Abstract
The comment analyzes the evolution, the present role and some possible perspectives of the HR in European legal system, in order to reduce the fragmentation of European Foreign Policy. At the same time, a peculiar attention is given to institutional questions concerning the problematic relationship of the HR with other European Institutions (European Council and Council, Commission, European Parliament) and the principles of action lying behind each of them.
The structural ambiguity of the “double hatting” solution for HR institutional position is the point of departure to explore opportunities and risks of this figure
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
Nugent (2010), p. 371, is very clear on the point. For the fixing of the common customs tariff, see Art. 18 et seqq. of the institutive EEC Treaty in its original formulation (1957). For the definition of a common commercial policy, see Art. 110 et seqq. EEC Treaty.
- 4.
See Art. 113.3 EEC Treaty in its original formulation, later to become Art. 133.3 EC Treaty in its formulation before the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and Art. 207 TFEU in force now.
- 5.
See Art. 130-UTEU-Maastricht, later Art. 177 EC Treaty and now Art. 208 TFEU.
- 6.
Art. 310 EC Treaty, now Art. 217 TFEU.
- 7.
Starting with the famous decision in Case 22/70, Commission v Council (AETR) (ECJ 31 March 1971). For an authoritative analysis of the first phase of Community jurisprudence dedicated to the subject of external relations, see Pescatore (1979).
- 8.
- 9.
The point is highlighted in the Declaration of Laeken on the future of the European Union. In scientific literature, see Cremona (2004) for the identification of five dimensions of protagonism of the Union/Community in the international scene. Recently, see also the various contributions in Emerson et al. (2011).
- 10.
Such aspiration had a considerable acceleration following the unrest that tore apart the European continent in the 1990s following the overcoming of the Yalta equilibrium.
- 11.
On the utilisability of the categories of constitutionalism, even in the absence of a European constitution in a true sense, see D’Atena (2010), p. 203 et seq.
- 12.
These requisites of the CFSP have been effectively outlined by J. Solana in his paper to the VII Work Group (External action) of the European Convention 15 October 2002 (Doc. WG VII—WD 8). For an interesting valorisation of the principle of coherence, in its horizontal declination (among Institutions) and vertical (among Union and MS), as “fundamental principle”—one could also say “structural”—of the European legal system, see Gauttier (2004), especially. p. 27.
- 13.
See Navarrete and Egea (2001), p. 49.
- 14.
On the solutions of the SEA, see Pescatore’s hard judgement 1987, p. 16, for which the provisions of part III on political cooperation can be summarised in the motto velleitas non est voluntas.
- 15.
For a positive evaluation of the solutions of the Treaty of Maastricht, more prescriptive and binding with respect to those of the previous SEA, see Gosalbo Bono (2006), p. 342.
- 16.
It suffices to think of the Commissioner for emergency humanitarian aid Emma Bonino in the Santer Commission (1995–1999) and her activism during some of the most tragic episodes of the civil war in Yugoslavia.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
This is a reference to the work of the IGC of 1996, the documents of which can be consulted at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/App/Cig/Cig1996.aspx?lang=en&cmsid=908&modeCIG=4. See also the report of the “Reflection Group” SN 520/95 (Reflex 21) on which is based the work of the conference.
- 20.
On the need to guarantee the CFSP greater consistency, continuity and visibility, see the notes of the Presidency of the Conference (Conf/3850 of 24 May 1996), 4. In this document the different possible options are also schematised with regard to the con figuration to give the CFSP and the Secretary General/High Representative, p. 4.
Among the scholars, for the findings of the limits of the Treaty of Maastricht model, see Denza (2012), p. 481.
- 21.
- 22.
For positions—opposing ones—with regard to the valorisation of the Secretary General/High Representative, see the proposals of the French delegation (Conf 3863/96 of 28 June 1996), “maximalist” so as to say, and that of the British delegation (Conf 3893/96 of 30 July 1996), which is instead “minimalist”.
- 23.
For a reconstruction of the role and tasks covered by the HR, see the same Solana (2000), p. 586 et seqq. See also, the intervention referred to in note 12.
- 24.
- 25.
For an analysis not without criticisms and alternative proposals with reference to the subject of the Union’s external relations, see Griller (2003).
- 26.
See the reference document for the members of the Convention (CONV 161/02 of 3 July 2002), p. 6.
- 27.
CONV 161/02 of 3 July 2002, p. 12.
- 28.
CONV 252/02 of 10 September 2002.
- 29.
See the final report of the Group (CONV 459/02 of 16 December 2002) and, in particular, the detailed report.
- 30.
This was the solution—in line with the Community method—advocated by Griller (2003), p. 148, who heavily criticises the case—then confirmed—of the “double hatting”, seen as the forerunner of conflicts of loyalty between Council and Commission for the HR, as well as prejudicial to the principle of the separation of Community powers (p. 146 et seq.).
- 31.
Sessions of 20 December 2002 (CONV 473/02), p. 7 et seq. and of 15/16 May 2003 (CONV 748/03).
- 32.
Document of 23 April 2003 (CONV 685/03), p. 4 et seq.
- 33.
On the delicate—since changeable, but only within certain limits—balance between the two principles, there is ample literature. With reference to the CFSP refer to Gianfrancesco (2011), p. 3 et seqq.
- 34.
CONV 850/03 of 18 July 2003.
- 35.
See document 11218/07 of 26 June 2007, p. 3 and 5.
- 36.
Modestly denoted with the circumlocution “The European Council can put an end to his mandate”.
- 37.
European Council Decision 2009/881/EU taken with the agreement of the President of the Commission of 1 December 2009 appointing the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, O.J L 315/49 (2009).
- 38.
Art. 1 of Decision 2009/881/EU.
- 39.
European Council Decision 2009/950/EU taken with the agreement of the President of the Commission, of 4 December 2009 appointing the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, O.J. L 328/69 (2009).
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
- 43.
- 44.
This aspect is highlighted by Denza (2012), p. 483 et seq.
- 45.
→ Art. 26 para 28, where this is highlighted as possible points of strength of the HR’s action.
- 46.
On the ambiguity of the Treaty’s discipline on the point, see Wouters et al. (2008), p. 153.
- 47.
Ceps, Egmont, EpC (2010), p.141 et seqq.
- 48.
- 49.
See, for all these, Nugent (2010), p. 393 et seqq.
- 50.
- 51.
As was in the case of the recent proposals presented in March and May 2011 on the relations with the countries of the southern part of the Mediterranean (COM(2011) 200 final of 8 March 2011) and the new neighbourhood policy (COM(2011) 303) of 25 May 2011.
- 52.
On the importance of the composition of the Commissioners’ Cabinets, see recently, Egeberg and Heskestad (2010).
- 53.
On this aspect, see Dijkstra (2011).
- 54.
I revise the opinion expressed in Gianfrancesco (2011), p. 15, in a less pessimistic way.
- 55.
In its most recent version this is the agreement of 20 October 2010, O.J. L 304/47 (2010).
- 56.
Interinstitutional agreement, para 5.
- 57.
P6_TA(2009)0387, para 59.
- 58.
Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, O.J. L 201/30 (2010).
- 59.
Art. 1.2 of the Decision. On the different options—minimalist or maximalist—of structure realisation, see synthetically Duke (2008), p. 15.
- 60.
Art. 1.3 of the Decision.
- 61.
Art. 2 of the Decision.
- 62.
Art. 3.4 of the Decision.
- 63.
See Thym (2012).
- 64.
About this theme, see Wessel (2012).
- 65.
About the role that the European Council plays too, in this area and the interactions with FAC, see Cherubini (2012).
- 66.
For the reasons already illustrated in Gianfrancesco (2011), p. 22 et seq., I do not consider on the other hand that a technical institution like the EDA (Art. 45 TEU) can significantly influence the political decisions with regard to common defence. Duke’s observations (Duke (1999), (p. 12) differ from these.
- 67.
- 68.
On the statement of the Petersberg Tasks as an element characterising the CFSP well before the Treaty of Lisbon, see Pagani (1998).
- 69.
Curtin (2009), p. 101.
- 70.
Piris (2010), p. 248.
- 71.
Hill (2003), p. 2.
- 72.
Thym (2004), p. 21.
- 73.
This specific relationship makes up a chapter on its own and with evident features of autonomy with respect to the more general strengthening of the relations between Commission and Parliament, revived by the President of the Commission himself Barroso during his first speech on the State of the Union of 7 September 2010 (speech/10/411, p. 10).
- 74.
For the appropriate underlining of the importance of the instruments of orientation and political control (particularly on the subject of budget) that the EP has with regard to the protagonists of the CFSP, see Mangiameli (2009), p. 421. The efficacy of these instruments is recognised also by whoever (Thym 2006, p. 118) has a limited view of the role and powers of the EP in CFSP matters.
- 75.
The specification is obligatory.
- 76.
For an analysis referring to the period prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, see Diedrichs (2004), retrenching the commonplace of “marginality” of the EP in the CFSFP, particularly in the financial area.
- 77.
P6_TA(2009)0387, para 16.
- 78.
On the importance of the inter-institutional agreements as an instrument for the recovery of the EP’s role in questions relative to the CFSP, see Maurer et al. (2005).
- 79.
This line of tendency and development plays on natural margins of indeterminateness of every inter-institutional discipline which lends itself to numerous intra-institutional adaptations often able to develop their unexpressed potential. For a recent study of the subject referred to European law, see Naurin and Rasmussen (2011).
- 80.
- 81.
On the development of the principle of representative democracy in the Treaty of Lisbon, see Mangiameli (2008).
- 82.
See also the document with written answers to a questionnaire sent by Baroness Ashton to the members of the Committee (Pe431.071v02-00—6 January 2010).
- 83.
It is coherent with this aim the demand for a 25 million euro enlargement of the EEAS budget, fiercely defended by HR in the question-time in EP of 1 February 2012.
- 84.
See Remarks by HR of 23 August 2011 (A 326/11). See also, in a wider perspective, the Speech of HR to the EP on 11 Mai 2011 (A179/11).
- 85.
For a recent explanation of the “deep democracy” model, see the Speech by HR at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), 10 February 2012 (A 54/12).
- 86.
It is interesting to notice that Baroness Ashton gives extremely rare interviews to press (like that one released to The Independent, 24 October 2011), if compared with a great number of “statements” or “remarks” available on the official website of the HR.
- 87.
The Serbian status of candidate for Accession to EU in 2012 is the most visible result of this successful—of course, not without problems—policy.
- 88.
The relationship with NATO is qualified as “essential” from Baroness Ashton in her speech on CSDP at the European Parliament, on 13 December 2011 (A 512/11). But leaving aside the rhetoric of “work hand in hand”, the need of rethinking this special relationship in the area of security and defence is evident, as Libyc experience shows. The problem is that every kind of new relationship implies a previous idea of what European policy in area of security and defence means and the aims to pursue.
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Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (2013). Article 18 [The High Representative]. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31706-4_19
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