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Institutions and Development

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Abstract

Much discussion in recent years has focused on why North America was able to follow Britain in a path of economic development, but Latin America and the Caribbean islands, though generally far richer initially, fell behind in the nineteenth century. In their discussion of Latin American economic development, Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) have emphasized the different factor endowments of North and South America.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Easterly (2007) sets up a formal model to analyze productivity and factor models.

  2. 2.

    See also Nunn (2008) who explores the causal relationship between those parts of Africa from where slaves were taken, and the subsequent degree of economic development.

  3. 3.

    Acemoglu et al. (2009).

  4. 4.

    Maybe we should see the Civil War as a conflict to overcome the Southern agrarian veto against industrialization. See Egnal (2009).

  5. 5.

    Broers (2005), Cheterian (2008), Lincoln (2008), Muskhelishvili et al. (2009), Muskhelishvili (2010). Also see Carothers (2002) on such partial transitions to democracy.

  6. 6.

    North (1981, 1990, 1993, 1994, 2005) and North et al. (2009).

  7. 7.

    For example, Acemoglu (2006) presents a model where the elite pursue inefficient policies in order to extract rent.

  8. 8.

    See Maddicott (2010) for the beginnings of Parliament in the Anglo–Saxon period in England.

  9. 9.

    See also Pincus (2009), for example, on the Glorious Revolution.

  10. 10.

    See also Schofield et al. (2003), Miller and Schofield (2003, 2008) and Schofield and Miller (2007).

  11. 11.

    As Diamond (2008) has noted, oil is the crucial factor in many authoritarian petro-regimes, including such states as Azerbaijan, Gabon, Iran, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, Uzbekistan and Venezuela.

  12. 12.

    Acemoglu et al. (2010a) offer a more economic model of a game between elite, citizenry and the military. A model of targeting the citizens through “clientism” is offered in the Appendix to Chap. 5.

  13. 13.

    The formal definition of the balance condition is given in Chap. 5. It is the condition that specifies how the leader will maximize support, based both on electoral and activist support.

  14. 14.

    The invasion of Georgia by Russia in early August 2008, and the problem over Russian gas prices and supplies in Eastern Europe and the Ukraine in January 2009 shows that Putin is ready and able to extend Russian power in its sphere of interest, especially in a situation where the United States has its military resources over-committed in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Lucas (2009).

  15. 15.

    See Lucas (2009).

  16. 16.

    Members of Parliament still received their monthly checks of $10,000 and appeared in no hurry to form a government.

  17. 17.

    Huntington (1991).

  18. 18.

    See Chap. 1.

  19. 19.

    Rashid (2008) notes that in 2006 Afghanistan produced 93% of the world’s heroin. There are also untapped reserves of oil, gas and many minerals.

  20. 20.

    See Syrquin (1988).

  21. 21.

    See Brambilla et al. (2009).

  22. 22.

    See Cantón (1968).

  23. 23.

    This section is based on Schofield and Cataife (2007).

  24. 24.

    US prosecutors in a Miami courthouse asserted that the government of Venezuela sent US$790,550 in cash to help Cristina F. Kirchner’s electoral campaign. The Argentine government denies this allegation.

  25. 25.

    Cavallo, 2004.

  26. 26.

    IMF (2004).

  27. 27.

    Figure 11.2 is clearly just a variant of Fig. 11.1.

  28. 28.

    Not all these leaders took office. Ollanta Humala was defeated in Peru’s run off election by Alan Garcia. But Nestor Kirchner won the 2003 Presidential election in Argentina, and was followed by his wife, Christina in 2007.

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Correspondence to Norman Schofield .

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Schofield, N., Gallego, M. (2011). Institutions and Development. In: Leadership or Chaos. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19516-7_11

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