constitution of Nicaragua (1939) (Nicaragua), Article 5 (added in article 65 of the 1939 constitution); Constitution of Panama (Panama), Article 45 (social function doctrine first added in 1947 constitution, article 47); Constitution of Suriname (Suriname), Article 34; Constitution of Venezuela (Venezuela), Article 115 (implicit) (including phrase “social function” explicitly in article 65 of the 1947 constitution but removing the phrase with adoption of the 1999 constitution).

  76. 76.

    Peru, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Mexico lack explicit reference to the doctrine in their constitutions. Peru’s 1979 constitution previously referred to property’s social function (Palomino 1996, 61). The current Peruvian constitution does not explicitly impose positive obligations on property owners; owners only need utilize land in accordance with law (Constitution of Peru (1993) (Peru), Article 70). But see sources cited supra notes 141–145 and in text (discussing current developments in Peru). Guatemala, which has some of the greatest land distribution inequity in the world, removed the phrase “social function” from its 1998 post civil war constitution, but continues to advocate the Doctrine in human rights sectors. Article 39 of the 1991 Constitution of Guatemala provides: “Se garantiza la propiedad privada como un derecho inherente a la persona humana, toda persona puede disponer libremente de sus bienes de acuerdo con la ley. El Estado garantiza el ejercicio de este derecho y deberá crear las condiciones que faciliten al propietario el uso y disfrute de sus bienes, de manera que se alcance el progreso individual y el desarrollo nacional en beneficio de todos los guatemaltecos.” [“Private property is guaranteed as an inherent right of the person, and every person may freely make use of such property within the confines of the law. The State guarantees the exercise of this right and should create conditions that facilitate the ability of property owners to use and enjoy their property in a manner that allows for individual growth and national development in the interest of all Guatemalans.” trans: Thomas Ruppert].

    [A]unque el término función social fue eliminado en el articulo 39 de nuestra Constitución de Derecho, ese término, y el concepto que abarca, esta vigente en nuestra Legislación por encima de dicha norma constitucional. [“Although the term social function has been eliminated from article 39 of our constitution, this term and the concept it represents continue to be effective in our legislation.” trans: Thomas Ruppert] (Pronunciamiento del Procurador Sobre el Derecho Humano a la Propiedad Privada 1992, 36).

    Costa Rica also does not refer to “social function” in its constitution, but nonetheless explicitly added “social function” to its agrarian reform law. The president of Costa Rica rejected previous versions of the law with more references to social function, reasoning that rejection of the phrase “social function” in the constitution meant that the phrase in legislation contravened the constitution (Alfaro 1980, 105–109).

  77. 77.

    For example, it appears that the 1917 Mexican Constitution and its elaborate treatment of property influenced the 1931 Spanish Constitution (Domínguez Luis 1999).

  78. 78.

    Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico), Article 27.

  79. 79.

    Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico), Article 27.

  80. 80.

    It is hardly surprising that the 1917 Mexican Constitution did not use the phrase “social function” since it was not until two years later, in 1919, did Leon Duguit use the term in his writing (Duguit 1919).

  81. 81.

    See Merryman (1968) for more information on the distinction between public and private law.

  82. 82.

    Sentencia 523/96 (judicio agrario, Mexico, published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 16 Jun 1998), sixth section under the heading “Considerando”. In this case, land was adjudged not in fulfillment of its social function since the owner planted cannabis sativa (marihuana) on the land. For cases presenting a similar scenario, see also Sentencia 489/96 (judicio agrario, Mexico, published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 9 Jun 1998); Sentencia 525/97 (judicio agrario, Mexico, published in the Diario Oficial de la Federacion, 11 Jan 1999).

  83. 83.

    Ley de Desarrollo Urbano del Distrito Federal (Mexico), Articles 2.II, 6.

  84. 84.

    Constitution of Brazil (Brazil), Article 184(0).

  85. 85.

    Constitution of Brazil (Brazil), Articles 5(0)XXIII, 156(1), 170(0)III, 182(2), 184(0), 185(1), 186.

  86. 86.

    Organization of American States (1997), Chap. VII, A.

  87. 87.

    Constitution of Brazil (Brazil), Article 182(2).

  88. 88.

    Law 160 (1994) (Colombia), Article 1.

  89. 89.

    Sentencia C-223/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § IV; Sentencia C-389/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia); Sentencia C-204/01 (2001) (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), §VII.17; Sentencia T-427/98 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § 111.C.3; Sentencia C-157/97 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VI.2.A).

  90. 90.

    Constitution of Colombia (Colombia), Article 58; Sentencia C-223/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § IV.

  91. 91.

    Sentencia C-223/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § IV; see also Sentencia C-595/95 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VI.h; Sentencia T-427/98 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § III.C.3.

  92. 92.

    Sentencia C-238/97 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VI.3 [trans: Thomas Ruppert]; see also Sentencia C-428/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VII.4.

  93. 93.

    Sentencia C-389/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VII.2 [trans: Thomas Ruppert]; see also Sentencia C-595/95 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VI.h.

  94. 94.

    Sentencia C-389/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VII.3.

  95. 95.

    Ibid. While forfeiture of land may occur when ownership is a result of illegal activities or enrichment (Sentencia C-389/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VII.3), forfeiture for failure to fulfill the social function is much broader than penal offenses leading to forfeiture (Sentencia C-409/97 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VI.2).

  96. 96.

    Acto Legislativo 01 (1999) Diario Oficial ano XCCV. N. 43654, 49.

  97. 97.

    Sentencia C-595/99 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VI.B.2.

  98. 98.

    Sentencia C-595/99 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VI.B.2.

  99. 99.

    Sentencia C-595/99 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), § VI.B.2, VI.C.

  100. 100.

    Constitution of Venezuela (1961) (Venezuela), Article 99. The 1961 constitution provided:

    The right to property is guaranteed. In virtue of its social function, property will be subjected to the contributions, restrictions, and obligations established by laws designed to further public utility and the general interest. [Se garantiza el derecho de propiedad. En virtud de su funcion social la propiedad estardi sometida a las contribuciones, restricciones y obligaciones que establezca la ley con fines de utilidad publica o de interes general.].

  101. 101.

    The 1999 Venezuelan constitution states that “[p]roperty will be subjected to the contributions, restrictions and obligations established by law to promote public utility or the general interest. Only for public utility or social interest, determined by a court judgment and timely payment of just compensation, may any type of property be expropriated” (Constitution of Venezuela (Venezuela)).

  102. 102.

    Presidential Decree No 1546 2001, Article 2(5), 18.

  103. 103.

    Presidential Decree No 1546 2001, Article 2(5).

  104. 104.

    Presidential Decree No 1546 2001, Article 37.

  105. 105.

    Presidential Decree No 1546 2001, Article 106–107.

  106. 106.

    Ley de Tierras y Colonizacion, Law No 2825 1961 (Costa Rica). The law also protects small agricultural plots from any sort of expropriation if they currently fulfill their social function: Article 142.

  107. 107.

    Ibid. Article144.

  108. 108.

    Ibid.

  109. 109.

    Ley de Tierras y Colonizacion, Law No 2825 1961 (Costa Rica), Article 6.

  110. 110.

    Noting that Colombia used “social function” as a justification for settling “seemingly empty and unproductive lands”.

  111. 111.

    An essential difference between first—and second-generation rights is that second generation (i.e., social and economic rights) rights require states to take affirmative, active steps to promote and secure these rights since state inaction is insufficient (see, e.g., Bossuyt 1992—noting that civil rights primarily require state abstention from action whereas social rights require active intervention from the State). First generation rights are most often thought of as limitations on state action to ensure individual rights. According to one well-known Costa Rican jurist, the difference between the classic, first generation right to property and its second generation expression may present itself more clearly in Spanish than it does in English. In Spanish, the first-generation right is best expressed as “derecho de propiedad” whereas in the American Declaration, the second-generation right is expressed as the “derecho a la propiedad” (Zeledon 2002, 30). At the same time, others assert that the distinctions between first and second generation human rights are blurring (Stanley 1997).

    However, many assert that to divide first and second generation rights between those that are “negative” versus “positive” fails to take account of the fact that some first generation rights (such as that to a speedy trial) require a substantial positive investment on the part of the state whereas some second generation rights (such as the right to unionize) require little expenditure on the part of the state (Dowell-Jones 2004, 4).

  112. 112.

    The United States is often held up as an example of the state most protective of private property rights (cf. van der Vyver 1985, 125–126).

  113. 113.

    Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.TS. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316) (1976).

  114. 114.

    Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.TS. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 490, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1976)).

  115. 115.

    Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948).

  116. 116.

    Noting that American, French, and English revolutions primarily focused on “right to be free from” rather than the “right to”.

  117. 117.

    This split again showed itself in 1974 when the United Nations General Assembly voted on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 1987, § 712, reporter’s note 1). This allowed that states have the right “to nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property” (Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 1987, § 712, reporter’s note 1). The United States and five other developed states voted against the Charter while one hundred-twenty, mostly developing nations, voted in favour (Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 1987, § 712, reporter’s note 1).

  118. 118.

    Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978). The United States has signed but not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. It has signed and ratified the American Declaration of Human Rights which provides that “[e]very person has a right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home.” American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article XXIII, OEA/ser. L./ V/11.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948) [hereinafter American Declaration]. This Declaration was approved in 1948 at the 9th International American Conference in Bogotá, Colombia.

  119. 119.

    1952 Protocol to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html (“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions…. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest.” (emphasis added)). Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights reads: “The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.” African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), adopted June 27, 1981, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z lafchar.htm (emphasis added).

  120. 120.

    Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (C-44/79) [1979] ECR 3727.

  121. 121.

    Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (C-44/79) [1979] ECR 3727, [18]-[19]; The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment (C-293/97) [1999] ECR I-02603, [54]; Schrader v Hauptzollamt Gronau (C-265/87) [1989] ECR 2237, [78].

  122. 122.

    Village of Euclid, Ohio v Ambler Realty Co, 272 US 365, 395 (1926).

  123. 123.

    Citing several Spanish laws imposing the cultivation obligation on agricultural property owners, dating back to the Franco regime). Colina Garea also cites a number of other Spanish and Italian commentators for this proposition.

  124. 124.

    See, e.g., supra Part 3.2.

  125. 125.

    Constitution of Colombia (Colombia), Article 58: “La propiedad es una funcion social que implica obligaciones. Como tal, le es inherente una funcion ecologica.” [“Property has a social function which implies obligations. As such, land has an inherent ecological function.” trans: Thomas Ruppert]; Colombian Law 338 (1997), Articles 2(1), 3(2)).

  126. 126.

    Constitution of Chile (Chile): “Sólo la ley puede establecer el modo de adquirir la propiedad, de usar, gozar y disponer de ella y las limitaciones y obligaciones que deriven de su función social. Esta comprende cuanto exijan los intereses generales de la Nacion, la seguridad nacional, la utilidad y la salubridad públicas y la conservación del patrimonio ambiental.” [“Only the law may establish the modes of acquiring, using, enjoying, and disposing of property as well as the limits and obligations that derive from property’s social function. This includes requirements to serve the general interests of the Nation, national security, public utility and health, and conservation of the nation’s environmental patrimony.” trans: Thomas Ruppert].

  127. 127.

    “Mexican law no longer threatens the expropriation of land if adequate social ‘use’ is not made.”

  128. 128.

    Sentencia T-523/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia).

  129. 129.

    Sentencia T-523/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia), II.2.C.3: The court there referred to article 366 of the Colombian Constitution ([“The general well-being and improvement of the quality of life of the population are social purposes of the state.” trans: Thomas Ruppert trans]).

  130. 130.

    Constitution of Colombia (Colombia), Article 58.

  131. 131.

    Sentencia T-523/94 (Supreme Constitutional Court of Colombia).

  132. 132.

    Using example of a landowner deforesting land, polluting waterways, causing erosion, excessively using agrochemicals, employing laborers under slave-like conditions with no worker guarantees in order to produce a monoculture exclusively for export and that does not promote accrual of any benefit in the form of essential needs for the community. See also Fernandes (2001), praising the Brazilian constitution’s definition of “social function” as a way to overcome the outdated civil code that “views land and property rights almost exclusively in terms of the economic possibilities granted to individual owners, allowing little room for socially oriented state intervention aimed at reconciling different interests over the use of land and property”.

  133. 133.

    Constitution of Brazil (Brazil), Article 182.

  134. 134.

    Constitution of Brazil (Brazil), Article 182(4)III.

  135. 135.

    Noting the dramatic increase of litigation over regulations through use of NAFTA’s chapter 11 investor-protection rules and similar rules in the rapidly expanding world of bilateral investment treaties.

  136. 136.

    Noting that private associations as well as the Secretary of Foreign Relations and the Secretary of Commerce and Industry strongly objected in 1928 to the idea that a landowner had the responsibility to ensure that her or his enjoyment of property also served a social function.

  137. 137.

    This is known as the “Calvo doctrine,” named after an Argentine diplomat and writer, which states that a foreigner shall not be entitled to greater legal protection than nationals of a country (Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 1987 (United States), § 713 cmt g, reporter’s note 6; Schneiderman 2000, 89–90). The United States has never recognized the validity of the Calvo doctrine, and its legal status is uncertain at the international level (Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 1987 (United States), § 713 cmt g, reporter’s note 6).

  138. 138.

    Metalclad v United Mexican States (2001) 40 ILM 36, 50.

  139. 139.

    Id 49 [88], 50 [99].

  140. 140.

    Id 51 [111].

  141. 141.

    This focus has led to intense criticism of market-assisted land reforms (Borras 2003).

  142. 142.

    Constitución de la República de Perú Article 38 (1920) (“La propiedad, cualquiera que sea el propietario, está regida exclusivamente por las leyes de la República y se halla sometida a las contribuciones, gravámenes y limitaciones que ellas establezcan.” [“Property, regardless of its owner, is regulated exclusively by the laws of the Republic and is subject to all contributions, burdens, and limitations established by law.” (Thomas Ruppert trans.)]).

  143. 143.

    Constitution of Peru (1933), Article 31.

  144. 144.

    Constitution of Peru (1979) (Peru), Article 124: “La propiedad obliga a usar los bienes en armonía con el interés social. El Estado promueve el acceso a la propiedad en todas sus modalidades. La ley señala las formas, obligaciones, limitaciones y garantias del derecho de propiedad.” [“Property obliges its use in harmony with the social interest. The State promotes access to all forms of property. The law determines the forms, obligations, limitations, and guarantees of the right to property.” trans: Thomas Ruppert trans].

  145. 145.

    Constitution of Peru (1993) (Peru), Article 70.

  146. 146.

    Sentencia 0048-2004-PI/TC (2005) (Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal). This decision notes:

    When our Constitution guarantees the inviolable right to property and indicates that this right should be exercised in harmony with the public good and within the limits of the law, the Constitution does nothing more than refer to the social function that the law of property has as part of its essence. [78] (emphasis added).

  147. 147.

    Decreto por el que se reforma el artículo 27 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1992) (Mexico) Diario Oficial de la Federación.

  148. 148.

    Language before January 3, 1992, decree (published Jan. 6, 1992):

    XV. Las comisiones mixtas, los gobiernos locales y las demás autoridades encargadas de las tramitaciones agrarias, no podrán afectar, en ningún caso, la pequeña propiedad agrícola o ganadera en explotación e incurrirán en responsabilidad, por violaciones a la Constitución, en caso de conceder dotaciones que la afecten.

    Se considerará pequeña propiedad agrícola la que no exceda de cien hectáreas de riego o humedad de primera o sus equivalentes en otras clases de tierras en explotación.

    [“The joint commissions, local governments, and other authorities in charge of procedures related to agricultural land may in no case expropriate small farms or cattle ranches THAT ARE ACTIVELY BEING EXPLOITED; any authorities that grant titles that conflict with such lands will be held responsible for constitutional violations.

    A small agricultural property is one that does not exceed 100 hectares of irrigated or moist soils or the equivalent in other classes of soils.” trans: Thomas Ruppert] (Constitution of Mexico (1917) (Mexico), Article 27.XV).

    Language after 3 January 1992 decree (published 6 January 1992):

    XV. En los Estados Unidos Mexicanos quedan prohibidos los latifundios.

    Se considera pequeñia propiedad agrícola la que no exceda por individuo de cien hectáreas de riego o humedad de primera o sus equivalentes en otras clases de tierras.

    [“Latifundos are prohibited in the United Mexican States.

    A small agricultural property is one that does not, per person, exceed 100 hectares of irrigated or moist soils or the equivalent in other classes of soils.” trans: Thomas Ruppert trans] (Constitution of Mexico (1917) (Mexico) with 3 Jan 1992 reforms, Article 27.XV).

  149. 149.

    Arguing that exclusion of the phrase “in use” from subpart XV of article 27 of the constitution indicates that landowners are now free to either use their rural lands or leave them idle [trans: Thomas Ruppert] (cf. Constitution of Mexico (1917) (Mexico), Article 27.XV with Constitution of Mexico (1917) (Mexico) with 3 Jan 1992 reforms; see also Grammont 1996).

  150. 150.

    One might easily see these reforms by Salinas as a way to heal the rift that began in 1938 when, after expropriations in Mexico affecting U.S. interests, the United States insisted that international law requires “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” (Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 1987 (United States), § 712, reporter’s note 1). Mexico, however, insisted that international law only required that foreigners be treated equally with nationals (Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 1987 (United States), § 712, reporter’s note 1).

  151. 151.

    Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 1987 (United States), § 713, reporter’s note 3: noting that Mexico and the United States began a disagreement in 1938 about the compensation necessary for expropriations motivated by land reform.

  152. 152.

    Article 65 of the 1939 constitution observed, “Property, by virtue of its social function, imposes obligations” (Constitution of Nicaragua (1939) (Nicaragua), Article 65).

  153. 153.

    Constitution of Nicaragua (1950) (Nicaragua), Article 65.

  154. 154.

    Constitution of Nicaragua (1983) (Nicaragua), Article 103: “El Estado garantiza la coexistencia democrática de las formas de propiedad pública, privada, cooperativa, asociativa y comunitaria; todas ellas forman parte de la economía mixta, están supeditadas a los intereses superiores de la Nación y cumplen una función social.” [“The State guarantees the democratic coexistence of public, private, cooperative, associative, and community-based forms of property; all these forms of property form part of the mixed economy and are subject to the superior interests of the Nation and serve a social function” trans: Thomas Ruppert].

  155. 155.

    Constitution of Nicaragua (1993) (Nicaragua), Articles 5, 44.

  156. 156.

    See supra notes 82–87, 130–132 and accompanying text.

  157. 157.

    See supra notes 88–97, 127–129 and accompanying text.

  158. 158.

    See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text.

  159. 159.

    Other Latin American countries also sometimes seem reluctant to alter application of the Social Function Doctrine and the substantive differences it creates in laws regarding expropriation. For example, in Chile a government subcommittee expressed the belief that any imposition on land provoked by application of the Social Function Doctrine does not require indemnification (Marinkovic 2004).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Florida Joint Program in Environmental Law and Conservation Clinic, Gainesville, FL, USA

    Thomas T. Ankersen

  2. Florida Sea Grant College Program, Bldg. 803, McCarty Drive, PO Box 110400, Gainesville, FL, 32611, USA

    Thomas Ruppert

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    Paul Babie

  2. Adelaide Law School, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia

    Jessica Viven-Wilksch

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Ankersen, T.T., Ruppert, T. (2019). Tierra y Libertad: The Social Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America. In: Babie, P., Viven-Wilksch, J. (eds) Léon Duguit and the Social Obligation Norm of Property. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7189-9_9

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