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Economic Principles in Antitrust Law in the Aftermath of the More Economic Approach

General Aspects, Current Issues and Recent Developments

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Book cover Law and Economics in Europe

Part of the book series: Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship ((EALELS,volume 1))

Abstract

More than a decade after progressive discussions of economic tendencies in traditional antitrust law1 and an increasing importance of economics in antitrust assessments in Europe2, the relationship between economics and law in the assessment of antitrust cases has still not yet adequately been solved. Although a “more economic approach ” has been discussed widely by economists and lawyers over the past years in the EU, in the EU3 member states4 as well as in Switzerland,5 there are still some important issues which are not yet solved.6

The key questions are, whether a form-based legal approach should be followed, whether an effects-based economic approach is better suited to cover antitrust cases, or whether an approach that combines both approaches is possible, at least in some cases.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In this essay the term “antitrust law” of the US legal system is used. This term is employed synonymously for the term “competition law” which is used as the common term under EU law.

  2. 2.

    See for example as one of the starting points of this economic approach the European Commission’s White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (‘White Paper’), OJ C 132, 12 July 1999, pp.1 et seqq.

  3. 3.

    Ewald, pp. 15 et seqq.; Hildebrand, Role of Economic Analysis, pp. 105 et seq.

  4. 4.

    For Germany see for example Böge, pp. 726 et seq.; Epple, pp. 220 et seqq.

  5. 5.

    For Switzerland see for example Künzler, pp. 5 et seqq.; Zäch and Künzler, pp. 269 et seqq.

  6. 6.

    For a general overview see Dreher and Adam, ‘More Economic Approach’, pp. 259 et seqq.; Hildebrand, ‘more economic approach’, pp. 513 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Regarding the purpose of legal rules and the product of competition Mestmäcker, pp. 26 et seq.; Basedow, p. 712; Böge, p. 726; Budzinski, p. 119; Carlton, p. 155; Ehlermann, p. 537; Röller, p. 37.

  8. 8.

    Antitrust cases by antitrust authorities in the EU and in Switzerland as well as by the EU Commission are assessed by a team of lawyers and economists.

  9. 9.

    Bishop and Walker, pp. 2 et seqq.

  10. 10.

    All references to Article 101 and 102 are made to Article 101 and 102 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), OJ 2012 C 326, 26 October 2012, pp. 49 et seqq.

  11. 11.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (“European Merger Control Regulation”, “EMCR”), OJ 2004 L 24, 29 January 2004, pp. 1 et seqq.; See also Seitz, ‘Ökonomische Analyse und Risikoverteilung’, pp. 719 et seq.

  12. 12.

    Seitz and Breitenmoser, pp. 445 et seqq.

  13. 13.

    Kasten, p. 994; Kneepkens, pp. 656 and 664; Schwaderer, pp. 653 et seq.

  14. 14.

    Beard, Kaserman and Stern, pp. 75 et seq.

  15. 15.

    US Supreme Court, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).

  16. 16.

    US Supreme Court, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).

  17. 17.

    Joelson, p. 369; Farrell and Katz, p. 3.

  18. 18.

    Article 102 TFEU was referred to as Article 82 EC-Treaty at that time.

  19. 19.

    European Commission, Discussion Paper, pp. 15 et seqq.

  20. 20.

    Schmidt and Voigt, p. 1097.

  21. 21.

    See for example Rousseva, p. 605; Kallaugher and Sher, pp. 263 et seqq.; Kamann and Bergmann, pp. 83 et seqq.; Sinclair, pp. 491 et seqq.; Ridyard, pp. 286 et seqq.

  22. 22.

    This Discussion Paper focuses on exclusionary abuses only, exploitative abuses are not part.

  23. 23.

    Kerse and Khan, p. 21; Werden, p. 53.

  24. 24.

    Bishop and Walker, p. 186; Baker and Rubinfeld, p. 386.

  25. 25.

    European Commission, Discussion Paper, p. 25. See also Loewenthal, pp. 456 and 464.

  26. 26.

    European Commission, Discussion Paper, p. 26.

  27. 27.

    Dreher and Adam, ‘Abuse of Dominance’, pp. 278 et seq.

  28. 28.

    Vakerics, § 1.03 (3), 1–15.

  29. 29.

    Ackermann, pp. 10 et seqq.

  30. 30.

    Hartley et~al., p. 3; Schmidtchen, pp. 1 et seqq.

  31. 31.

    Hartley et~al., p. 3; Hellwig, p. 231.

  32. 32.

    US Supreme Court, United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596.609 n. 10 (1972). See also Carstensen and First, p. 171.

  33. 33.

    US Supreme Court, United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596.609 n. 10 (1972).

  34. 34.

    Hartley et~al., p. 4.

  35. 35.

    Hartley et~al., p. 4.

  36. 36.

    US Supreme Court, GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n. 16 (1977).

  37. 37.

    Salop and Romaine, pp. 650 et seq.

  38. 38.

    Kauper, pp. 1623 et seqq. and pp. 1641 et seqq.

  39. 39.

    Jones, p. 720.

  40. 40.

    Goetz and McChesny, p. 11.

  41. 41.

    Goetz and McChesny, p. 11.

  42. 42.

    Areeda, pp. 45 et seq.

  43. 43.

    Sufrin, pp. 933 et seqq.

  44. 44.

    Schmidtchen, pp. 9 et seq.; Strohm, p. 113.

  45. 45.

    European Commission, Discussion Paper, para. 31: “It is very likely that very high markets shares, which have been held for some time, indicate a dominant position. This would be the case where an undertaking holds 50 % or more of the market, provided that rivals hold a much smaller share of the market.”

  46. 46.

    Joelson, p. 400.

  47. 47.

    Motta, p. 17.

  48. 48.

    Motta, p. 17.

  49. 49.

    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Competition on the Merits, p. 2.

  50. 50.

    See for difficulties of this uncertainty in practice Seitz, ‘Kartellverfahrensverordnung’, pp. 71 et seqq.

  51. 51.

    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Competition on the Merits, pp. 2 et seqq.

  52. 52.

    Florian and Walker, pp. 320 et seqq.

  53. 53.

    See Van den Bergh and Camesasca, p. 4; Schmidt, ‘More Economic Approach’, p. 877; Bune and Batchelor, pp. 22 et seqq.

  54. 54.

    Schmidt, ‘Suitability’, pp. 408 et seq.

  55. 55.

    Dethmers and Dodoo, pp. 537 et seq.

  56. 56.

    Behrens, p. 97; Hildebrand, ‘more economic approach’, pp. 513 et seqq.; Immenga, p. 463; Albers, pp. 3 et seqq.

  57. 57.

    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Competition on Merits, pp. 2 et seqq.

  58. 58.

    Bune and Batchelor, pp. 22 et seqq.

  59. 59.

    Furse, p. 199.

  60. 60.

    Van den Bergh and Camesasca, p. 6.

  61. 61.

    See Williamson , p. 314.

  62. 62.

    Spivack, ‘Chicago School Approach’, p. 86; Spivack, ‘Monopolization’, pp. 304 et seqq.; Fox, p. 1140; Pitofsky, p. 1051.

  63. 63.

    Williamson , pp. 315 et seqq. and 326 et seqq.

  64. 64.

    Armentano, p. 10.

  65. 65.

    Wessling, pp. 80 et seq; Sauter, p. 34; Neven, Papandropoulos and Seabright, p. 15.

  66. 66.

    Van den Bergh and Camesasca, p. 6.

  67. 67.

    Pablo and Walker, p. 320.

  68. 68.

    Pablo and Walker, p. 320.

  69. 69.

    Pablo and Walker, pp. 320 et seq.

  70. 70.

    Shapiro, Bork and Breyer, p. 6.

  71. 71.

    See Shapiro, Bork and Breyer, p. 7.

  72. 72.

    Shapiro, Bork and Breyer, p. 9.

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    Claudia Seitz

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Seitz, C. (2014). Economic Principles in Antitrust Law in the Aftermath of the More Economic Approach. In: Mathis, K. (eds) Law and Economics in Europe. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7110-9_14

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