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A Design of Secure Preferential E-Voting

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E-Voting and Identity (Vote-ID 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5767))

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Abstract

A secure preferential e-voting scheme is designed in this paper. It is a homomorphic e-voting scheme. It is illustrated that although mix-based voting is a very simple solution to preferential e-voting it is vulnerable to a coercion attack. The coercion attack especially attacks preferential e-voting scheme only outputs the election result and does not reveal any vote, so is invulnerable to the attack. Homomorphism of the employed encryption algorithm is exploited not only to count the votes without revealing them but also to adjust the votes when a new round of counting is needed. Moreover, it achieves all the security properties usually desired in e-voting.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

    Kun Peng & Feng Bao

Authors
  1. Kun Peng
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  2. Feng Bao
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Peter Y. A. Ryan

  2. Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science,, Technical University of Eindhoven, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    Berry Schoenmakers

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Peng, K., Bao, F. (2009). A Design of Secure Preferential E-Voting. In: Ryan, P.Y.A., Schoenmakers, B. (eds) E-Voting and Identity. Vote-ID 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5767. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04135-8_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04135-8_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-04134-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-04135-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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