Abstract
Several recent articles have defined and studied judgment aggregation rules based on some minimization principle. Although some of them are defined by analogy with some voting rules, the exact connection between these rules and voting rules is not always obvious. We explore these connections and show how several well-known voting rules such as the top cycle, Copeland, maximin, Slater or ranked pairs, are recovered as specific cases of judgment aggregation rules.
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Lang, J., Slavkovik, M. (2013). Judgment Aggregation Rules and Voting Rules. In: Perny, P., Pirlot, M., Tsoukiàs, A. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8176. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_18
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