Abstract
The “Hand rule ” – named after US Federal Judge Learned Hand, its originator – is familiar in the literature of Economic Analysis of Law as the first attempt to define the standard of care when determining negligence , and hence ultimately liability, by means of a cost-benefit analysis . According to the rule, a person acts negligently if the expected value of some harm caused by that person is greater than the cost of avoiding it. Proponents of the Hand rule see it as the basis for the most efficient possible regulation of tort law , since in bilateral incidents of harm or accidents it sets the right incentives for both the injurer and the victim to take precautions as long as the costs are proportionate, and thus promotes the maximization of social welfare. The objection to this imposition from a traditional juristic viewpoint is that tort law ’s main function is to bring about corrective justice between the affected parties rather than to achieve welfare-maximizing outcomes of any kind. The present essay attempts to mediate between these conflicting viewpoints by setting out the possibilities and limitations of any application of the Hand rule in Swiss tort law .
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- 1.
For a detailed presentation of Richard Posner ’s theory of wealth maximization, see Mathis, Efficiency, pp. 143 et seqq.
- 2.
Historically, tort law was one of the starting points of Economic Analysis of Law and is now one of the best researched areas of this legal theoretical discipline. Fundamental contributions to this development were made by the works of Guido Calabresi , The Costs of Accidents, and John P. Brown, ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Liability’.
- 3.
For instance Honsell, § 1 N 73, views the prevalence of the idea of compensation as an instance of great cultural progress which may not be undone for any reason.
- 4.
BGE 130 I 337. This case is especially controversial since the Federal Supreme Court overruled the Canton of Bern administrative court’s decision and referred the case back to the lower court. In its new judgement, however, the lower court did not adhere to the Federal Supreme Court’s dismissal, whereupon the complainants took their case to the Federal Supreme Court a second time. In BGer 4P.244/2005 of February 6, 2006, the Federal Supreme Court also overturned the administrative court’s second ruling and accepted the appeal.
- 5.
A delirium is understood to mean an etiologically unspecific organic brain syndrome characterized by disturbances of consciousness, attention, perception, thinking, cognition, memory, psychomotor and emotional functions.
- 6.
BGer 4P.244/2005, E. 4.
- 7.
In healthcare, the “Number Needed to Treat” (NNT) refers to the number of patients whom it would be necessary to treat in order to avoid one additional bad outcome – for example, in cancer treatment, the death of one patient.
- 8.
These figures are taken from the calculations of the lower court. See BGer 4P.244/2005, E. 4.1.
- 9.
This was the decision of the lower court, whose judgement was overruled by the Federal Supreme Court. On this, see BGer 4P.244/2005, E. 4.1 and 5. Criticism of the Federal Supreme Court’s ruling are voiced e.g. by Kuhn, pp. 1015 et seqq. and Seiler, pp. 148 et seqq.
- 10.
When the parties concerned are not in any contractual relationship with one another which would regulate the consequences of a harmful event, so that the harmful event or accident itself instigates the legal relationship between them, this is referred to in economics as an involuntary transaction. Brown, ‘Liability Rules’, pp. 34 et seq.
- 11.
Brown, ‘Liability Rules’, p. 35.
- 12.
Mathis, Efficiency, p. 78.
- 13.
Under Swiss law, compensation for pure economic losses (“reine Vermögensschäden”) demands a breach of a protection norm, i.e. the violation of a behavioural norm, the purpose of which is to protect against such forms of harm. Bärtschi, p. 119.
- 14.
Bärtschi, p. 131; Rey, N 12.
- 15.
Coleman, pp. 13 et seq.; Perry, p. 67.
- 16.
Hartmann, p. 64.
- 17.
The definitive criterion is the principle of causation, i.e. the person who caused the harm is liable for it. Negative externalities (costs) incurred by B but caused by A are passed on from B to A. A is liable towards B for the harm caused.
- 18.
The concern here is to minimize the repercussions of a certain instance of harm for the whole of society. The aim therefore is to spread the loss suffered by an individual or the resultant costs as well as possible across the whole of society. Calabresi , pp. 39 et seqq. This spreading function is largely fulfilled by the insurance market (e.g. obligatory liability insurance). Perry, p. 77.
- 19.
In this context Guido Calabresi developed the argumentational device of the “cheapest cost avoider”, whereby the person who should be obliged to prevent the harm or pay compensation is whoever can avoid the harm at the lowest cost; Calabresi , pp. 136 et seqq. This model is intended to resolve cases of reciprocal harm, when the avoidance of a disadvantage to one party irrefutably imposes a disadvantage on the other party, i.e. if either the injurer, the victim, or a third party alone can prevent the harmful event. Gerner-Beuerle, pp. 17 et seq.; Schäfer and Müller-Langer, pp. 16 et seq. Based on this reasoning, it is then possible to derive the various liability rules, each with their own efficient scope of application. On this, see Sect. 8.2.3 below.
- 20.
On this, see Sect. 8.3.2 below. An overview of the individual economic theories behind these functions of tort law is provided in Perry, pp. 68 et seqq.
- 21.
Mathis, Efficiency, p. 78.
- 22.
Mathis, Efficiency, p. 69. From a juristic viewpoint, preventing harm is only a secondary purpose or side effect of tort law, at the most. On the situation in Swiss tort law see e.g. Bärtschi, p. 131; Rey, N 14 et seqq.
- 23.
Mathis, Efficiency, p. 79.
- 24.
Brown, ‘Liability Rules’, p. 36.
- 25.
Brown, ‘Liability Rules’, p. 38; Nell, Hofmann and Buhné, p. 853; on the significance of this principle in Swiss law see Rey, N 18 et seqq.
- 26.
Mathis, Efficiency, pp. 72 et seqq.
- 27.
Rey, N 95. A fundamental presentation of strict liability from the perspective of Economic Analysis of Law is found in Richard A. Epstein, ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’.
- 28.
Mathis, Efficiency, p. 73; Nell, Hofmann and Buhné, p. 853.
- 29.
Brown, ‘Liability Rules’, p. 38; Schäfer and Müller-Langer, p. 10.
- 30.
Cooter and Ulen, p. 225; Mathis, Efficiency, p. 74.
- 31.
Brown, ‘Liability Rules’, p. 38. According to US law, negligence liability can be further divided into different subtypes, each associated with different legal consequences. In simple negligence the injurer is held liable for the full extent of the harm caused, irrespective of the victim’s behaviour. Under the negligence with a defense of contributory negligence rule, the injurer can discharge himself from liability if he proves that the victim also acted negligently. Finally, under comparative negligence the costs of the harm are split between the parties proportionally, depending on the contribution of their negligent behaviour to the harmful event. Cooter and Ulen, pp. 208 et seqq.; Schäfer and Müller-Langer, pp. 17 et seqq.
- 32.
Guttel, p. 1396. For a detailed economic analysis of the law of negligence liability, see Richard A. Posner , ‘A Theory of Negligence’.
- 33.
For the derivation of this result see Cooter and Ulen, pp. 205 et seqq.; Mathis, Efficiency, pp. 75 et seq.
- 34.
Rey, N 843 et seq.
- 35.
Fletcher, Concepts, p. 189.
- 36.
Perry, p. 70.
- 37.
For this reason it is also commonly referred to as the Learned Hand formula or Learned Hand test in the literature.
- 38.
Cooter and Ulen, p. 215; Mathis, Efficiency, p. 77.
- 39.
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
- 40.
For a complete account of the case and discussion of the ruling see Feldman and Kim, pp. 525 et seqq.
- 41.
Feldman and Kim, p. 527.
- 42.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
- 43.
Feldman and Kim, pp. 527 et seq.
- 44.
Feldman and Kim, p. 523.
- 45.
Mathis, ‘Consequentialism’, p. 21.
- 46.
Mathis, Efficiency, p. 77.
- 47.
Perry, p. 71; Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, p. 214. On the social optimum of precautions, see Sect. 8.2.2 above.
- 48.
Mathis, Efficiency, p. 76.
- 49.
Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, p. 215. Note that the potential injurer cannot be made liable for additional precautions exceeding the optimum degree of care (= area to the right of c*), but for his part causes costs which are undesirable from a welfare-economic point of view.
- 50.
Cooter and Ulen, pp. 214 et seq.; Guttel, p. 1391.
- 51.
Since in this examples both parties fail to exercise due care, the decisive issue is which form of negligence liability is implied by the concrete case. In a case of comparative negligence, the costs of harm are split proportionally according to their respective degrees of negligence. In an instance of simple negligence or negligence with a defense of contributory negligence, however, in the first case the injurer and in the second case the victim bears the full costs of the harm. On this, see Cooter and Ulen, pp. 208 et seqq., as well as the paragraph on “Negligence Liability” in Sect. 8.2.3 above.
- 52.
See Sect. 8.3.1 . above.
- 53.
Cooter and Ulen, p. 215; Mathis, Efficiency, p. 77.
- 54.
- 55.
Cooter and Ulen, pp. 217 et seq.; Hanson, Hanson and Hart, pp. 311 et seq.
- 56.
In bilateral accidents, the same applies to determining any contributory fault on the part of the injured party. On this, see Sect. 8.3.2 above. Ultimately, this results in over- or underinvestment in precautions, which impairs the welfare-maximizing function of the Hand rule. Grossmann, Cearley and Cole, pp. 4 et seqq.
- 57.
Schäfer and Ott, p. 192. Beyond this, it often remains unclear whether a precaution will produce the expected effect at all – for example, equipping a ship with lifeboats and lifejackets may not ensure that no passenger ever drowns. So uncertainty may exist not only about the efficiency of a precaution but also regarding its effectiveness. Medicus, p. 812.
- 58.
The parties try to alleviate this information problem by submitting their own information about precautions and accident-prevention impact to the court and by scrutinizing the opposing side’s information, since they have an incentive to win the court case. Adams , p. 121.
- 59.
On this controversy see, for instance, Cooter and Ulen, pp. 223 et seq.; Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, p. 229; Schäfer and Müller-Langer, p. 24.
- 60.
Cooter and Ulen, pp. 223 et seq. However, according to Hanson, Hanson and Hart, p. 314, there is no empirical evidence about this.
- 61.
Grossmann, Cearley and Cole, pp. 9 et seq.
- 62.
On the limitations of the insurance market as an information basis, see Grossmann, Cearley and Cole, pp. 11 et seqq.
- 63.
On the valuation of human life, see Balz Hammer, ‘Valuing the Invaluable’.
- 64.
In cases of harm to the environment, e.g. as caused by the nuclear reactor accident in Fukushima (2011) or the oil-drilling disaster in the Gulf of Mexico (2010), it is virtually impossible to ascertain the true magnitude of the harm because the ecological impacts of these incidents cannot yet be predicted.
- 65.
Medicus, p. 812.
- 66.
See Sect. 8.4.1 above. Posner , Economic Analysis of Law, pp. 216 et seq., refers in this connection to the important distinction between calculable risk and uncertainty. As he points out, the Hand rule assumes that risk is calculable, i.e. the probability is a number between 0 and 1. Yet in some cases this number cannot be quantified precisely, and the probabilityof the occurrence of harm is uncertain.
- 67.
See the thorough discussion in Herbert A. Simon, ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’.
- 68.
On the theme of psychological distortions, particularly in judicial judgements, see Klaus Mathis and Fabian Diriwächter, ‘Is the Rationality of Judicial Judgements Jeopardized by Cognitive Biases and Empathy?’.
- 69.
Hammer, p. 220. This critique on the misjudgement of risk is not to be confused with another critique directed against the basic economic assumption of the individual’s risk-neutrality. Individual behaviour – the objection goes – is not, in fact, risk-neutral but fundamentally risk-averse, i.e. given a choice between several alternative courses of action with the same expected value, individuals always choose the one that entails the least possible loss; Hanson, Hanson and Hart, pp. 314 et seq. This argument from behavioural economics can be countered, however, with the point that potential injurers and victims are generally insured – so that the loss is spread across the total population of policyholders – which is why they behave risk-neutrally. Schäfer and Müller-Langer, pp. 33 et seqq.
- 70.
Mathis and Diriwächter, pp. 58 et seqq.
- 71.
Cooter and Ulen, pp. 231 et seq. Moreover, there can also be a degree of uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of precautions; see Sect. 8.4.1 above.
- 72.
Hartmann, p. 67; Polinsky, pp. 50 et seq.
- 73.
Hanson, Hanson and Hart, p. 302.
- 74.
Brown, ‘Liability Rules’, p. 40; Schäfer and Ott, p. 131.
- 75.
Hartmann, p. 67. A counter-argument, however, is that for certain dangerous activities, experience and practice in turn reduce the probability of accidents or harm. It is well known that people who seldom operate a chainsaw are more injury prone when they do so.
- 76.
Cooter and Ulen, p. 212; Schäfer and Müller-Langer, pp. 8 et seq.
- 77.
Hanson, Hanson and Hart, p. 313. In welfare economic terms, the optimum activity level is precisely where the social utility generated by an increase in the activity level equals the additional expected costs of damages. Schäfer and Ott, p. 132.
- 78.
That is probably why most national legal systems have chosen to formulate driver’s liability not as negligence liability but as strict liability, even though it is a prime example of a bilateral accident, since essentially both road-users can take precautions. For the Swiss regulation see Art. 58 Swiss Road Traffic Act (SVG, SR 741.01).
- 79.
Cooter and Ulen, p. 212; Polinsky, pp. 51 et seq.; Schäfer and Ott, pp. 131 et seq.
- 80.
Brown, ‘Liability Rules’, p. 40. Steven Shavell was the first to arrive at this fundamental insight in his essay ‘Strict Liability versus Negligence’.
- 81.
This critique is not directed against the Hand rule alone, but against the economic analysis of tort law in general. On this, see Sect. 8.5.1 above.
- 82.
As per Coleman, pp. 13 et seqq.; Weinrib, pp. 355 et seq. According to George P. Fletcher, ‘Fairness’, p. 540, this dispute goes back to the fundamental question of whether courts, in ruling on a tort case, can find their attention solely to the interests of the parties concerned or, instead, should resolve private disputes in such a way as to serve the interests of the community as a whole.
- 83.
Weinrib, p. 354.
- 84.
Weinrib, p. 349.
- 85.
Weinrib, pp. 355 et seq. Discussing the question of whether the court’s decision-finding process has to give regard to the micro- and macro-level real consequences of its judgement, Mathis, ‘Consequentialism’, pp. 21 et seqq., points out the so-called paradox of consequences that can arise when the Hand rule is applied.
- 86.
Coleman, pp. 13 et seqq.; Mathis, Efficiency, p. 78; Mathis, ‘Consequentialism’, p. 23.
- 87.
Coleman, p. 15.
- 88.
Coleman, pp. 14 et seq.
- 89.
Fellmann and Kottmann, § 1 N 15 et seqq.; Honsell, § 1 N 13; Oftinger and Stark, AT, § 1 N 102; Rey, N 66; Roberto, ‘Unterscheidung’, p. 1323.
- 90.
Examples of simple causal liability are animal keepers’ liability (Art. 56 Swiss Code of Obligations [OR, SR 220]) or premises owners’ liability (Art. 58 OR).
- 91.
Examples of strict causal liability are car-drivers’ liability (Art. 58 Swiss Road Traffic Act) and the liability of nuclear power station operators (Art. 3 Swiss Nuclear Energy Liability Act [KHG, SR 732.44]).
- 92.
Honsell, § 1 N 17 et seqq.; Roberto, Haftpflichtrecht, N 34. Since the injurer is normally liable for the full harm under strict causal liability, irrespective of any considerations of care, this category of liability corresponds to the strict liability category in Economic Analysis of Law. On this, see the paragraph on “Strict Liability” in Sect. 8.2.3 above.
- 93.
Since the prevailing opinion conflates the lack of care with fault, the proof of care in simple causal liability actually means nothing other than fault-based liability with a reversed burden of proof. Roberto, Haftpflichtrecht, N 35; Honsell, § 1 N 23. Therefore in place of the traditional categorization of tort law, some advocate making a distinction merely between liability for own misconduct (fault-based and simple causal liabilities) and liability for risks (strict causal liability). For instance, Roberto, Haftpflichtrecht, N 36.
- 94.
Further examples of the use of the Hand rule in Swiss tort law in Sarah Kuhn, Der effizienzorientierte Fahrlässigkeitsbegriff in der Rechtsprechung westlicher Staaten, pp. 99 et seqq.
- 95.
Honsell, § 1 N 9; Rey, N 62; Oftinger and Stark, AT, § 1 N 103.
- 96.
Fellmann and Kottmann, N 525; Rey, N 834 et seqq.; Roberto, Haftpflichtrecht, N 219; Oftinger and Stark, AT, § 5 N 14. In contrast, in US tort law, intentional harm is treated separately from unintentional, i.e. negligent harm. Cooter and Ulen, p. 188; Perry, pp. 65 et seq.
- 97.
Bieri, p. 289; Honsell, § 6 N 4; Oftinger and Stark, AT, § 5 N 40; see also section “Negligence Liability” in Sect. 8.2.3 above.
- 98.
Bieri, p. 289.
- 99.
On this, see Sect. 8.3 above.
- 100.
Bärtschi, p. 134.
- 101.
Kramer, p. 256.
- 102.
Bieri, p. 296; Seiler, p. 150.
- 103.
Cf. for instance BGE 137 III 539, E. 5.2; BGE 116 Ia 162, E. 2c; BGer 4A_22/2008 of April 10, 2008, E. 4.
- 104.
BGE 137 III 539, E. 5.2.
- 105.
BGHZ 40, 379.
- 106.
Germany differs from Switzerland in that fault-based liability is not formulated as a blanket provision but is regulated in §§ 823 and 826 of the Civil Code (BGB) in the form of three general offence definitions, of which § 823 para. 1 BGB is very close in content to Art. 41 para. 1 Swiss Code of Obligations.
- 107.
Kötz and Wagner, N 113.
- 108.
BGHZ 40, 379, pp. 382 et seqq.
- 109.
Honsell, § 17 N 4; Oftinger and Stark, BT, § 21 N 30 et seqq.
- 110.
Honsell, § 17 N 1; Rey, N 1012; Oftinger and Stark, BT, § 21 N 82.
- 111.
BGE 131 III 115, E. 2.1; BGE 126 III 113, E. 2b.
- 112.
Rey, N 1014; Oftinger and Stark, BT, § 21 N 88.
- 113.
Brehm, N 53 on Art. 56, Swiss Code of Obligations; Lüchinger, p. 78; Metzger, p. 97.
- 114.
Oftinger and Stark, BT, § 21 N 94.
- 115.
BGE 126 III 14, E. 1 b.
- 116.
BGE 126 III 14, E. 1 c.
- 117.
BGE 102 II 232, E. 1 a.
- 118.
In contrast to the animal keepers’ liability, proof of due care is not an option for premises owners, and some therefore argue that this is a strict form of causal liability. See for instance Honsell, §18 N 2. As a matter of fact, the premises owner is not liable per se for all harms that go back to a cause; in fact the premises must have been poorly built or maintained, which is why premises owners’ liability can in fact be categorized as a form of simple causal liability. Honsell, § 3 N 35.
- 119.
Roberto, Haftpflichtrecht, N 394; BGE 130 III 736, E. 1.1; BGE 121 III 448, E. 2a.
- 120.
Roberto, Haftpflichtrecht, N 399 et seq.; BGE 130 III 736, E. 1.3.
- 121.
Roberto, Haftpflichtrecht, N 401; BGE 130 III 736, E. 1.3.
- 122.
Brehm, N 58 on Art. 58, Swiss Code of Obligations; Oftinger and Stark, BT, § 19 N 78 et seq.
- 123.
Brehm, N 60 on Art. 58, Swiss Code of Obligations.
- 124.
Roberto, Haftpflichtrecht, N 401.
- 125.
BGE 117 II 399, E. 3e.
- 126.
BGE 130 III 736, E. 1.4.
- 127.
BGE 126 III 113, E. 2b.
- 128.
As for example in BGE 129 III 65, E. 1.1; BGE 126 III 113, E. 2b; BGE 121 III 358, E. 4a; BGE 117 II 399, E. 2; BGE 106 II 208, E. 1a; BGE 100 II 134, E. 4.
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Hammer, B., Duss, S. (2014). The “Hand Rule” as a Standard of Care in Swiss Tort Law?. In: Mathis, K. (eds) Law and Economics in Europe. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7110-9_8
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