Abstract
Our already acquired attitudes, beliefs and virtues considerably inform the way in which we formulate principles of toleration. For they affect our understanding of the needs, views and practices of other groups, and, as a result, they also affect our conception of how those groups should be treated fairly. But, if what we take to be tolerant turns out to be a practice, attitude or virtue which subtly discriminates against other groups, then all we end up with is another form of intolerance. In this paper, I defend an approach to the problem of accommodating religious differences, which makes possible the formulation of such fair principles of toleration. One of the keys elements of this approach is a Kantian, critical account of moral normativity. Such an account can explain how principles can have a normative force which is stronger than that conferred by intersubjectivity, but which need not be committed to the demanding assumptions of moral realism. While the approach I defend here is also appropriate more generally for the problem of dealing fairly with any morally relevant differences, I argue that the focus on religious differences and on a concern for accommodating differences morally make it particularly adequate for the issue of toleration.
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Notes
- 1.
I am working here with a few metaethical assumptions. While it is not possible to defend these assumptions within the confines of this paper, it is I think useful to mention those which are most relevant here. First, I understand moral objectivity in a Kantian sense to refer to a stronger normative status than that offered by subjective states of mind – sensible incentives of all sorts, but also ‘intuitions’ accepted without justification on the basis of personal insight or claims of self-evidence. At the same time, however, this moral objectivity does not presuppose moral realism. Morally objective principles or values are not necessarily existing in some Platonic world; they depend on the agent’s rationality, insofar as they are structures of this rationality and make possible moral judgement. I make these assumptions in order to avoid problems related to the demanding character of moral realism and its weak account of justification; also, I hope in this way to offer a stronger account of normativity than that based on intersubjectivity – whether one established by an actual or by a hypothetical agreement. (On the problems of actual and hypothetical agreement as a ground of normativity, see Onora O’Neill (1989); see also Matthew Festenstein (1999)). I can only state here that, although I think that epistemologically some versions of contemporary constructivism can properly account for moral objectivity, ontologically they need some stronger commitments, although not as strong as those of moral realism. See also Baiasu (2009).
- 2.
In the first case, (when toleration is prescribed by a principle) Bader talks about ‘tolerance’; in the second, (when toleration is prescribed by attitudes, dispositions, virtues of practices – whether individual or collective), he talks more specifically about ‘toleration’ (Chapter 2 by Bader, this volume).
- 3.
I talk about ‘toleration’ in general as including tolerance and the more specific sense of toleration distinguished by Bader. (See n. 2 above.) For the purpose of this paper, I need not distinguish between this general sense of toleration and the more specific sense.
- 4.
His view on the governance of religious diversity is developed in Secularism or Democracy? (2007).
- 5.
Thus, on Rawls’s account, one aspect of self-respect is ‘finding our person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others who are likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed’ (1999: 386).
- 6.
Of course, insofar as these more demanding forms of toleration aim to internalise acceptance of the practices of minority, they are self-defeating, since toleration implies that the object of toleration be in some sense objectionable. My point here is different: internalisation of acceptance of practices presupposes the creation of a certain set of motivations for performing those practices; but motivation cannot be controlled and monitored by political power. As a result, more and more demanding forms of toleration will be required, although the aim of bringing about that set of motivations is unachievable or at least ineffective by democratic means. (See also Section 5.11) A possible reply to the objection that more demanding forms of toleration are self-defeating is that what members of the majority are expected to endorse, appreciate and approve of are not practices, but the status of the members of the minority, the fact that they are fellow citizens capable of having and leading a valued plan of life (Jones 2006). But, first, I do not see how this will be able to avoid the problem of motivation I have just mentioned. Secondly, assuming that it does somehow avoid it, one could formulate a Rawlsian rejoinder and question the possibility of having our persons and deeds appreciated and respected as generic persons and deeds. But this leads precisely to the problem of dealing morally with differences. For the majority will understand the generic person and deed on the models currently influential in their group, and this may well result in treatment of others which is not only inappropriate, but also unfair. Granting internal freedoms of belief to minorities may be the way the member of the majority thinks she appreciates and respects persons and their deeds in general. As we have seen, this is in fact discriminatory.
- 7.
In fact, any difference which has the potential of becoming morally relevant can pose this problem in the appropriate context.
- 8.
- 9.
The case discussed in the next section is used by Bernard Williams to illustrate the difficulty of finding a virtue or value of toleration (Williams 1996).
- 10.
I think an even more general formulation can be provided, which refers to justification and normativity, but it is not specifically tied to moral normativity and justification. The problem can, for instance, occur in relation to epistemic or aesthetic justification.
- 11.
For a discussion of an objection to this assumption, see Section 5.14 below.
- 12.
As Williams puts it, citizens ‘must have at least a shared belief in the system itself’ (Williams 1996: 22).
- 13.
Free persons are those who make their own lives and determine their own convictions, and power must be used to make this possible, not to frustrate it by imposing a given set of convictions (Williams 1996: 22–23).
- 14.
Williams refers here to Thomas Nagel’s distinction between enforcing individualism and adopting the practices of the liberal state. On Nagel’s account, ‘the consequences of making such a conception [namely, an individualistic one] the basis of policy would be quite different from the position of liberal toleration’. (Nagel 1991: 165) Nagel also makes the threefold distinction between types of policy to which I will refer next. (Nagel 1991: 165–166)
- 15.
This is, again, Williams’s point; on his account, the distinction between the procedures of the liberal state and substantive liberal values ‘is not a distinction that is neutral in its inspiration. It is asymmetrically skewed in the liberal direction. This is because it makes a lot out of a difference of procedure, whereas what matters to a nonliberal believer is the difference of outcome’ (Williams 1996: 24).
- 16.
This is the so-called radical sceptical Problem of the Criterion, initially formulated by Pyrrho and then reasserted by Pyrrhonian sceptics, such as Sextus Empiricus.
- 17.
For one (Kantian) way of dealing with the sceptical Problem of the Criterion, see Westphal (2009).
- 18.
At one point, talking about the values of individual autonomy, Williams notes that the point of the challenge is not that these values ‘are misguided or baseless’, but that they ‘like others, may be rejected’ (Williams 1996: 25). He also adds that toleration cannot be based on such values ‘and also hope to escape from substantive disagreements about the good’ (Williams 1996: 25).
- 19.
Sextus 1985: x. Williams’s aim is less radical. In general, he defends a version of ethical particularism and, in this context, he attempts to show that the value or virtue of toleration which is available to us is ‘less ambitious than the pure value of liberal toleration’ and closer ‘to a tradition that can be traced back to Montesquieu and to Constant’. (Williams 1996: 26; see also Williams 1985) Interestingly, however, Nagel says that his aim is ‘to achieve a certain peace of mind’ (Nagel 1991: 158).
- 20.
I claim that the appropriate principle or criterion on the basis of which we must decide how to treat differing parties or how to adjudicate on conflicting claims must be independent in the relevant sense from the positions being adjudicated on. Could one not then say that what is deemed relevantly independent from one perspective may not be relevant from another? The problem with this question is, first, that it can be raised about whatever claim one makes and at whatever moment; secondly, however, if we consider the specific case in which I need to decide whether A or B is right, and I try to judge this on the basis of the criterion that A is always right, then there might be some argument that the criterion is independent in a certain sense, say, because in its formulation three words do not refer to A or B. But could A say that this sense of independence is relevant? On what basis?
- 21.
For many religions, the law of non-contradiction does not hold, especially for the most important aspects of their doctrines, which are usually regarded as ‘mysteries’. Sometimes a mystery is considered to be even the way in which decisions are made as to which aspects of the religious doctrine to maintain, change or reject. This is, for instance, the case in Orthodox Christianity: ‘This inner Tradition ‘handed down to us in a mystery’ is preserved above all in the Church’s worship. Lex orandi lex credendi: our faith is expressed in our prayer. Orthodoxy has made few explicit definitions about the Eucharist and the other Sacraments…’ (Ware 1997: 205).
- 22.
Imagine the following reply: although we cannot determine which party is right and although the policy we enforce gives advantage to one party, members of that party will claim that it does not matter the policy is skewed towards them or biased, since this is justifiable as leading to the ‘right answer’. Two points can be noted here: first, this goes against the assumption that there is no right and wrong answer, that it cannot be said that one party is right and the other, wrong; secondly, the notion of justification in the claim that it is justifiable to have a biased principle becomes normatively almost powerless, since it amounts to the assertion that, when I say ‘this principle is right because I want it to be so’, I provide a justification for it.
- 23.
Michael Barber has recently offered a cogent and promising approach to this problem. (Barber 2001) Elsewhere, I have presented in detail and evaluated Barber’s approach. (Baiasu 2004) Here I can only outline Barber’s project and indicate how it answers the problem of dealing ethically with differences. I have argued that this project has considerable merit, but some of its aspects undermine its feasibility; nevertheless, I have indicated how these problems can be remedied (Baiasu 2004: 209–214). The project combines in an original way Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatism and Emmanuel Levinas’s phenomenology of alterity, and although I do not subscribe completely to either, I think the project offers one of the best approaches to this problem to date.
- 24.
Apel’s and Levinas’s theories are expected to address these two worries, respectively.
- 25.
See, for instance, Apel (1980).
- 26.
See, for instance, Levinas (1999).
- 27.
Levinas’s phenomenology is supposed to help us precisely in this way.
- 28.
In what follows, when I talk about the value of toleration, I refer to this notion as defined by Williams. In this sense, the value of toleration is one possible basis for the practice of toleration, namely, the thought that there is something good or right about performing the practice in a particular case.
- 29.
In this volume, Glen Newey’s objection to Locke’s argument for toleration relies precisely on the opposite claim. Thus, Newey’s objection is directed to Locke’s claim that ‘laws are of no force at all without penalties, and penalties in this cased are absolutely impertinent; because they are not proper to convince the mind’ (Locke 1991: 19). Newey denies that ‘one person cannot forcibly bring another to form a belief’. (Chapter 3 by Newey, this volume) One reason for such a claim could be given by experimental psychology, in particular the theory of cognitive dissonance. As David Velleman notes, however, although the classical demonstration presented by Festinger and Carlsmith ‘has been replicated hundreds if not thousands of times, […] its interpretation remains controversial’. (Velleman 2000: 351)
- 30.
- 31.
Scepticism concerning the possibility of deciding which claim is right can be a reason for considering it as right, say, not to impose a certain prohibiting policy and, hence, to act tolerantly. But global scepticism of the Pyrrhonian kind could not lead to toleration, since it cannot entertain the thought of some practice’s being right to perform.
- 32.
Of course, those who think that it is problematic to talk about being motivated morally to do something, in a situation in which one is compelled to do that anyway, will have a problem in making sense of this condition. For instance, Christine Korsgaard offers the example of one of her students, who is facing the prospect of taking a compulsory course: ‘While you may very well grasp the reasons why we require the course, and it may even be true that for those reasons you would have taken it anyway, there is something odd about saying that is your motive’. (1996: 27). Nevertheless, her comments later on in the book seem to suggest that she is not necessarily excluding an action on such a motivation. (Korsgaard 1996: 105–107) By contrast, Marcus Willaschek (2002) excludes moral motivation in a situation in which one is coerced to perform a particular action.
- 33.
I follow here Nagel’s distinction (1991: 154–155).
- 34.
See Section 5.8.
- 35.
- 36.
A note is here required on terminology. I use ‘moral’ in a general sense, which includes both the ethical and the juridical. Any decision taken on normative grounds with a view to determining what is good or right is in this sense moral. I take ethics to be concerned with norms which ought to regulate the actions of responsible agents, but without being enforced by any other means apart from the persons’ own realisation that performing the actions is the right thing to do. Hence, for ethics, motivation is relevant and enforceability is not. The other part of morality, juridical morality, has to do with norms which ought to regulate the actions of responsible agents and will be enforced by state, if individuals do not observe them. Ethical motivation is not a main concern in this case, but enforceability, feasibility, capacity for being monitored are relevant and important. So, instead of talking, with Forst and Jürgen Habermas, about ethical reasons to refer to norms which are specific for particular groups, I prefer to talk explicitly about religious prescriptions, morals or views of the good life (Forst 2004, Habermas 1993). There is a certain sense in which, choosing an appropriate policy of toleration of certain practices is a moral issue, insofar as it is constrained by the criterion of equal consideration of all parties and may result in right or wrong decisions. But, as Nagel notes, it is a moral issue in a higher-order sense. It does not apply to the beliefs of citizens, but to the practices of the state and of other citizens towards those beliefs.
- 37.
Forst’s solution can be challenged in the same way.
- 38.
I do not mean to suggest here that objectivity can be reduced to independence. Recall that, in Sections 5.8 and 5.9, I talked about objectivity as involving independence in the relevant sense. Hence, there are more conditions to objectivity than independence. My claim here is only that, insofar as the other conditions of objectivity are met, but the condition of independence is not, the reformulation of the criterion in a way which leads to the satisfaction of the condition of independence will lead also to objectivity.
- 39.
This seems to be the suggestion defended sometimes by Horton (Chapter 7) in his contribution to this volume.
- 40.
One clarification must be made at this point: the problem of dealing morally with religious differences and the approach I formulated here do not imply an attempt to identify and articulate principles which will be able to deal once and for all with every challenge and every objection which will then be raised. As I have mentioned, one very problematic feature of our agency is that we are not always aware that we are biased even when we make genuine efforts not to be so. Hence, principles will sometimes have to be reformulated, for instance, by introducing exceptions or adding further conditions, as the case requires. In this respect, the approach I advocate here is compatible with Emmanuela Ceva’s ‘ex post legem’ approach defended in her contribution to this volume. (Chapter 9 by Ceva, this volume).
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Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Monica Mookherjee for insightful and detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to the reviewers of the volume for very helpful suggestions. I have also benefited from discussion on issues related to this topic with Glen Newey and John Horton.
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Baiasu, S. (2011). Dealing Morally with Religious Differences. In: Mookherjee, M. (eds) Democracy, Religious Pluralism and the Liberal Dilemma of Accommodation. Studies in Global Justice, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9017-1_5
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