Skip to main content

Security Dilemma Between China and Other South China Sea Claimant States

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 1543 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter applies the concept of security dilemma between China on one side and “other claimants” on the opposite side. Even though the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei do not establish an alliance, they share anxiety of China’s potential of being offensive. On the other hand, China is anxious about controlling the South China Sea and the intervention of external power.

The chapter explains the activation of the dormant security dilemma and how the process reached the stage of spiral, culminated with China’s defection in the control of the Scarborough Shoal and massive construction of artificial islands. It also discusses the rationale of China’s defection by incorporating international and domestic factors, particularly the dynamics within the Chinese politics.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    “Scarborough Shoal Dispute ‘Of Concern’,” Viet Nam News, 26 April 2012, http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/223972/scarborough-shoal-dispute-of-concern.html#X6I5SzoVyyDTmXhG.97 (accessed 12 July 2016).

  2. 2.

    Jerry E. Esplanada, “Malaysia Too Wants Peace in Panatag Shoal,” Inquirer, 31 May 2012, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/38389/malaysia-too-wants-peace-in-panatag-shoal (accessed 21 June 2016).

  3. 3.

    “Vietnam, Philippines Issue Joint Statement on Strategic Partnership,” Viet Nam News, 19 November 2015, http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/278770/viet-nam-philippines-issue-joint-statement-on-strategic-partnership.html#79Xbphp3bdvfyHx5.97 (accessed 8 July 2016).

  4. 4.

    “Vietnam Welcomes South China Sea Ruling, Reasserts Its Own Claims,” Reuters, 12 July 2016, http://in.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-ruling-vietnam-idINKCN0ZS16W (accessed 29 August 2016).

  5. 5.

    Jamandre, “Brunei Snubs ASEAN Spratly Claimant’s Meeting to Forge One Stand on China,” VERA Files, 4 March 2014.

  6. 6.

    Francis Chan, “China Criticised for Apparent Attempt to Divide ASEAN,” The Strait Times, 26 April 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/china-criticised-for-apparent-attempt-to-divide-asean (accessed 28 April 2016).

  7. 7.

    Hamilton and Rathbun, “Scarce Differences: Toward a Material and Systemic Foundation for Offensive and Defensive Realism,” 436–65.

  8. 8.

    Michael A Glosny, “Heading Toward a Win–Win Future? Recent Developments in China’s Policy Toward Southeast Asia,” Asian Security, 2, no. 1 (2006): 24–57.

  9. 9.

    Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s Growing Defense Budget: Not as Scary as You Think,” The Diplomat, 5 February 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chinas-growing-defense-budget-not-as-scary-as-you-think/ (accessed 5 July 2016).

  10. 10.

    Fang Yang and Mingjiang Li, “Comparing China’s Claims and Policies in the East and South China Seas: Implications for Regional Security,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, (2016); Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” 292.

  11. 11.

    David Pilling, “Asia Follows China into an Old-Fashioned Arms Race,” Financial Times, 2 April 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9d83bf62-b9b9-11e3-a3ef-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2yB0Ekgob (accessed 5 August 2016).

  12. 12.

    Ibid.

  13. 13.

    Stephen Harner, “U.S. Policy, Not China Is Driving the Asian Arms Race,” Forbes Asia, 6 April 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2014/04/06/u-s-policy-not-china-is-driving-the-asian-arms-race/ (accessed 9 March 2016).

  14. 14.

    Pilling, “Asia Follows China into an Old-Fashioned Arms Race,” Financial Times, 2 April 2014.

  15. 15.

    Raul Dancel, “US$671 m Arm Buys to Upgrade Philippine Military,” Asia News Network, 17 March 2014, http://www.asianewsnet.net/news-58075.html (accessed 5 May 2016).

  16. 16.

    Harner, “U.S. Policy, Not China Is Driving the Asian Arms Race,” Forbes Asia, 6 April 2014.

  17. 17.

    Lim, “A Tale of Two Realisms in Chinese Foreign Policy,” 299–312.

  18. 18.

    “Japan to Supply Philippines with Military Equipment,” The Japan Times, 28 February 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/28/national/japan-to-supply-philippines-with-military-equipment/#.WGxK7FN96Ul (accessed 15 August 2016).

  19. 19.

    Gardiner Harris, “Vietnam Arms Embargo to Be Fully Lifted, Obama Says in Hanoi,” The New York Times, 23 May 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/world/asia/vietnam-us-arms-embargo-obama.html?_r=2 (accessed 19 September 2016).

  20. 20.

    Tang, “Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis,” 31–55.

  21. 21.

    A Theory of Security Strategies for Our Time: Defensive Realism, 43.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Press Release of the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines vs the People’s Republic of China).”

  24. 24.

    Jerome Cohen, “Like It or Not, UNCLOS Arbitration Is Legally Binding for China,” East Asia Forum, 11 July 2016, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/11/like-it-or-not-unclos-arbitration-is-legally-binding-for-china/ (accessed 20 July 2016); Hao Duy Phan, “Why a Ruling That Cannot Be Enforced Still Matters,” The Strait Times, 16 July 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/why-a-ruling-that-cannot-be-enforced-still-matters (accessed 14 August 2016).

  25. 25.

    Zha, “China’s Energy Security: Domestic and International Issues,” 179–90.

  26. 26.

    Owen and Schofield, “Disputed South China Sea Hydrocarbons in Perspective,” 809–22.

  27. 27.

    Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, 27–28.

  28. 28.

    Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Press Release of the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines vs the People’s Republic of China).”

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    Sutter, “China’s Self-Absorbed Nationalism,” The Diplomat, 31 August 2012.

  31. 31.

    Shicun Wu Ying Fu, “South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage,” The National Interest, 9 May 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-china-sea-how-we-got-stage-16118 (accessed 12 May 2016).

  32. 32.

    游润恬, “九段线停留在历史视角,” 联合早报, 2016年5月15日 [Yew Lun Tian, “Understanding the Basis for China’s South China Sea Claims,” Lianhe Zaobao, 15 May 2016], http://www.zaobao.com.sg/node/617117 (accessed 19 May 2016).

  33. 33.

    Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Press Release of the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines vs the People’s Republic of China).”

  34. 34.

    Robert Beckman, “Tribunal Ruling a Game Changer,” The Strait Times, 14 July 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/tribunal-ruling-a-game-changer-south-china-sea (accessed 15 August 2016).

  35. 35.

    Ralf Emmers, “China’s Influence in the South China Sea and the Failure of Joint Development,” in Rising China’s Influence in Developing Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Chakraborti, “China and Vietnam in the South China Sea Dispute: A Creeping ‘Conflict–Peace–Trepidation’ Syndrome,” 283–301.

  39. 39.

    Scot Marciel, “Maritime Issues and Sovereignty Disputes in East Asia, Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15 July 2009,” http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/07/126076.htm (accessed 27 August 2016); Schofield and Storey, The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions, 31; Glaser, “Tensions Flare in the South China Sea.”

  40. 40.

    Tran, “Recent Development in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Security and Cooperation,” 7.

  41. 41.

    Ibid.; Glaser, “Tensions Flare in the South China Sea.”

  42. 42.

    Schofield and Storey, The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions.

  43. 43.

    “China Warns Exxon over Vietnam Deal-Newspaper,” Reuters, 20 July 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/exxonmobile-asia-idUKPEK26269420080720 (accessed 17 August 2015).

  44. 44.

    Glaser, “Tensions Flare in the South China Sea.”

  45. 45.

    Chan and Li, “New Chinese Leadership, New Policy in the South China Sea Dispute?” 1–16.

  46. 46.

    Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” 292.

  47. 47.

    Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” 7–48.

  48. 48.

    Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” 292; “Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the Competition over Maritime Rights.”

  49. 49.

    US Department of State, Remarks at Press Availability, 23 July 2010, Hanoi, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm (accessed 8 July 2016).

  50. 50.

    Greer, “The South China Sea Is Really a Fishery Dispute,” The Diplomat, 20 July 2016.

  51. 51.

    Carlyle A Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” (Paper presented at the Conference on Maritime Security in the South China Sea, sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2011), 15.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., 16.

  53. 53.

    Ibid.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., 17.

  55. 55.

    Lyle Goldstein, “Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea: An Abundance of Noise and Smoke, but Little Fire,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 33, no. 3 (2011): 320–47.

  56. 56.

    Gregory Poling, “How Deeper US-Vietnam Military Cooperation Starts with Medicine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 18 August 2011, http://cogitasia.com/how-deeper-u-s-vietnam-mil-coop-starts-with-medicine/ (accessed 3 April 2016).

  57. 57.

    Lewis M. Stern William Jordan, Walter Lohman, “US-Vietnam Defense Relations: Investing in Strategic Alignment,” The Heritage Foundation, 18 July 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/07/us-vietnam-defense-relations-investing-in-strategic-alignment#_ftn3 (accessed 6 April 2016).

  58. 58.

    uUS Department of State, Manila Declaration on USPhilippine Alliance, 16 November 2011, http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/11/20111116141458su0.2878338.html#axzz4FaWayzlm (accessed 5 July 2016).

  59. 59.

    US Department of State, Toward a Deeper Alliance: United States-Philippines Bilateral Cooperation, 27 January 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/01/182689.htm (accessed 14 November 2016).

  60. 60.

    Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics, 45–46.

  61. 61.

    Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, 66.

  62. 62.

    Ying Fu, “South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage,” The National Interest, 9 May 2016.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    Ibid.

  65. 65.

    Zhang, “China’s Growing Assertiveness in the South China Sea: A Strategic Shift?” 21.

  66. 66.

    Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, 66.

  67. 67.

    Tang, A Theory of Security Strategies for Our Time: Defensive Realism, 66–69.

  68. 68.

    According to the UNCLOSTribunal, no feature in the Spratly Islands is island; therefore no one can claim a 200 nm of EEZ. See “Press Release of the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines vs the People’s Republic of China).”

  69. 69.

    Wang Wen, “Debunking 10 Myths about China and the South China Sea,” South China Morning Post, 10 July 2016, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1986732/debunking-10-myths-about-china-and-south-china-sea (accessed 16 August 2016).

  70. 70.

    Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” 3.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    Chong-Pin Lin, “Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions with China,” Asian Survey, 55, no. 3 (2015): 478–501.

  73. 73.

    Zhang, “China’s Growing Assertiveness in the South China Sea: A Strategic Shift?” 19, 22; Goldstein, “Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea: An Abundance of Noise and Smoke, but Little Fire,” 320–47.

  74. 74.

    “Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea: An Abundance of Noise and Smoke, but Little Fire,” 320–47.

  75. 75.

    Jian Zhang, “China’s Growing Assertiveness in the South China Sea: A Strategic Shift?” in The South China Sea and Australia Regional Security Environment, 2 October 2013 (Canberra: National Security College, Australian National University), 19.

  76. 76.

    Ying Fu, “South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage,” The National Interest, 9 May 2016.

  77. 77.

    China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and thePhilippinesin the SouthChina Sea (People’s Republicof China Response to the 12 July 2016 ruling on the South China Sea territorial claims by the UNCLOS Tribunal), Beijing, 2016, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2016-07/14/content_26088896.htm (accessed 15 July 2016).

  78. 78.

    Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper on Republic of China South China Sea Policy Beijing, 2016, http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/South/Position%20Paper%20on%20ROC%20South%20China%20Sea%20Policy.pdf (accessed 2 April 2016).

  79. 79.

    François-Xavier Bonnet, “Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal,” Irasec’s Discussion Papers, 14 (2012).

  80. 80.

    Denyer, “China’s Fishermen on the Front Line in the South China Sea,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 April 2016.

  81. 81.

    Ibid.

  82. 82.

    Ibid.

  83. 83.

    Graham, “South China Sea History Lesson: Parallels from the Paracels?” The Interpreter, 31 March 2016.

  84. 84.

    Jaime A. FlorCruz, “Checkered End-of-Term Report Card for Hu Jintao,” CNN, 9 November 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/08/world/asia/china-hu-jintao-report-card-florcruz (accessed 16 August 2016).

  85. 85.

    Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010), 48–49.

  86. 86.

    Minnie Chan, “Hu Jintao’s Weak Grip on China’s Army Inspired Xi Jinping’s Military Shake-Up: Sources,” South China Morning Post, 11 March 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1734663/hu-jintaos-weak-grip-chinas-army-inspired-president-xi-jinpings-military (accessed 28 October 2016).

  87. 87.

    Lingling Wei Jeremy Page, “Bo’s Ties to Army Alarmed Beijing,” The Wall Street Journal, 17 May 2012, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304203604577398034072800836 (accessed 26 July 2016).

  88. 88.

    “中国维护海洋权益:从维稳到维权的转折,” 人民日报海外版,2014年06月28日, [China Defends Maritime Rights: The Shift from Maintaining Stability to Maintaining Rights, People’s Daily overseas edition, 28 June 2014], http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-06/28/c_1111359109.htm (accessed 8 August 2016).

  89. 89.

    “回顾习近平治军 老领导曾叮嘱习近平的三件事,” 和讯新闻,2015年8月2日 [Reviewing Xi Jinping Governing Military Old Leaders Had Warned of Xi Jinping’s Three Points, Hexun News, 2 August 2015], http://news.hexun.com/2015-08-02/178025271.html (accessed 15 August 2016).

  90. 90.

    “南海争端如何应对?习近平都将清楚了,” 凤凰资讯,2016年7月1日 [How to Deal with the South China Sea Dispute? Xi Jinping has Spoken Clearly, Phoenix New Media, 1 July 2016], http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20160701/14550831_0.shtml (accessed 8 September 2016).

  91. 91.

    Philip Wen, “South China Sea: Sleepy Port Town Is Base for Beijing’s ‘Little Blue Men’,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 July 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/world/south-china-sea-sleepy-port-town-is-base-for-beijings-little-blue-men-20160630-gpv84r.html (accessed 7 August 2016).

  92. 92.

    “习近平赴潭门看望海上民兵连 鼓励大更多的鱼打大鱼,” 南海网, 2013年4月9日 [Xi Jinping Visited Tanmen, Met with Maritime Militia Encouraged Them to Trawl for More and Bigger Fish, Hinews, 9 April 2013], http://www.hinews.cn/news/system/2013/04/09/015590106.shtml (accessed 15 August 2016).

  93. 93.

    “South China Sea: Sleepy Port Town Is Base for Beijing’s ‘Little Blue Men’,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 July 2016.

  94. 94.

    Baijie An, “Xi Visits Fleet, Praises Sanya Sailors,” China Daily USA, 12 April 2013, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2013-04/12/content_16397947.htm (accessed 10 August 2016).

  95. 95.

    “南海争端如何应对?习近平都将清楚了,” 凤凰资讯, 2016年7月1日 [How to Deal with the South China Sea Dispute? Xi Jinping has Spoken Clearly, Phoenix New Media, 1 July 2016].

  96. 96.

    Linda Jakobson and Ryan Manuel, “How Are Foreign Policy Decisions Made in China?,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 3, no. 1 (2016): 98–107.

  97. 97.

    Bonnie S Glaser, “China’s Maritime Right Protection Leading Small Group—Shrouded in Secrecy,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 11 September 2015, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-maritime-rights-protection-leading-small-group-shrouded-in-secrecy/ (accessed 25 August 2016).

  98. 98.

    “中国已成立中央海权办 系涉海高层次协调机构,” 中国网, 2013年3月2日 [China has Established Maritime Protection Leading Small Group, a Top Level Coordinating Body on Maritime Affairs, China.com.cn, 2 March 2013], http://ocean.china.com.cn/2013-03/02/content_28105606.htm (accessed 8 September 2016).

  99. 99.

    Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, 26 (2008): 1–21.

  100. 100.

    Cary Huang, “How Leading Small Groups Help Xi Jinping and Other Party Leaders Exert Power,” South China Morning Post, 20 January 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1409118/how-leading-small-groups-help-xi-jinping-and-other-party-leaders-exert (accessed 21 September 2016).

  101. 101.

    Ibid.

  102. 102.

    Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” 1–21.

  103. 103.

    Interview with a Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Scholar, Beijing, 5 November 2015.

  104. 104.

    Interview with a Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Scholar, Beijing, 5 November 2015.

  105. 105.

    Julian E. Barnes Jeremy Page, “China Expands Island Construction in Disputed South China Sea,” The Wall Street Journal, 18 February 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-expands-island-construction-in-disputed-south-china-sea-1424290852 (accessed 17 September 2016).

  106. 106.

    Jeffrey A Bader, How Xi JinpingSees the World... and Why (Brookings Institution, 2016). https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/xi_jinping_worldview_bader-1.pdf (accessed 21 November 2016).

  107. 107.

    Ibid.

  108. 108.

    “China to Complete Land Reclamation of Construction on Some Nansha Islands Soon,” China Daily, 16 June 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-06/16/content_21017939.htm (accessed 13 May 2016).

  109. 109.

    Tang, A Theory of Security Strategies for Our Time: Defensive Realism, 102.

  110. 110.

    Ibid.

  111. 111.

    Hunt and Quiano, “China Allows Philippines Fishermen Access to Disputed Shoal in South China Sea,” CNN, 31 October 2016.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Raditio, K.H. (2019). Security Dilemma Between China and Other South China Sea Claimant States. In: Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1283-0_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics