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Useful Adversary: Foreign-Domestic Linkages in China’s Relations with Japan (2010–15)

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Abstract

Of all the foreign policy relationships of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan has always been considered the most sensitive and emotional, one that needs to be prudently handled in Chinese domestic politics. This chapter examines the influence of domestic politics on Chinese foreign relations with Japan. By examining two cases after the Chinese fishing trawler collision incident in 2010 and improvements in China-Japan relations since 2014, this chapter offers an alternative interpretation of China’s Japan policy in the post-Cold War era by highlighting the domestic legitimacy of political leaders and the power rivalry within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Inayama Yoshihiro, the head of Keidanren in 1985 wrote a secret report to the Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda Masaharu on July 21, 1986. The report is preserved at Nakasone’s general office. For the details of the secret communication, see Nakasone Yasuhiro, “Yasukuni koshiki sanpai, iken dewa nai [Official visit to Yasukuni not unconstitutional],” Yomiuri Shimbun, p. 14, August 14, 1992; Sekai Heiwa Kenkyujo ed., Nakasone naikaku shi: Hibi no chousen, pp. 725–727; Nakasone Yasuhiro, “Watashi ga Yasukuni-jinja koshiki-sanpai o dannen shita riyu [Why I gave up paying a formal visit to the Yasukuni Shrine],” Seiron, (September 2001), pp. 108–109; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Nihon no sorigaku [Knowledge needed to be a Japanese prime minister] (PHP Shinsho, 2004), p. 45; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Tenchi yujou—50 nen no sengo seiji o kataru [The nature of Heaven and Earth—Talking about 50 years of postwar politics] (Bungei Shunju, 1996), pp. 463,492; Nakasone Yasuhiro,Nagasone Yasuhiro ga kataru sengo nihon gaiko [Japanese Foreign Policy since 1945: Nakasone Yasuhiro Oral History]. (Tokyo: Shinchousha, 2012); Gotoda Masaharu, Naikaku kanbo chokan [Chief Cabinet Secretary], (Kodansha, 1989). p. 149. Also see an interview with Nakasone , Yokoyama Hiroaki, Nitchu no shoeki [The invisible wall between Japan and China] (Saimaru Shuppankai, 1992), pp. 72–73.

  2. 2.

    Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 144.

  3. 3.

    On November 11, 2017, Abe and Xi held a meeting during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC ) summit in the Vietnamese resort city of Danang. At the end of the meeting, Xi said that the meeting marked a fresh start in relations between Japan and China. For details, see reports offered by the South China Morning Post. http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2120455/xi-and-abe-say-its-fresh-start-china-and-japan-hmm (accessed on November 22, 2017).

  4. 4.

    Niccolo Machiavelli , The Prince (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), p. 48.

  5. 5.

    For detailed discussion on the importance of power to a ruler, see Niccolo Machiavelli , The Prince, Chapter 10, Chapter 15 and Chapter 17.

  6. 6.

    Peter Gourevitch , “The Second-Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32, No.4. (Autumn, 1978), p. 905.

  7. 7.

    Robert D, Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, No.3. (Summer, 1988), pp. 456–459.

  8. 8.

    Helen Milner , Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. (Princeton University, 1997), p. 11.

  9. 9.

    Ibid., p. 46.

  10. 10.

    For early studies related to political survival of politicians in democracies, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracies. (New York: Harper, 1957); William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962).

  11. 11.

    Bueno de. Mesquita et al. The Logic of Political Survival. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). pp. 7–15.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., p. 23.

  13. 13.

    For classical discussion of legitimacy in the studies of politics, see Plato, The Republic of Plato, translated by Francis MacDonald Cornford, (Oxford University Press, 1978); Alan Ryan, “Hobbes’s Political Philosophy” in Tom Sorell, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed., by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

  14. 14.

    Raymond Geuss , History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 31.

  15. 15.

    For insightful discussion of this categorization and empirical examples of domestic-foreign linkages appearing in China, South Korea, Japan, and the United States, see Chong-pin Lin, “Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions with China: Struggle without Breaking”, Asian Survey, Vol.55, No.3 (May/June 2015), pp. 478–501.

  16. 16.

    For details, see Thomas J. Christensen. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958. (Princeton University Press, 1996).

  17. 17.

    “Nihon wa F35 dōnyū o – Beikokubōchōkan” [Japan to Import F35s – American Secretary of Defense], Jiji.com, (12 January 12, 2011), at http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201101/2011011200018. (Accessed on May 12, 2012).

  18. 18.

    People’s Daily, December 15, 2010.

  19. 19.

    Apple Daily (October 21, 2010).

  20. 20.

    “Xi criticizes anti-Japan war” Xinhua Net. “http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/07/c_133465725.htm (accessed on June 30, 2015).

  21. 21.

    Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 18, 2014, p. 2.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    See “Yang Jiechi Meets National Security Advisor of Japan Shotaro Yachi, China and Japan Reach Four-Point Principled Agreement on Handling and Improving Bilateral Relations” the homepage of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC. (Accessed on October 25, 2015).

    http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1208360.shtml. (Accessed on June 25, 2015).

  24. 24.

    Yomiuri Shimbun, December 27, 2014, p. 4.

  25. 25.

    According to analysis offered by one of the Japanese journalists, the realization of the China-Japan top leadership summit was welcomed by Beijing. But in public, the Chinese leader needed to create an image that China was handling requests that were originally initiated by Japan. It is a domestic public strategy that aims at avoiding domestic criticism within China on the Japan issue. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 18, 2014, p. 2. For this domestic political struggle within the Chinese Communist Party since 2012 and its linkage with foreign affairs related to Japan, see Minemura, Kenji. 13 okubun no ichi no otoko [One in 1.3 Billion: The Man Who Won the Chinese Throne after the Greatest Power Struggle in the World] (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 2015), Chapter 4 and 5. Minemura Kenji was the senior correspondent of Asahi Shimbun on China’s politics and foreign relations.

  26. 26.

    See, Chong-pin Lin, Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions with China: Struggle without Breaking”, Asian Survey, Vol.55, No.3 (May/June 2015), p. 488. A former official of the Chinese Coastguard also confirmed that weapons on the ships are locked and cannot be used without permission from a party authority. A conference held in Shanghai, 2013.

  27. 27.

    “Meiti chen sanzhongquanhui hou gaige 60 xiangrenwu zhishao 23 xiang yi qidong” Media report that 23 reforms are among 60 items already started after the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC, Daigongwang

    http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/focus/2013-12/2142298.html (accessed on May 18, 2016).

  28. 28.

    See Phoenix report in Hong Kong on this issue: http://news.ifeng.com/a/20141229/42819557_0.shtml

  29. 29.

    Mainichi Shimbun, July 23, 2015 http://mainichi.jp/shimen/news/20150723ddm001030217000c.html (Accessed on October 2, 2015).

  30. 30.

    During the special committee on security affairs held on July 29, 2015, Abe mentioned that China’s incursion in the East China Sea and expansions in the South China Sea were threats. Kanehara Nobukatsu, assistant to the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary of Abe’s administration, reportedly also suggested to Abe that he should not visit Beijing in September. Mr. Kanehara was the former chief of the Foreign Ministry’s International Legal Affairs Bureau and was generally regarded as the senior advisor to Abe on foreign relations issues. For details, see Weekly Toyo Keizai, August 22, 2015, p. 96.

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Amako, S., Cheung, M. (2018). Useful Adversary: Foreign-Domestic Linkages in China’s Relations with Japan (2010–15). In: Leng, TK., Aoyama, R. (eds) Decoding the Rise of China. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8288-7_6

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