Abstract
During the 1980s structured research into tax evasion and non-compliance became widespread following the political concerns in the United States of an increasing “tax gap.” Initially, the literature which emerged from the United States had a strong focus on economic theory. Utility theory, developed by Allingham and Sandmo, assumed taxpayers to be utility maximisers in decisions of tax reporting and compliance, where tax evasion was viewed as worthwhile if the financial gains purely outweighed the financial costs.
More recently, however, tax compliance studies have been based on social and psychological theories. Research studies in this field have argued that the human element plays a vital role in individual taxpayer compliance decisions. However, while the tax compliance literature has emerged from a wide variety of disciplines, there has been a lack of consensus and agreement as to why people do or do not pay their taxes. Indeed the tax compliance literature indicates that there are still many research gaps that need to be filled with respect to issues concerning tax morals, tax fairness and deterrence measures, for the likely improvement in overall taxpayer compliance.
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Notes
- 1.
Tanzi and Shome (1994, p. 17).
- 2.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972, pp. 323–338).
- 3.
See for example Murphy (2004), Tan (1998), Hite (1997) and Torgler and Murphy (2004).
- 4.
Cuccia (1994, pp. 81–116).
- 5.
Ibid 90–91.
- 6.
See, for example, Kaplan et al. (1986, pp. 461–476).
- 7.
See Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Chap. 3 generally.
- 8.
Ibid 142.
- 9.
See for example, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980).
- 10.
See Chap. 3 for more discussion on an extended economic deterrence model.
- 11.
See, for example, Fischer et al. (1992, pp. 1–46).
- 12.
See for example Hite (1989, p. 254).
- 13.
Milliron and Toy (1988, pp. 84–104).
- 14.
Fischer et al. (1992, p. 2).
- 15.
Becker (1968, pp. 169–217).
- 16.
Ibid 181.
- 17.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
- 18.
Friedland et al., quoted in Lewis (1982), St Martins Press New York, conducted a simulation test of Allingham and Sandmo’s model. The results suggest that the overall income declared decreased and the probability of evasion increased as a function of higher taxes, and that the fraction of earned income was very elastic with respect to the tax rate. However, the relationships were not found to be statistically significant. Lewis also questioned the comparability of the simulation to real-life behaviour. As cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 39).
- 19.
That is the threshold or maximum chance of being detected for a tax offence.
- 20.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972, pp 323–338).
- 21.
Srinivasan (1973, pp. 339–346).
- 22.
Ibid 342.
- 23.
Ibid 344.
- 24.
Kolm (1973, pp. 265–270).
- 25.
Kolm as cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 40).
- 26.
Yitzhaki (1974, pp. 201–202).
- 27.
Yitzhaki as cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 40).
- 28.
Ibid.
- 29.
Tittle and Logan (1973, pp. 371–389).
- 30.
Friedland (1982, pp. 54–59).
- 31.
Ibid 55.
- 32.
Jackson and Jones (1985, pp. 7–17). This research also added credence to congressional efforts to raise the magnitude of legal penalties a taxpayer faces for non-compliance (Code Section 6661).
- 33.
Self-assessment was implemented in Australia in 1986 and approximately 2 % of the taxpaying population are audited based on this system.
- 34.
Graetz and Wilde (1985, pp. 355–363).
- 35.
Jackson and Milliron (1986).
- 36.
Reinganum and Wilde (1986, pp. 739–760).
- 37.
Ibid 748.
- 38.
Graetz et al. (1986, pp. 1–32).
- 39.
Graetz et al. cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 43).
- 40.
Cowell (1985, pp. 164–193).
- 41.
Cowell as cited in McKerchar (2003, pp. 41–42).
- 42.
Scotchmer and Slemrod (1989, pp. 17–32) as cited in McKerchar (2003, pp. 44–45).
- 43.
Slemrod (1989) in Roth and Scholz (1989).
- 44.
Slemrod as cited in McKerchar (2003, pp. 45–46).
- 45.
Ibid 46.
- 46.
Ibid 46.
- 47.
Cuccia (1994, pp. 81–116).
- 48.
Cuccia cited in Smart (1999, p. 11).
- 49.
Jackson and Milliron (1986, p. 6).
- 50.
Falkinger and Walther (1991, pp. 67–79).
- 51.
Ibid 72.
- 52.
Alm et al. (1995, pp. 3–18).
- 53.
Ibid 16.
- 54.
Pilkington (1998).
- 55.
See Carnes and Eglebrecht (1995, pp. 26–41).
- 56.
Roth and Scholz (1989).
- 57.
Hasseldine (2000, pp. 299–303).
- 58.
Schmolders (1959, pp. 184–193).
- 59.
Ibid 187.
- 60.
McKerchar (2003, p. 55).
- 61.
Strumpel (1969).
- 62.
Ibid.
- 63.
Strumpel cited in Smart (1999, p. 13).
- 64.
Kinsey (1986, pp. 403–425).
- 65.
Kinsey as cited in Smart (1999, p. 13).
- 66.
Ibid.
- 67.
Ibid.
- 68.
Spicer (1974).
- 69.
Vogel (1974, pp. 499–513).
- 70.
Song and Yarbrough (1978, pp. 442–452).
- 71.
See studies herein Chap. 2 generally, which found both tax morals and tax fairness variables to be significantly related to compliance behaviour.
- 72.
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980).
- 73.
An extended version of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) is provided in the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). See Ajzen (1991, p. 179).
- 74.
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980).
- 75.
Bobeck et al. (2007, pp. 49–64).
- 76.
Ajzen and Fishbein as cited in Lewis (1982, p. 173).
- 77.
Ibid.
- 78.
Ibid 174.
- 79.
Ibid.
- 80.
Ajzen and Fishbein as cited in McKerchar (2003, pp. 48–50).
- 81.
Lewis (1982, p. 172).
- 82.
Ibid 173–176.
- 83.
Ibid 183.
- 84.
Ibid 222–224.
- 85.
Cialdini (1989, pp. 200–227).
- 86.
Ibid 221.
- 87.
Schmolders (1959, p. 190).
- 88.
Hite (1997, pp. 155–180).
- 89.
For example, the ATO in Australia and the IRD in New Zealand.
- 90.
Hite (1997, pp. 155–180).
- 91.
Ibid 161.
- 92.
Ibid 175–176.
- 93.
See for example Torgler and Murphy (2004), Braithwaite et al. (2001).
- 94.
Groenland and Van Veldhoven (1983, pp 129–144).
- 95.
Ibid 132.
- 96.
Ibid 136.
- 97.
Ibid 140.
- 98.
Ibid 143.
- 99.
Ibid 144.
- 100.
Kaplan and Reckers (1985, pp. 97–102).
- 101.
Ibid 99.
- 102.
Ibid 101.
- 103.
Smith and Kinsey (1978, pp. 639–663).
- 104.
Ibid 651.
- 105.
Ibid 657.
- 106.
Smith and Kinsey cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 75).
- 107.
Alm et al. (1992, pp. 118–126).
- 108.
Ibid 1022.
- 109.
See Alm et al. (1992, pp. 107–114). See also Alm et al. (1992, pp. 311–329) and Alm et al. (1993, pp. 285–303).
- 110.
Refer to Sect. 2.3.2.4 of this chapter, for the various findings of tax fairness studies conducted during the 1990s.
- 111.
See, for example, Hite (1989), Parcano (1988) and Beron et al. (1992).
- 112.
Slemrod (1992).
- 113.
Tan (1998, pp. 59–71).
- 114.
For example, the NZ government has introduced several tax simplification measures, particularly since the beginning of the 1990s for small business, and is continuing to look for ways to alleviate the burden of tax for them, cited in Tan and Sawyer (2003, pp. 431–454).
- 115.
Ibid 431.
- 116.
The variable ‘moral values’ has been employed in different ways in different studies producing inconsistent results for the same variable, cited in Smart (1999).
- 117.
See, for example, Grasmick and Scott (1982, pp. 213–230). Kaplan and Reckers (1985), Coleman (1997) and Song and Yarbrough (1978).
- 118.
See, for example, Vogel (1974), Robben et al. (1990), Hasseldine and Kaplan (1992) and Hite (1997).
- 119.
Warneryd and Walerud (1982, pp. 187–211).
- 120.
Porcano (1988, pp. 47–67).
- 121.
Collins et al. (1992).
- 122.
Reckers et al. (1994, pp. 825–836).
- 123.
Antonides and Robben (1995, pp. 617–640).
- 124.
Attwell and Sawyer (2001, pp. 111–146).
- 125.
Ibid 144.
- 126.
Torgler and Murphy (2004, pp. 298–335).
- 127.
Schwartz and Orleans (1967, pp. 274–300, 280).
- 128.
Studies using the experimental approach tend to measure the tax compliance behaviour based on the outcome of a tax reporting simulation exercise.
- 129.
Schwartz and Orleans cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 55).
- 130.
Roth et al. (1989, p. 44).
- 131.
Vogel (1974, pp. 499–513).
- 132.
Ibid 510.
- 133.
Song and Yarbrough (1978, pp. 442–452).
- 134.
Ibid 447.
- 135.
Ibid 450.
- 136.
Song and Yarbrough cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 58).
- 137.
Kaplan and Reckers (1985, pp. 97–102).
- 138.
Kaplan et al. (1988, pp. 371–379).
- 139.
Ibid 374.
- 140.
Ibid 378.
- 141.
Grasmick and Scott (1982, pp. 213–230).
- 142.
Ibid 227.
- 143.
Grasmick and Scott cited in Smart (1999, p. 18).
- 144.
Grasmick and Bursik (1990, pp. 837–861).
- 145.
Stalans et al.(1989, pp. 481–503).
- 146.
Grasmick and Bursik (1990).
- 147.
Grasmick and Bursik cited in Smart (1999, p. 18).
- 148.
Thurman et al. (1984, pp. 309–327).
- 149.
Ibid 309.
- 150.
Richardson and Sawyer (2001, p. 153).
- 151.
Thurman et al. (1984, p. 314).
- 152.
Hite (1988, pp. 445–466).
- 153.
Ibid 461.
- 154.
Ibid 462.
- 155.
Thurman (1991, pp. 289–298).
- 156.
Thurman cited in Smart (1999, p. 18).
- 157.
Ibid.
- 158.
Ibid.
- 159.
Robben et al. (1990, pp. 512–522).
- 160.
Hasseldine et al. (1994, pp. 79–93).
- 161.
Ibid 90.
- 162.
Robben et al. cited in Smart (1999, p. 19).
- 163.
Ibid.
- 164.
Brooks and Doobs (1990).
- 165.
Smith (1990, pp. 350–369; 1992).
- 166.
Sheffrin and Triest (1992, pp. 193–218).
- 167.
See Smart (1999, p. 19).
- 168.
Roberts (1994, pp. 67–86).
- 169.
Roberts cited in Smart (1999, p. 19).
- 170.
Hite cited in Smart (1999, p. 19).
- 171.
Ibid.
- 172.
Roberts cited in Smart (1999, p. 19).
- 173.
McGraw and Scholz (1991, pp. 471–498) cited in Smart (1999, p. 19).
- 174.
Hasseldine and Kaplan (1992, pp. 45–60) cited in Smart (1999, p. 20).
- 175.
Coleman (1997, pp. 11–15) cited in Smart (1999, p. 20).
- 176.
Ibid.
- 177.
Ibid.
- 178.
Ibid.
- 179.
Eriksen and Fallan (1996, pp. 387–402).
- 180.
Eriksen and Fallan as cited in Smart (1999, p. 20).
- 181.
Ghosh and Grain (1995, pp. 353–365).
- 182.
Chang (1995, pp. 25–42).
- 183.
Bosco and Mittone (1997, pp. 297–324).
- 184.
Wahlund (1992, pp. 657–677).
- 185.
De Juan et al. (1994, pp. 90–105).
- 186.
Niemirowski and Mobbs (2002, pp. 1–114).
- 187.
Ibid 49.
- 188.
See Song and Yarbrough (1978) where the Tax Administration did not represent the desires of the people—“taxation without representation”
- 189.
Braithwaite et al. (2001, pp. 1–21).
- 190.
Ibid. This work resulted in collaboration between the ATO and ANU in the CTSI Unit.
- 191.
Ibid 4.
- 192.
Ibid 7.
- 193.
Ibid 11.
- 194.
Trivedi et al. (2005, pp. 29–61).
- 195.
Ibid 56.
- 196.
Torgler and Murphy (2004, pp. 298–335).
- 197.
There are many behavioural norms and moral constraints that are strongly influenced by religious motivations. The Torgler and Murphy study employed a simple question of religious belief.
- 198.
Torgler and Murphy (2004, p. 331).
- 199.
Torgler (2003, pp. 283–302).
- 200.
Torgler (2004, pp. 63–74).
- 201.
Ibid 69.
- 202.
Ibid 72.
- 203.
Torgler (2004, pp. 235–253).
- 204.
Wenzel (2005, pp. 491–510).
- 205.
Injunctive norm refers to perceived behaviour, of which most people approve or disapprove. In contrast subjective norms refer to perceptions of injunctive norms held by referents (Bobek et al. 2007).
- 206.
Cadsby et al. (2006, pp. 343–359).
- 207.
Ibid 351.
- 208.
Ibid 355.
- 209.
Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui (2006, pp. 174–180).
- 210.
Ibid 178.
- 211.
Wenzel (2007, pp. 31–50).
- 212.
Ibid 44.
- 213.
Kornhauser (2007, pp. 599–632).
- 214.
Ibid 626.
- 215.
Ibid 628.
- 216.
Ibid 628.
- 217.
McGee and Gupta (2009, pp. 1–22).
- 218.
Ibid 19.
- 219.
Cummings et al. (2009, pp. 447–457).
- 220.
Torgler and Schneider (2009, pp. 228–245).
- 221.
Braithwaite (2007) as cited in Smart (2012, p. 58).
- 222.
The three coping sensibilities are: ‘thinking morally’, ‘feeling oppressed’ and taking control and they are all based on how people deal with life events.
- 223.
Pope and McKerchar (2010, pp. 1–13).
- 224.
Ibid 11–12.
- 225.
Defined in Pope and McKerchar as the extent to which an individual is committed to the religion he or she professes and its teachings, with individuals’ attitudes and behaviour reflecting this commitment.
- 226.
Jackson and Milliron (1986, pp. 125–165).
- 227.
Elffers et al. (1992, pp. 545–567).
- 228.
See Jackson and Milliron (1986, pp. 125–165), Christensen et al. (1994, pp. 63–94) and also Richardson and Sawyer (2001, p. 154).
- 229.
The three categories of distributive fairness explored herein are horizontal, vertical and exchange equity. Some references will also be made to procedural and general fairness perceptions.
- 230.
Thibaut et al. (1974, pp. 792–801).
- 231.
Ibid 795.
- 232.
Spicer (1974, p. 135).
- 233.
Spicer and Lundstedt (1976, pp. 295–305) cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 57).
- 234.
Ibid.
- 235.
Ibid.
- 236.
Spicer and Becker (1980, pp. 171–175) as cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 60).
- 237.
Ibid.
- 238.
Robben et al. (1990, p. 522).
- 239.
McGraw and Scholz cited in Smart (1999, p. 25).
- 240.
The first message emphasised the social consequence of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and normative duties, while the second message emphasised the personal consequence of the TRA and strategies to reduce tax liabilities, cited in Smart (1999, p. 25).
- 241.
Coleman (1997).
- 242.
Coleman cited in Smart (1999, p. 25).
- 243.
Collins et al. (1992).
- 244.
The subgroups in this contingency model were identified by the contingency factors: taxpayer objective (whether the main intention is to ensure correct return or minimise taxes), and preparation mode (whether returns were prepared by self or a tax preparer), cited in Smart (1999, p. 26).
- 245.
Collins cited in Smart (1999, p. 27).
- 246.
Cowell (1992, pp. 521–543).
- 247.
Ibid 537.
- 248.
Mosser et al. (1995, pp. 619–634).
- 249.
Moser cited in Smart (1999, p. 27).
- 250.
Smith (1992, pp. 223–250).
- 251.
Ibid 246.
- 252.
Lempert (1992, pp. 251–257).
- 253.
De Juan et al. cited in Smart (1999, p. 26).
- 254.
Wearing and Headley (1997, pp. 3–17).
- 255.
Hite and Roberts (1992, pp. 115–137).
- 256.
Hite and Roberts cited in Smart (1999, p. 26).
- 257.
Ibid.
- 258.
See also Hite and Roberts (1991, pp. 47–57).
- 259.
Hite (1997, pp. 155–180).
- 260.
Hite cited in Smart (1999, p. 27).
- 261.
Hite (1990, pp. 90–108).
- 262.
Hite cited in Smart (1999, p. 27).
- 263.
Brooks and Doobs (1990).
- 264.
Brooks and Doobs cited in Smart (1999, p. 27).
- 265.
Hasseldine et al. (1994).
- 266.
Antonides and Robben (1995).
- 267.
Antonides and Robben cited in Smart (1999, p. 27).
- 268.
Spicer (1974).
- 269.
Spicer and Lundstedt (1976).
- 270.
Song and Yarbrough (1978).
- 271.
Spicer and Becker (1980).
- 272.
Scott and Grasmick (1981, pp. 359–408).
- 273.
Wallschutzky (1984).
- 274.
Becker et al. (1987, pp. 243–252).
- 275.
Porcano (1988).
- 276.
Alm et al. (1992).
- 277.
Alm et al. cited in Smart (1999, p. 28).
- 278.
See Wallschutzky (1984) and Wallschutzky (1985).
- 279.
Wallschutzky (1984, p. 380).
- 280.
Ibid 380.
- 281.
Alm et al. (1992).
- 282.
Alm et al. cited in Smart (1999, p. 28).
- 283.
Ibid.
- 284.
Alm et al. (1992, pp. 285–303).
- 285.
Alm et al. (1992, pp. 1018–1026) and (1992, pp. 311–329). See also Gilligan and Richardson (2005, pp. 1–13).
- 286.
Alm et al. (1992) cited in Smart (1999, p. 28).
- 287.
Ibid.
- 288.
Ibid.
- 289.
Alm et al. (1992) cited in Smart (1999, p. 29).
- 290.
Ibid.
- 291.
Ibid.
- 292.
Alm et al. (1995).
- 293.
Chang et al. (1987, pp. 299–305) cited in Smart (1999, p. 29).
- 294.
Tan (1998).
- 295.
Ibid 66.
- 296.
Ibid 67.
- 297.
Taylor (2001).
- 298.
Ibid 15.
- 299.
Bloomquist (2003, pp. 1–26).
- 300.
Ibid 19.
- 301.
Ibid 21.
- 302.
Lederman (2003, pp. 1–40).
- 303.
Ibid 36.
- 304.
Ibid 37.
- 305.
Ibid 38.
- 306.
Gilligan and Richardson (2005, pp. 1–13).
- 307.
Ibid 10.
- 308.
Ibid 11.
- 309.
Richardson (2006, pp. 39–52).
- 310.
Ibid 50.
- 311.
See Richardson and Sawyer (2001, pp. 180–184) and Jackson and Milliron (1986, p. 137).
- 312.
The three particular dimensions of fairness, have been vertical equity, horizontal equity and exchange equity.
- 313.
Gravelle and Gravelle (2006, pp. 631–649).
- 314.
Ibid 640.
- 315.
Ibid 647.
- 316.
James et al. (2005, pp. 157–188).
- 317.
Ibid 179.
- 318.
Ibid 179.
- 319.
Ibid 181.
- 320.
Richardson (2005, pp. 407–434).
- 321.
Ibid 427.
- 322.
Ibid 428.
- 323.
Kirchler et al. (2006) as cited in Smart (2012, p. 51).
- 324.
Murphy (2003) as cited in Smart (2012, p. 49).
- 325.
Franzoni (2000) as cited in Smart (2012, p. 51).
- 326.
Tyler (2010) as cited in Smart (2012, p. 52).
- 327.
Hartner et al. (2008) as cited in Smart (2012, p. 59).
- 328.
Data for this study was taken from the Community, Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey (Braithwaite, et al. 200) and the Australian Tax System- Fair or not survey.
- 329.
Murphy (2005) as cited in Smart (2012, pp. 49–50).
- 330.
Van Dijke and Verboon (2010) as cited in Smart (2012, p. 50).
- 331.
Saad (2009, 2011) as cited in Smart (2012, p. 37).
- 332.
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) is an extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (See Fig. 2.2), and posits that attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural controls are key elements in determining a person’s intentions to engage in target behaviour and ultimately influences the performance of that behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen 1991).
- 333.
Warneryd and Walerud (1982) cited in Smart (1999, p. 29).
- 334.
McGhee et al. (1996, pp. 101–127).
- 335.
See Sect. 2.3.3 generally.
- 336.
See Dean et al. (1980), Schwartz and Orleans (1967), Frieberg (1986) all had significant findings with respect to penalties improving taxpayer compliance.
- 337.
Grasmick et al. (1993, pp. 679–705).
- 338.
Richardson and Sawyer (2001, p. 149).
- 339.
Schwartz and Orleans (1967, pp. 274–300).
- 340.
Ibid 293.
- 341.
Ibid 294.
- 342.
Ibid 295.
- 343.
Ibid 296.
- 344.
Ibid 297.
- 345.
Roth et al. cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 55).
- 346.
Meier and Johnson (1977, pp. 292–304).
- 347.
Ibid 297. See also Jackson and Milliron (1986, p. 137).
- 348.
Zimring and Hawkins (1973).
- 349.
Ibid 158.
- 350.
Ibid 162.
- 351.
Tittle and Logan (1973).
- 352.
Ibid 385.
- 353.
Ibid 386.
- 354.
Ibid 385.
- 355.
Nagin (1978, pp. 341–365).
- 356.
Ibid 357.
- 357.
Ibid 360.
- 358.
Mason and Calvin (1978, pp. 73–89).
- 359.
Ibid 86.
- 360.
Ibid 87.
- 361.
Klepper and Nagin (1989, pp. 209–240). See also Klepper and Nagin (1989, pp. 126–155).
- 362.
Ibid 235.
- 363.
Ibid 236.
- 364.
Dean et al. (1980, pp. 28–44).
- 365.
Ibid 39.
- 366.
Ibid 41.
- 367.
Witte and Woodbury (1983, pp. 133–148) cited in McKerchar (2003, p. 63). (It should be noted that this study modelled data from the IRS’s Tax Compliance Measurement Program—a massive US data set.).
- 368.
Ibid.
- 369.
Ibid.
- 370.
Witte and Woodbury (1985, pp. 1–13).
- 371.
Ibid 9.
- 372.
Ibid 10.
- 373.
Ibid.
- 374.
Grasmick and Scott (1982, pp. 213–230).
- 375.
Ibid 227.
- 376.
Ibid 227.
- 377.
Ibid 228.
- 378.
Kinsey (1986, pp. 1–50).
- 379.
There is a range of economic considerations from the government’s viewpoint as to whether or not to increase sanctions or penalties for taxation offences, particularly when the cost of auditing and collecting the revenue outweighs the additional revenue that will be raised.
- 380.
Kinsey (1986, p. 11).
- 381.
Ibid 34.
- 382.
Ibid 38.
- 383.
See for example Ambrecht (1988), Frieberg (1986) and Dean (1981).
- 384.
Ambrecht (1998, pp. 1–12).
- 385.
Hasseldine (1989, pp. 509–523).
- 386.
Alm et al. (1995, pp. 3–16).
- 387.
Ibid 10.
- 388.
In Australia, for example, self-assessment was introduced in 1986. Taxpayers’ tax returns are not scrutinised by the tax authorities upon lodgement, but rather are subject to the possibility of audit.
- 389.
Pilkington (1998).
- 390.
Milleman (1994, pp. 343–352).
- 391.
Ibid 347.
- 392.
Ibid 350.
- 393.
Hite (1997).
- 394.
James and Alley (1999, pp. 3–14).
- 395.
Callihan and Spindle (1997, pp. 1–23).
- 396.
Ibid 18.
- 397.
Wickerson (1994, pp. 125–143).
- 398.
Ibid 137.
- 399.
See Alm et al. (1992, pp. 21–38) and Andreoni et al. (1998, pp. 818–860).
- 400.
Ibid 35.
- 401.
Ibid 36.
- 402.
Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 855).
- 403.
Ibid 855.
- 404.
Hasseldine and Hansford (2003, pp. 110–122).
- 405.
Ibid 114.
- 406.
Ibid 116.
- 407.
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005, pp. 23–47).
- 408.
Ibid 34.
- 409.
Ibid 39.
- 410.
Williams (2001, pp. 1–26).
- 411.
Ibid 20.
- 412.
Ibid 22.
- 413.
Feld and Fry (2003, pp. 1–19).
- 414.
Ibid16.
- 415.
Ibid 17.
- 416.
Wenzel (2003, pp. 1–32).
- 417.
The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions survey was mailed to a random sample of Australians between June and October 2000. The purpose of the survey was to obtain a snapshot of the beliefs, attitudes, values and motivations that Australian citizens held in relation to the ATO, the tax system, Australian democracy and fellow taxpayers during the first phase of tax reform. The survey was designed to canvass a broad range of issues relating to taxation in Australia, and produced data on some 500 variables. See Braithwaite (2001).
- 418.
Wenzel (2003, p. 22).
- 419.
Ibid 24.
- 420.
Ibid 27.
- 421.
Karlinsky et al. (2004, pp. 226–240) see also Burtonet al. (2005, pp. 35–48).
- 422.
Ibid 234.
- 423.
McIntosh and Veal (2001, pp. 80–108).
- 424.
Slemrod (2007, pp. 25–48).
- 425.
Ibid 33.
- 426.
Ibid 41.
- 427.
Ibid 44.
- 428.
Kirchler et al. (2008, pp. 210–225).
- 429.
See Braithwaite (2003, pp. 15–39).
- 430.
Kirchler et al. (2008, p. 219).
- 431.
Hasseldine et al. (2007, pp. 171–194).
- 432.
Ibid 187.
- 433.
Ibid 191.
- 434.
Dubin (2007, pp. 500–529).
- 435.
Dubin et al. (1987, pp. 240–245).
- 436.
Ibid 242.
- 437.
Ibid 243.
- 438.
Alm et al. (2010, pp. 577–586).
- 439.
Ibid 581.
- 440.
Ibid 583.
- 441.
Loo (2006, pp. 117–140).
- 442.
Ibid 139.
- 443.
Ibid 140.
- 444.
Gupta (2007, pp. 1–27).
- 445.
Ibid 17–18.
- 446.
Raskolnikov (2006, pp. 569–642).
- 447.
Ibid 638.
- 448.
See for example, Sandmo (2005, pp. 643–663).
- 449.
See Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
- 450.
Sandmo (2005, pp. 659–660).
- 451.
Schauer and Bajor (2007) as cited in Smart (2012, p. 40).
- 452.
Van Prooijen et al. (2008) as cited in Smart (2012, p. 43).
- 453.
See Sheffrin and Triest (1992, pp. 193–218). The study indicated that broadly-based enforcement programs might reduce the chance of adversarial relationships between the IRS and taxpayers and lower taxpayers’ estimates of the probability of detection as a result of being affected by the enforcement program.
- 454.
For example, the link between morals and sanction levels will be tested.
- 455.
Kaplan and Reckers (1985, pp. 97–102).
- 456.
Hasseldine and Kaplan (1992, pp. 45–60).
- 457.
Richardson and Sawyer (2001).
- 458.
Ibid 180–184.
- 459.
See for example, Christensen, Weihrich and Newman (1994) and Hite (1997).
- 460.
Richardson and Sawyer (2001, pp. 192–196).
- 461.
See for example, Smith (1992), Sheffrin and Triest (1992).
- 462.
See for example, Kaplan and Reckers (1985) and Greonland and Veldhoven (1983).
- 463.
Richardson and Sawyer (2001, p. 243).
- 464.
See for example, Milliron and Toy (1988) and McKerchar (2003).
- 465.
Where the literature, quantitative and qualitative findings are drawn together to strengthen the overall results.
- 466.
See Chap. 2 generally.
- 467.
Jackson and Milliron (1986, pp. 125–165, 136).
- 468.
Richardson and Sawyer (2001, pp. 137–320, 177).
- 469.
Jackson and Milliron (1986, pp. 125–165, 137).
- 470.
Christensen et al. (1994, pp. 63–94).
- 471.
Richardson and Sawyer (2001, p. 180).
- 472.
Jackson and Milliron (1986, pp. 125–165, 140–142).
- 473.
Richardson and Sawyer (2001, pp. 192–199).
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Devos, K. (2014). Tax Compliance Theory and the Literature. In: Factors Influencing Individual Taxpayer Compliance Behaviour. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7476-6_2
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