Abstract
The speed with which the Indian Government accustomed itself to the conduct of foreign policy can be explained by the interest taken in external affairs by the nationalist movement, the Indian National Congress, which was founded as early as 1885. Originally its attention was directed towards issues closely related to India’s neighbours. The use of the Indian army and the consequent drain on Indian resources by various British expeditions caused early protests. The first session of the Congress passed a resolution condemning the annexation of Upper Burma, largely because of fears of increased taxation, and advocated separate status for Burma as a Crown Colony. In 1891 reference was made to the subject again as a possible source of a clash with China. The Younghusband expedition to Tibet in 1904 was severely criticised by the Congress President, Sir Henry Cotton, as an “act of wanton violence and agression.” Another member condemned the action, because there were no indications of fresh provocation by Russia in Tibet or Central Asia, which in any case would not necessarily concern India.1 In view of the importance they would later acquire, relations with Tibet deserve further attention.
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References
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Younghusband failed to obtain the signature of the Amban as instructed. He exceeded his instructions by insisting on an indemnity and obtaining the right for the British trade-agent at Gyantse to visit Lhasa. The Indian Government cancelled this right and reduced the indemnity.
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This paragraph and the following are based upon the India Office Library Political Files, Tibet negotiations with China (1913) Vol. 16, 17, 18, and Foreign Office Register of Correspondence, China (1913). Public Records Office, IND. 27857.
The Foreign Office wrote to the Under Secretary of State in the India office “H.M.G. must acquire no rights and undertake no responsibilities that can in any way be held to infringe the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907” (April 30, 1913, No. 16537/13). It also rejected the idea of having two separate sets of negotiations, with China and with Russia, as these would inevitably influence each other’s course (May 15, 1913, No. 20005/13).
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The distinction was not without precedent. Edward Balfour’s Cyclopedia of India (3rd ed., Quaritch, London, 1885, Vol. 3, p. 87) stated: “The Chinese government divides Tibet into two provinces, Anterior Tibet and Ulterior Tibet.”
Exchanges of notes between all three parties would state that Tibet formed part of Chinese territory, but that Outer Tibet would not be represented in the Chinese parliament.
The India Office attached great importance to this right as it would be the only effective means to enforce observance of the tripartite agreement (Secret Department No. 1706). The Times of Jan. 6, 1913 had argued “The best way of terminating forever Chinese attempts to assert sovereignty over Tibet is to send a British representative to Lhasa.” At the Simla Conference a compromise was reached after the Chinese delegate had opposed discussion at Lhasa of any questions of a political, territorial or international character by the British agent. The Boundary Question between China and Tibet, p. 106.
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Van Eekelen, W.F. (1967). Sino-Indian Relations Prior to 1954. In: Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6555-8_2
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