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Regional Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries pp 271–286Cite as

Dimension V: General Legal Principles Governing the Allocation of Competences in RTAs and the Notion of Time

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Part of the book series: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition ((MSIC,volume 9))

Abstract

Regional integration is often automatically associated with the concept of supranationality. However, while supranationality might have constituted a key driver in the European competition and general economic system, it is not an indispensable condition for a regional competition law regime’s success. Moreover, the concept of supranationality can materialize in different forms, reflecting different degrees of integration and centralization. As the interplay of regional bodies, substantive law and enforcement competences has shown, inter-governmentalism and supranationality do not appear as alternative forms of regional integration, but cumulative factors that shape the overall design of an agreement. Yet, the existence of both factors also bears potential for conflicts and calls for a balancing act. A regional competition law system in particular has to provide for mechanisms and principles that resolve conflicts that might arise from an ambiguous allocation of competences.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cengiz, Regulation 1/2003 Revisited, 2009, pp. 26, 30 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1512527> accessed 11 November 2018; Cseres, Questions of Legitimacy in the Europeanization of Competition Law Procedures of the EU Member States, 7 February 2013, p. 6 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213192> accessed 11 November 2018.

  2. 2.

    Judgment of the ECJ, 5 February 1963, Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, ECR 1, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; see also Drexl, in: Drexl (Ed.), The Future of Transnational Antitrust, 2003, p. 311, 331.

  3. 3.

    Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Processo 3-AI-96, 27 October 1999.

  4. 4.

    See for example Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Processo 3-AI-96, 27 October 1999.

  5. 5.

    Tangarife Torres, Derecho de la Integración en la Comunidad Andina, 2002, p. 208.

  6. 6.

    See also Article 215 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

  7. 7.

    Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Processo 3-AI-96, 27 October 1999.

  8. 8.

    Drexl, in: Drexl (ed.), The Future of Transnational Antitrust, 2003, p. 311, 339; Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 106.

  9. 9.

    This was the case under the former European system, in which the European Commission had the exclusive competence to apply the former Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty. Regarding the discussion on a reform of the Commission’s monopoly on Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty, see Ehlermann, Implementation of EC Competition Law by National Anti-Trust Authorities, 17 ECLR 88, 92ff. (1996).

  10. 10.

    See Article 11(6) of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003.

  11. 11.

    Such a parallel application is probable in the CARICOM, see Part II, Dimension V: Sect. 9.2.4.

  12. 12.

    This kind of parallel application of regional competition law enforcement is applicable in the European Union. For an overview of the reform of EC Competition Law, see Korah, in: Lianos/Kokkoris (Eds.) The Reform of EC Competition Law, 2010, pp. xxiii–xxviii.

  13. 13.

    Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, pp. 82f.

  14. 14.

    In the European Union, in the course of the installation of decentralized competition enforcement, national judges have been inter alia attributed the role of guaranteeing the supremacy of community competition law; see Judgment of the Court of 9 March 1978, Case 106/77, Simmenthal II, ECR 1978 - 629, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49.

  15. 15.

    Even in the case of the utilization of the “downloading option”, the AndeanC did not constitute a system of parallel competition law enforcement. On cases with cross-border effect solely Decision 608 was applicable in its function as regional norm. In case of practices with solely national effects, Decision 608 applied as national norm.

  16. 16.

    In contrast to the European system, regional competition law in the AndeanC does not comprise specific requirements concerning the domestic competition laws’ content; see above on “soft” harmonization through non-binding guidelines Part II, Dimension II: Sect. 6.3.

  17. 17.

    For example through the judicial mechanisms of actions of non-compliance or failure to act, see above Part II, Dimension IV: Sects. 8.3.2.5 or 8.3.2.6.

  18. 18.

    Beckford, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, p. 185, 197.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., p. 198.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., p. 201.

  21. 21.

    Article 176(5) RTC: “5. If there is a difference of opinion between the Commission and the Member State regarding the nature and effects of the business conduct or the jurisdiction of the investigating authority, the Commission shall: (a) cease any further examination of the matter; and (b) refer the matter to COTED for its decision.”

  22. 22.

    Statements made by Kusha Haraksingh during an interview with the author in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 2012.

  23. 23.

    Statements made by Kusha Haraksingh during an interview with the author in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 2012.

  24. 24.

    In Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt the CJEU held that “(…) parallel application of the national system can only be allowed in so far as it does not prejudice the uniform application throughout the common market of the community rules on cartels and of the full effect of the measures adopted in implementation of these rules.”; Judgment of the Court of 13 February 1969, Case 14-68, Walt Wilhelm and others v Bundeskartellamt, ECR 1, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4, para. 4.

  25. 25.

    Statements made by Kusha Haraksingh during an interview with the author in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 2012.

  26. 26.

    Drexl, in: Drexl (Ed.), The Future of Transnational Antitrust, 2003, p. 311, 338. Judgment of the CJEU of 20 September 2001, Case C-453/99, Courage v Crehan, ECR I-06297, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465.

  27. 27.

    Principle of equivalence.

  28. 28.

    Drexl, in: Drexl (Ed.), The Future of Transnational Antitrust, 2003, p. 311, 338.

  29. 29.

    See for example Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, [2010] OJ 83/206, 30 March 2010.

  30. 30.

    Article 5 of the Treaty of Dakar: “Dans l’exercice des pouvoirs normatifs que le présent Traité leur attribue et dans la mesure compatible avec les objectifs de celui-ci, les organes de l’Union favorisent l’édiction de prescriptions minimales et de réglementations-cadres qu’il appartient aux Etats membres de compléter en tant que de besoin, conformément à leurs règles constitutionnelles respectives.”

  31. 31.

    Article 60 of the Treaty of Dakar: “(…) [la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et du Gouvernement] identifie les domaines prioritaires dans lesquels, conformément aux dispositions du présent Traité, un rapprochement des législations des Etats membres est nécessaire pour atteindre les objectifs de l’Union.”

  32. 32.

    Informe de la Cuarta Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/IV/INFORME, 1 August 2003, pp. 3ff (available from the author).

  33. 33.

    Ibid., p. 3.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., p. 3.

  35. 35.

    Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2006, pp. 184ff.; see also Judgment of 23 October 2003, Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v Commission, ECR II-04653, ECLI:EU:T:2003:281, paras. 197–199, in which the Court rejected the principle of subsidiarity as an argument against the prerogative enforcement right of the Commission.

  36. 36.

    In the CARICOM, the CARICOM Heads of State and Government in 2005 established a Technical Working Group on Governance of the Caribbean Community in order to review the current institutional governance structure. The Technical Working Group in its report of the 23 October 2006 argued in favour of the introduction of the “collective exercise of sovereignty” in agreed areas by member states. The agreed areas of such “shared sovereignty” are supposed to be determined on the basis of the principles of “proportionality” and “subsidiarity”, Report of the Technical Working Group on Governance appointed by CARICOM Heads of Government, p. 14. “On this basis, it would be possible to reconcile the twin imperatives of nationalism and regionalism, based on a division of responsibility between the two levels of decision-making.”

  37. 37.

    European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, 2009, p. 8; Cseres, Questions of Legitimacy in the Europeanization of Competition Law Procedures of the EU Member States, 7 February 2013, pp. 7, 13 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213192> accessed 11 November 2018.

  38. 38.

    Cengiz, The European Competition Network, 2009, p. 19 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/11067/MWP_2009_05.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 11 November 2018; Cengiz, Regulation 1/2003 Revisited, 2009, p. 33 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1512527> accessed 11 November 2018; Cseres, Questions of Legitimacy in the Europeanization of Competition Law Procedures of the EU Member States, 7 February 2013, p. 4 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213192> accessed 11 November 2018.

  39. 39.

    Article 1 of Directive no. 02/2002/UEMOA: “Structure nationale de concurrence: toute institution nationale, à compétence générale ou sectorielle, intervenant dans le domaine du contrôle de la concurrence.” In fact, the national competition law authorities in the WAEMU differ in their composition and range of functions and competences. See above Part II, Dimension II: Sect. 6.1.

  40. 40.

    Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 215.

  41. 41.

    Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 215.

  42. 42.

    The competent national authority does not necessarily have to be the national competition authority, but can constitute a ministry or sectorial agency or even several national authorities. See for example the cooperation between the ministries in Senegal with the WAEMU Commission. See above Part II, Dimension II: Sect. 6.1.1.

  43. 43.

    See for example Article 21(1) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.

  44. 44.

    See above on the conduct of investigations, Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.1.2.

  45. 45.

    See above on the initiation and conduct of an investigation, Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.1.2.

  46. 46.

    Rule 6(1) of the CARICOM Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2011, “Power to enter premises under warrant”.

  47. 47.

    See on the discussion, Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition, 2008, pp. 203ff., 166f.; Bätge, Wettbewerb der Wettbewerbsordnungen?, 2009, pp. 268ff.

  48. 48.

    Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition, 2008, pp. 166f., 203f.; Bätge, Wettbewerb der Wettbewerbsordnungen?, 2009, pp. 268f.

  49. 49.

    Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition, 2008, pp. 166f., 203f.; Bätge, Wettbewerb der Wettbewerbsordnungen?, 2009, pp. 268f.

  50. 50.

    Article 11(6) of Regulation no. 1/2003.

  51. 51.

    Article 11(6) of Regulation no. 1/2003.

  52. 52.

    Cengiz, The European Competition Network, 2009, p. 17 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/11067/MWP_2009_05.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 11 November 2018.

  53. 53.

    See Compagnie Air France v. Syndicat des Agents de Voyage et de Tourisme du Sénégal, Cour de Justice de l’UEMOA, Arrêt n° 1/2005, 12 January 2005. In more detail discussed above Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.3.2.2.

  54. 54.

    Article 176(6) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

  55. 55.

    Article 211 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

  56. 56.

    Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance that do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis), C 368/07, 22 December 2001, OJ C 291/1, 30 August 2014, p. 1–4.

  57. 57.

    Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), 29 January 2004, OJ L 24, 29 January 2004, p. 1–22.

  58. 58.

    In fact, the inter-governmental group of experts regarding competition law and policy at a conference in 2008, argued in favour of an auto-limitation of the WAEMU Commission regarding its competences. The adoption of a de minimis rule was brought forward as possible solution; Groupe Intergouvernemental d’experts sur le Droit et de la Politique de la Concurrence, Répartition des Compétences entre les Autorités Communautaires et les Autorités Nationales, 16–18 July 2008, Geneva.

  59. 59.

    Article 181 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

  60. 60.

    Article 21 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), 29 January 2004, OJ L 24, 29 January 2004, p. 1–22.

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    Julia Molestina

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Molestina, J. (2019). Dimension V: General Legal Principles Governing the Allocation of Competences in RTAs and the Notion of Time. In: Regional Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 9. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58525-2_9

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