Abstract
It is a common belief that computing a market equilibrium in Fisher’s spending model is easier than computing a market equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu’s exchange model. This belief is built on the fact that we have more algorithmic success in Fisher equilibria than Arrow-Debreu equilibria. For example, a Fisher equilibrium in a Leontief market can be found in polynomial time, while it is PPAD-hard to compute an approximate Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in a Leontief market.
In this paper, we show that even when all the utilities are additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave, computing an approximate equilibrium in Fisher’s model is PPAD-hard. Our result solves a long-term open question on the complexity of market equilibria. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first PPAD-hardness result for Fisher’s model.
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Chen, X., Teng, SH. (2009). Spending Is Not Easier Than Trading: On the Computational Equivalence of Fisher and Arrow-Debreu Equilibria. In: Dong, Y., Du, DZ., Ibarra, O. (eds) Algorithms and Computation. ISAAC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5878. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10631-6_66
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10631-6_66
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