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Formation of a Bubble and Its Background

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Abstract

Japan experienced a formation of a huge bubble in the 1980s, which turned out to be a prelude to the subsequent two-decade-long economic stagnation. In this chapter, we will look at what happened to the asset price (land and stocks) in Japan in the 1980s (Section 1), and why it happened and, what could (should) have been done to contain the bubble (Section 2). In examining causes of the bubble, we will look at two factors: economic policy management in the 1980s and bank behaviors under financial liberalization from the latter half of the 1970s.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The rate of change in the urban commercial land price index (six largest cities) from six months before started to rise at a significantly higher pace than before, as early as in 1983, with the rate of increase nearly doubling from 3.1% in March 1983 (which was about the average rate of increase in the preceding two to three years) to 5.7% in October 1983, and it continued to rise to hit a peak of 27.2% in April 1987. Although it is not easy to determine the exact timing when the bubble started, it does not seem to be as late as the late 1980s (that is when the rate of increase started to fall) as sometimes argued (e.g., Okina et al. (2001) treats the four years from 1987 to 1990 “bubble period,” partly due to difference in the definition of a bubble).

  2. 2.

    From September 1982, the Nikkei monthly average almost continuously recorded positive growth from the previous month with occasional brief falls until December 1989, before it started to collapse in January 1990.

  3. 3.

    See the supplement to this chapter for the derivation of theoretical price (i.e., price based on fundamentals).

  4. 4.

    In calculating the theoretical price, the prevailing levels of return and the interest rate were assumed to be unchanged for the future. See Nenji Keizai Hokoku (Annual Economic Report) 1991 (Economic Planning Agency).

  5. 5.

    This is when the rate of commercial land price increase nearly doubled (see Endnote 1 in this chapter).

  6. 6.

    See 2.3 (Stock price) of Supplement to this chapter.

  7. 7.

    The theoretical price rises if the risk premium (α) decreases, and/or the expected growth rate (g) of return increases in Eq. (2.2) on page 36.

  8. 8.

    See Komine, Takao (2011a).

  9. 9.

    See Komine (2011a).

  10. 10.

    In 1982, a tragic incident happened in which a young Chinese man, who was mistaken for a Japanese man, was killed by laid-off automobile workers in Detroit.

  11. 11.

    See Volcker and Gyoten (1992).

  12. 12.

    Ahead of the summit meeting in London in 1978, an argument gained a high profile that Japan, West Germany, and the United States, with their relatively good performance, should act as the locomotive countries to lead the recovery of the world economy.

  13. 13.

    Komine (2011a, 112)

  14. 14.

    Komine (2011a, 115–17)

  15. 15.

    Komine (2011a, 123–4) quotes a writing by an ex-official of the Ministry of Construction, who interviewed 20 local real estate agents that were actively buying land in the center of Tokyo. He wrote that out of 20 agents, only one mentioned the intended use of the land that it purchased, suggesting that they were buying land to resell at higher prices.

  16. 16.

    However, in 2000, the size of office space in the central Tokyo turned out to be 8000 ha, not very far from the projection (Komine 2011a, 284).

  17. 17.

    Komine (2011a, 148)

  18. 18.

    See Funabashi (1988) and Kondo (1999).

  19. 19.

    See Funabashi (1988, 28–9). It has not been made publicly available yet.

  20. 20.

    For such observations, see Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2002).

  21. 21.

    Komine (2011a, 118, 213, 232).

  22. 22.

    The combined share in the total amount of physical assets of non-manufacturing industries held by these four industries accounted for 57% as of 1990, 6.1% for construction, 18.8% for transportation and postal services, 18.1% for wholesale and retail, and 14.1% for real estate. Major holders of physical assets, other than these four sectors as of 1990, are electricity (17.3%), entertainment (5.2%), and advertising (10.8%).

  23. 23.

    A detailed analysis of the balance sheets of the corporate sector is given in Chap. 6.

  24. 24.

    The IS balance approach to current account determination may be helpful in capturing this process.

    We have a national account identity:

    $$ \mathrm{Y}= \mathrm{Cp}+ \mathrm{Ip}+ \mathrm{Cg}+ \mathrm{Ig}+\mathrm{X}-\mathrm{M}, $$

    (24.1)

    Where Y = GDP, Cp = private consumption, Ip = private investment, Cg = government consumption, Ig = government investment, X=export, M = import

    Using T for Tax and rearranging the identity, we have:

    $$ \left\{\left(\mathrm{Y}-\mathrm{T}-\mathrm{Cp}\right)-\mathrm{Ip}\right\}+\left(\mathrm{T}-\mathrm{Cg}\right)-\mathrm{Ig}=\mathrm{X}-\mathrm{M}, $$

    (24.2)i.e., (private savings − private investment) (= investment/savings balance of the private sector) + (government savings-government Investment) (= investment/savings balance of the government sector) = external balance. The combined savings/investment balance of private and government sectors moved to excess investment in the United States under Reaganomics, producing a huge external deficit.

  25. 25.

    Assume that companies invest in plants and equipment so as to keep the capital–output ratio (K/Y) constant (a) under the expected GDP growth rate (ge) and also assume for the sake of simplicity there is no disposition of assets, then we have:

    $$ \mathrm{K}/\mathrm{Y}=\varDelta K/\varDelta Y=\mathrm{I}/\varDelta Y=\mathrm{a}, $$
    (25-1)

    where K = capital stock, Y = GDP, I = private investment in plants and equipment

    $$ \varDelta Y/\mathrm{Y}=\mathrm{ge} $$
    (25-2)

    From Eqs. (25.1) and (25.2):

    $$ \mathrm{I}/\varDelta Y=\mathrm{I}/\left(\mathrm{Y}\times \mathrm{ge}\right)=\mathrm{a} $$
    (25-3)

    So, we have:

    $$ \mathrm{I}/\mathrm{Y}=\mathrm{a}\times \mathrm{ge} $$
    (25-4)

    That is, the share of private investment in plants and equipment in GDP has positive correlation with the expected GDP growth rate, i.e., if the expected GDP growth rate falls, then the share of private investment in GDP also falls.

    Relaxing the unrealistic assumption of zero disposal of assets, let us assume that the amount of disposed assets (D) is a fraction (b) of capital stock (D = bK). Then, ΔK = I−bK, and therefore, Eq. (25.4) changes into

    $$ \mathrm{I}/\mathrm{Y}=\mathrm{a}\left(\mathrm{ge}+\mathrm{b}\right) $$
    (25-5)

    So, basically, the same argument applies even under this formulation.

  26. 26.

    As an argument for a need to enhance consumption in Japan, see Katz (1999). Whether we can raise growth contribution of consumption in a sustainable manner is an unanswered question even now, 30 years after the bubble period (see Chap. 7 for this point).

  27. 27.

    There may well be an argument that adjustments in the exchange rate or liberalization of domestic markets will contribute to correcting external imbalances through changes in exports and imports. However, effectiveness of the market opening depends largely on reactions of companies and households and is therefore uncertain. Adjustments in foreign exchange rates were actually implemented, and the external imbalance of both Japan and the United States declined. As is shown in Fig. 2.18, however, the decline in current account deficits of the United States took place in conjunction with the decline in the size of excess investment in investment/savings balance, implying that the US external imbalance was a domestically driven phenomenon after all.

  28. 28.

    It may be said that this is an outcome of external consideration taking precedence over the stabilization of the domestic economy and society, given the circumstances that Japan depends on a foreign country for its national security.

  29. 29.

    Ministry of Finance (1993).

  30. 30.

    “Tochi Shinwa,” which literally translated means “land myth,” is a perception that there is no asset more profitable than land. This perception held well until 1980s. For example, an estimate is made that, although investment of 3 million yen in deposits in 1955 would have increased to 22.83 million yen in 1985, investment of the same amount in land in one of the six largest cities would have increased to 402 million yen, 17.6 times more in 1985 (Ministry of Finance 1993). Price of land continued to rise after the Second World War, with an exceptional fall in 1974, after the oil crisis. There had been land price surges twice (early 1960s and around 1972–73) after the war, but neither of them were later found to be a bubble. In the 1980s, the asset price surge was generally not considered as a bubble at that time. Noguchi (1992) counted the number of the articles that appeared in the media, such as Nihon Keizai Shimbun, which have the word “bubble” for each year from 1985 to 1992. He found that the number was 1–8 in each year from 1985 to 1988, 11 in 1989, the peak year of the bubble, 194 in 1990, and then a dramatic increase to 2,546 in 1991, and 3,475 in 1992. These numbers suggest the asset price developments started to be recognized as a bubble only after those prices had started to fall.

  31. 31.

    In the 1980s, aggressive profit-seeking by banks was under way. One famous phrase that was spoken by the chairman of one of the biggest city banks in the early 1980s conveys well the thinking of the era; “Mukou Kizu ha Towanai” (literally, frontal scar will not bother). “Mukou Kizu” is a scar that one receives from a frontal assault, when fighting an enemy, while “Ushiro Kizu” (a scar on the back) is the kind one would suffer when trying to escape from the enemy. Samurai regarded Ushiro Kizu as a shame. This phrase indicates that the management of banks at the time accepted or even encouraged aggressive profit-seeking by their staff (see Kusu [2005]). Presumably, raising objections to such profit-seeking activities meant dropping out from internal competition in the institution.

  32. 32.

    Ministry of Finance (1993).

  33. 33.

    The number of individual shareholders increased by around 10% each year in this period, from over 16 million in FY1985 to over 24 million in FY1989 (Ministry of Finance 1993). Privatization of government-owned Japan Telegram and Telephone Corporation and sales of its shares to the public in 1987 attracted nationwide attention.

  34. 34.

    See Kusu (2006).

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Correspondence to Kenji Aramaki .

Supplement

Supplement

1.1 Theoretical Price of an Asset

1.1.1 Definition of an Asset Price Bubble

A asset price bubble is a phenomenon wherein the price of an asset rises to a level that is not based on fundamentals.

1.1.2 Fundamental Price and Its Derivation

1.1.2.1 Fundamental Price

The price based on fundamentals (=theoretical price) is expressed as below:

If the asset has no risk and the return is fixed:

$$ \mathrm{P}=\mathrm{R}/\mathrm{i}, $$
(2.1)

where R = return (office or housing rent, interest, etc.) to an asset, P = price of asset, i = long-term, risk-free interest rate (typically, long-term government bond yield in a secondary market).

If the asset has a risk and the return to the asset grows each period at a fixed rate of g, the fundamental price is rewritten as follows:

$$ \mathrm{P}=\mathrm{R}/\left(\mathrm{i}+\alpha -\mathrm{g}\right), $$
(2.2)

where α is the risk premium (an additional return that is required for a risk asset to be held, on top of the return to a risk-free asset)

1.1.2.2 Derivation
1.1.2.2.1 Risk-free Case

Derivation of theoretical price (price based on fundamentals)

Assumption: There is no difference in risk profile across assets

Formulation: The rate of return will be equalized across different assets via arbitrage, so that we have

$$ \mathrm{R}/\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{i} $$
(2.3)

Note: Arbitrage may be defined as a simultaneous purchase and sale of assets to make profits from price discrepancy.

Then, we have:

$$ \mathrm{P}=\mathrm{R}/\mathrm{i} $$
(2.4)
1.1.2.2.2 Risk Asset Case

If the asset has a risk, then its rate of return has to be higher than that of risk-free assets (this additional part is called the risk premium (α) as explained before). Then, instead of (2.4), we have

$$ \mathrm{P}=\mathrm{R}/\left(\mathrm{i}+\alpha \right) $$
(2.5)

The aforementioned assumes that the asset price is constant. If the asset price changes, then, the formulation changes as follows.

The rate of return for buying the asset in period 1 for P1 and selling it in period 2 for P2 is shown in the left-hand side of Equation (2.6). and it will be equal to the rate of return of the risk-free asset on the right-hand side of the equation.

$$ \left(\mathrm{R}+\left({\mathrm{P}}_2-{\mathrm{P}}_1\right)\right)/{\mathrm{P}}_1=\mathrm{i} $$
(2.6)

Or,

$$ {\mathrm{P}}_1=\left(\mathrm{R}+{\mathrm{P}}_2\right)/\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right) $$
(2.7)

In the same way, the asset price in period 2 (P2) may be expressed as follows.

$$ {\mathrm{P}}_2=\left(\mathrm{R}+{\mathrm{P}}_3\right)/\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right) $$
(2.8)

By inserting (2.8) into (2.7), we have

$$ {\mathrm{P}}_1=\left(\mathrm{R}+\left(\mathrm{R}+{\mathrm{P}}_3\right)/\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right)\right)/\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right) $$
(2.9)

Or,

$$ {\mathrm{P}}_1=\mathrm{R}/\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right)+\mathrm{R}/{\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right)}^2+{\mathrm{P}}_3/{\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right)}^3 $$
(2.10)

By repeating this, we obtain;

$$ {\mathrm{P}}_1=\mathrm{R}/\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right)+\mathrm{R}/{\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right)}^2+\mathrm{R}/{\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right)}^3+\cdots, $$
(2.11)

which means that P1 is equal to the discounted present value of future returns

1.1.2.2.3 Growth of Return

If we assume that the return (R) grows every period at a fixed rate of g, then we have

$$ {\mathrm{P}}_{11}=\mathrm{R}/\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right)+\mathrm{R}\left(1+\mathrm{g}\right)/{\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right)}^2+\mathrm{R}{\left(1+\mathrm{g}\right)}^2/{\left(1+\mathrm{i}\right)}^3+\cdots $$
(2.12)

As this is the sum of geometrical series, assuming g < i, it can be written as:

$$ {\mathrm{P}}_1=\mathrm{R}/\left(\mathrm{i}-\mathrm{g}\right) $$
(2.13)

If the asset has a risk, then we use i+α instead of i:

$$ {\mathrm{P}}_1=\mathrm{R}/\left(\mathrm{i}+\alpha -\mathrm{g}\right) $$
(2.14)

Note: The above explanation is from Chapter 2 of Nenji Keizai Hokoku (Annual Economic Report) (1991).

1.2 Interest Rate-Adjusted PER and the Ratio of the Actual to Theoretical Stock Price

The theoretical price of stock is expressed by Eq. (2.1) (i.e., P = R/(i + α − g)).

If we assume no risk and no growth in return, the theoretical stock price is expressed by Eq. (2.2) (i.e., P = R/i).

Assuming the return (R) in Eq. (2.2) can be replaced with profit per one unit of stock (ρ), then the theoretical stock price (P) is expressed as

$$ \mathrm{P}=\rho /\mathrm{i} $$
(2.15)

The interest rate- adjusted PER (i × (Actual stock price/profit per one unit of stock (ρ))) corresponds to the ratio of Actual stock price to Theoretical stock price:

$$ {\displaystyle \begin{array}{l}\mathrm{iPER}=\mathrm{i}\times \left(\mathrm{Actual}\ \mathrm{stock}\ \mathrm{price}/\rho \right)=\mathrm{Actual}\ \mathrm{price}/\\ {}\left(\rho /\mathrm{i}\right)=\mathrm{Actual}\ \mathrm{stock}\ \mathrm{price}/\mathrm{Theoretical}\ \mathrm{stock}\ \mathrm{price}\end{array}} $$
(2.16)

The theoretical price rises if the risk premium decreases, and/or the expected growth rate of return increases

Note: PER = price/earning ratio, that is, stock price divided by profit per one unit of stock

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Aramaki, K. (2018). Formation of a Bubble and Its Background. In: Japan’s Long Stagnation, Deflation, and Abenomics. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2176-4_2

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