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Scheduler-Independent Declassification

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Mathematics of Program Construction (MPC 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 7342))

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Abstract

The controlled declassification of secrets has received much attention in research on information-flow security, though mostly for sequential programming languages. In this article, we aim at guaranteeing the security of concurrent programs. We propose the novel security property WHAT&WHERE that allows one to limit what information may be declassified where in a program. We show that our property provides adequate security guarantees independent of the scheduling algorithm (which is non-trivial due to the refinement paradox) and present a security type system that reliably enforces the property. In a second scheduler-independence result, we show that an earlier proposed security condition is adequate for the same range of schedulers. These are the first scheduler-independence results in the presence of declassification.

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Lux, A., Mantel, H., Perner, M. (2012). Scheduler-Independent Declassification. In: Gibbons, J., Nogueira, P. (eds) Mathematics of Program Construction. MPC 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7342. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31113-0_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31113-0_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31112-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31113-0

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