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Judicial Independence and Accountability in the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights

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Book cover European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of Constitutional Law ((EYCL,volume 1))

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Abstract

This chapter assesses various aspects of judicial independence, judicial accountability and the election and selection of judges as reflected by the experiences of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). History shows that independence is a common principle and tradition of European constitutionalism. It has been implemented and balanced with accountability through reforms conditioned by standards of soft law from the Council of Europe and by case law of the ECtHR. The puzzle of rules that frame personal and institutional independence and accountability shows remaining problems and differences between international and constitutional judges. Election procedures balance personal independence with institutional accountability, but the supporting European consensus suffers populist threats to human rights protection.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Pizzorusso 2002, p 144 ff.

  2. 2.

    Von Bogdandy and Venzke 2014, p 191. For a political concept, see Tushnet 2013 and Schmitter 2007, p 3: ‘Accountability is first a relationship between two sets of actors (actually, most of it is played out not between individuals, but between organizations) in which the former accepts to inform the other, explain or justify his or her actions and submit to any pre-determined sanctions that the latter may impose’.

  3. 3.

    Bogdanor as quoted by official UK documents under: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Consultations/accountability.pdf Accessed 1 April 2019.

  4. 4.

    Von Bogdandy and Venzke 2014, p 85 ff.

  5. 5.

    Benvenisti and Downs 2017, p 105 ff.

  6. 6.

    Guarnieri 2013, p 356. Andenas 2007, p 12 distinguishes the ‘judicial culture’ of European judges from the ‘diplomatic culture’ of other international judges.

  7. 7.

    https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf; https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Copenhagen_Declaration_ENG.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2019.

  8. 8.

    Posner and Yoo 2005, p 66 praise a higher dependence and efficiency of international judges.

  9. 9.

    Plato, Laws, VI, 13, 767–768.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Tabula IX, 2: ‘Duram esse legem putas, quae iudicem arbitrumve iure datum, qui ob rem [iu]dic[a]ndam pecuniam accepisse convictus est, capite poenitur?’

  12. 12.

    C. 3.5.1.: ‘Generali lege decernimus neminem sibi esse iudicem vel ius sibi dicere debere.’

  13. 13.

    Act of Settlement 1701: ‘That after the said Limitation shall take Effect as aforesaid Judges Commissions be made Quam diu se bene Gesserint and their Salaries ascertained and established but upon the Address of both Houses of Parliament it may be lawfull to remove them.’

  14. 14.

    Grove 2018, p 465; Zimmermann 2014, p 56 ff; Pasquino 2010, p 195.

  15. 15.

    Spirit of the Laws (1748), XI, 6: ‘… one fears the magistracy, not the magistrates?’

  16. 16.

    Quoted by Alvazzi dal Frate 1999, p 124.

  17. 17.

    ‘The judicial power can in no case be exercised neither by the king, nor by the legislature, but justice will be administrated in the name of the King by the sole tribunals established by law, respecting the principles of the Constitution and the forms determined by the law.’

  18. 18.

    Article 102 Constitution Belgium 1831 added that remunerations shall be defined by law.

  19. 19.

    Hayo and Voigt 2014, p 189: ‘countries with a British legal origin and a Scandinavian legal origin are less likely to have implemented [judicial independence] in their constitutions.’

  20. 20.

    Kotuby and Sobota 2017, p 163 ff. For the relevance of general principles see Golder v. United Kingdom (1975).

  21. 21.

    Similar Article 14 Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) 1996. Article 26 OAS-Declaration 1948: just impartiality.

  22. 22.

    Loizidou 1995, para 75.

  23. 23.

    Wildhaber 2007, p. 521 ff; Greer and Wildhaber 2012, p. 655 ff.

  24. 24.

    Favoreu 2002, p 35 ff.

  25. 25.

    Zimmermann 2014, p 449 ff.

  26. 26.

    The Commissioner for Human Rights was admitted to third party intervention ex Article 36 (3) ECHR.

  27. 27.

    The Directorate of Legal Affairs launched a multilateral conference with the European Association of Judges (EAJ) and the European Association of Judges for Democracy and Freedom (MEDEL) adopting a ‘European Charter on the Statute of Judges’ (1998).

  28. 28.

    See the appendix of the ‘Framework global action plan for judges in Europe’ https://www.coe.int/fr/web/ccje/-/report-on-judicial-independence-and-impartiality-in-the-council-of-europe-member-states-in-2017 Accessed 1 April 2019.

  29. 29.

    Resolutions 1082 (1996), 1295 (1996), 1200 (1999), 1646 (2009), 2002 (2014), recomendations 1429 (1996), 1649 (2009).

  30. 30.

    CDL-AL (2001)003-rev, par. 41.

  31. 31.

    CDL-AD (2010)004.

  32. 32.

    Wittreck 2015, p 148 ff.

  33. 33.

    Voigt 2017, p 51.

  34. 34.

    Neumeister 1968, Delcourt 1970, Ringeisen 1971, De Wilde 1971, H. v. Belgium 1979, Schiesser 1980, Le Compte 1981, Piersack 1982, Sramek 1984, Campbell 1984, Benthem 1985, Ettl 1987, Belilos 1988, Langborger 1989, Padovani 1993, Bryan 1995, Findlay 1997, Lauko 1998, Incal 1998, Wille 1999, Silfirdingur 1999, Kyprianou 2001, Morris 2002, Kleyn 2003, Meznaric 2005, Flux 2007, Micallef 2009, Urban 2010, Maktouf 2013, Baka 2016.

  35. 35.

    Overruled in Borgers (1991), the participation without vote of the Belgian Procurateur Général to a deliberation of the Cour de Cassation was only criticised as ‘unusual’ and compared with the better system of the Court of Justice of the European Union. On impartiality, see Steinfatt 2012.

  36. 36.

    EComHR, application no. 8603/79, 8722/79, 8723/79, 8729/79, 18 December 1980.

  37. 37.

    EComHR, application no. 8866/80, 5 October 1981, quoted by Schermers and Kuijer 2005, application no. 12952/87, 6 November 1990.

  38. 38.

    EComHR, application no. 10279/83, 7 May 1984.

  39. 39.

    European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, ‘Independence, Accountability and Quality of the Judiciary’, available at http://njb.nl/Uploads/2017/6/encj-report-ia-2017-adopted-ga.pdf Accessed 1 April 2019.

  40. 40.

    ‘In the exercise of their judicial functions, judges shall be independent of all external authority or influence. They shall refrain from any activity or membership of an association, and avoid any situation, that may affect confidence in their independence.’ Similar ‘The Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary’, available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/international-courts/sites/international-courts/files/burgh_final_21204.pdf Accessed 1 April 2019.

  41. 41.

    AS/Jur (2014) 17 ‘Reinforcement of the independence of the European Court of Human Rights’.

  42. 42.

    Voeten 2009 and 2011, p 70 ff.

  43. 43.

    Zimmermann 2014, p 497 ff.

  44. 44.

    Article 4 amended in 2010 precludes representation in ECtHR proceedings for a period of two years from expiration.

  45. 45.

    Engel 2003, p 130. Pantiru became President of the Constitutional Court of Moldavia.

  46. 46.

    Statement of the ECtHR President 19 October 2011.

  47. 47.

    Follesdal 2017, p 500.

  48. 48.

    CoM Res (2009) 5.

  49. 49.

    Engel 2010, p 148 ff.

  50. 50.

    Lambert Abdelgawad 2017a, p 246 ff.

  51. 51.

    Engel 2003; De Boer-Buquicchio 2003.

  52. 52.

    AS/Jur (2014) 17.

  53. 53.

    Zimmermann 2014, p 490 ff.

  54. 54.

    Critical Lamber Abdelgawad 2017b.

  55. 55.

    Resolutions 1842 (2011) and 2002 (2014).

  56. 56.

    Lopez Guerra 2017, p 401 ff.

  57. 57.

    Bobek 2015, p 281 ff.

  58. 58.

    Limbach 2003; Voeten 2009 and 2011; Schabas 2015, pp 658 ff; Lemmens 2015, pp 95 ff; Kosar 2015, pp 161 ff; Baade 2017, pp 481 ff.

  59. 59.

    Resolution 1366 (2004), modified by resolutions 1426 (2005), 1627 (2008) and 1841 (2011).

  60. 60.

    Members are geographically and gender balanced chosen by the CoM among members of the highest national courts, former judges of international courts and other lawyers of recognised competence.

  61. 61.

    Häberle 2016, p 95.

  62. 62.

    Voigt 2017, pp 527 ff.

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  1. University of Eastern Piedmont Amedeo Avogadro, Alessandria, Italy

    Jörg Luther

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    Gerhard van der Schyff

  3. Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Maarten Stremler

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Luther, J. (2020). Judicial Independence and Accountability in the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. In: Hirsch Ballin, E., van der Schyff, G., Stremler, M. (eds) European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2019. European Yearbook of Constitutional Law, vol 1. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-359-7_9

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