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A Neurophenomenological Study of Epileptic Seizure Anticipation

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Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

Abstract

This article sets out to retrace the course of a neurophenomenological project initiated by Francisco Varela, the purpose of which is the anticipation of epileptic seizure, and to evaluate the relevance of the neurophenomenological approach from the methodological, therapeutic and epistemological viewpoints. New mathematical methods for analysing the neuro-electric activity of the brain have recently enabled researchers to detect subtle modifications of the cerebral activity a few minutes before the onset of an epileptic seizure. Do these neuro-electric changes correspond to modifications in the patients’ subjective experience, and if that is the case, what are they? In a first part, after having recalled the context of the project, I will describe the methods I used for trying to detect the dynamic micro-structure of preictal experience, the difficulties I met and the results I obtained. Then I will show how the “pheno-dynamic” and neuro-dynamic analyses have guided, determined and mutually enriched each other throughout this project. In a third part, I will show that this genetic approach to epileptic seizure opens a new line of research into a cognitive and non-pharmacological therapy for epilepsy. Finally, I will argue through this example that neurophenomenological co-determination could shed new light on the difficult problem of the “gap” which supposedly separates subjective experience from neurophysiological activity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

     The structure and content of this article is partly inspired by Le Van Quyen and Petitmengin (2002), Petitmengin (2005), Petitmengin et al. (2006) and Petitmengin et al. (2007).

  2. 2.

    The term “pre-reflective” (in French “pré-réfléchi”, to use the vocabulary of Husserl (1913), later adopted by Sartre [1936, 1938] and Ricœur [1949]) qualifies the part of our lived experience which, although “lived through” subjectively, is not immediately accessible to consciousness, introspection or verbal report.

  3. 3.

     On the need to develop specific methods for studying lived experience: (Varela et al. 1993; Varela and Shear 1999a; Depraz et al. 2003; Petitmengin, 2009). For a synthesis of the difficulties of becoming aware of one’s pre-reflective experience: (Petitmengin 2006b; Petitmengin and Bitbol, 2009).

  4. 4.

    In this quotation the term “pre-reflexive” is equivalent to “pre-reflective”.

  5. 5.

    In Greek, epilambanein means “to fall suddenly”.

  6. 6.

    Inter-ictal (from Latin ictus: crisis) means “between two seizures”. Pre-ictal means “before a seizure”.

  7. 7.

    This figure was created by Michel Le Van Quyen.

  8. 8.

     Or LENA (CNRS UPR 640, Paris, France).

  9. 9.

    A partial seizure (versus a generalized seizure) is a seizure which starts locally in the brain at the level of the epileptogenic focus and progressively recruits other cerebral areas, but does not expand to the whole brain. It is not always accompanied with a loss of consciousness.

  10. 10.

    For a general description of the difficulties of description and the interview techniques used to overcome each of them, see Petitmengin (2006b). For a complete description of one of these methods, the “explicitation interview” see Vermersch (1994/2003).

  11. 11.

     For example the protocol that involves presenting the subjects with a 3D illusion (Lutz 2002).

  12. 12.

    These indicators are verbal, non-verbal and para-verbal. The verbal indicators are the use of “I”, the present tense, the specific context indicators (place and time), the concrete and detailed character (as opposed to conceptual and general) of the vocabulary used. An example of a non-verbal indicator is the direction of the eyes: when the subject is reliving the past experience, he takes his eyes off the interviewer to look “into space”, to the horizon. Concomitantly, the flow of speech slows, and the words are often cut with silences: these para-verbal clues are the sign that the subject is plunging into himself to make contact with the pre-reflective dimension of his experience. At the same time, metaphoric or deictic co-verbal gestures appear.

  13. 13.

    The focusing questioning mode is very well suited for helping a person direct his attention to his bodily feelings, intensify perception of the feeling and describe it (Gendlin 1996).

  14. 14.

     Various papers have shown that eye movements precisely indicate the sensorial register used (Kinsbourne 1972; Galin and Ornstein 1974; Grinder et al. 1977; Ellickson 1983; Buckner et al. 1987).

  15. 15.

    For more details on these operations of abstraction (classification/instantiation, aggregation/disaggregation and generalization/specialization) see (Petitmengin-Peugeot 1999).

  16. 16.

     These findings are confirmed by other studies, for example (Rajna et al. 1997), (Schulze-Bohage et al. 2006).

  17. 17.

     Fyodor Dostoyevsky, “The Idiot” (1868).

  18. 18.

    The epileptologist R. Efron (1956; 1957) explains that one of his patients managed to stop her incipient seizures by smelling a certain perfume. As her profession of singer did not allow her to have her bottle of perfume with her all the time, she learned to associate the smell of the perfume to a visual stimulus (a bracelet) first present and then only imagined, with the same result.

  19. 19.

    On this topic the reader may refer to the very interesting testimony of J. Benak (2001).

  20. 20.

    There are other contexts where a neurophenomenological correlation provides a neurological, “third person” confirmation of the existence of sensations or states that are not taken seriously and little studied. It is for example the case of some deep meditative states. Recent research carried out on very experienced Buddhist meditators shows that these states have quite characteristic neuronal signatures, which have never been observed in a non-pathological context (Lutz et al. 2004).

  21. 21.

    See Levine (1983). The “explanatory gap” is the core of the “hard problem” formulated by David Chalmers (1996): why does conscious experience emerge from some neurophysiological processes. The reader will find a presentation of this problem in (Roy et al. 2002). The recent article of M. Bitbol (2006) contains a summary of the theories - Behaviorism, Identity theory, Eliminativism, Functionalism, Idealism - that try to solve the problem, without providing any satisfactory solution.

  22. 22.

    “We need to turn to the only link between brain and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself” (Varela 1996, p. 330).

  23. 23.

    This figure was drawn by Vincent Navarro (Petitmengin et al. 2006).

  24. 24.

    Indeed, a homeomorphism between A and B brings elements of explanation, in the sense that “A is linked to B by a law”. This doesn’t mean at all that A is reducible to B, or B to A. And this link is symmetrical (if A is linked to B, B is linked to A).

  25. 25.

    On this topic we fully agree with Baynes (2004, p. 13): “Formal models can only capture the structure of a domain; they cannot capture its intrinsic nature. Those who think that the hard problem is hard do so because they think that the phenomenal character - the ‘what it is like’ of experience - cannot be fully captured by structural descriptions”.

  26. 26.

     Plato and Aristotle had already identified these characteristics, which they called “common sensibles”.

  27. 27.

    As the unceasing internal dialog, recognized as essential in the constitution of the “narrative self” (Gallagher 2000)

  28. 28.

    This neurophenomenological research of Lutz deals with 3D vision.

  29. 29.

     Is there even one experimentation that makes absolutely no reference to subjective experience? For example, a cerebral area is called “auditory” because a correlation is made between its activation and a first person report of an auditory experience. The first person point of view is always present, but in an implicit, naive manner.

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Ackowledgments

This work is dedicated to the memory of Francisco Varela who was the principle instigator of the project. I thank Vincent Navarro and Michel Le Van Quyen for our collaboration. I would also like to thank Jacques Martinerie from the Neurodynamics Group in the Cognitive Neurosciences and Brain Laboratory (CNRS UPR 640, France), and Michel Baulac and Claude Adam from the Epilepsy Unit of the Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, for their help throughout this project. Many thanks also to the patients who had the patience to answer my questions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut Télécom, Paris, France

    Claire Petitmengin

  2. Centre de Recherche en Épistémologie Appliquée (CREA), Paris, France

    Claire Petitmengin

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  1. Claire Petitmengin
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Correspondence to Claire Petitmengin .

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  1. FB Philosophie und Philologie, Universität Mainz, Jakob Welder-Weg 18, Mainz, 55128, Germany

    Daniel Schmicking

  2. Dept of Philosophy & Cognitive Sciences, University of Central Florida, Colbourn Hall 411, Orlando, 32816-1352, U.S.A.

    Shaun Gallagher

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Petitmengin, C. (2010). A Neurophenomenological Study of Epileptic Seizure Anticipation. In: Schmicking, D., Gallagher, S. (eds) Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0_25

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