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Correlated Equilibrium of Bertrand Competition

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Book cover Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5385))

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Abstract

This paper explores the relation between equilibrium coarsenings and equilibrium refinements via Bertrand competition example and similar situations, it shows that the typical equilibrium coarsening -— a unique correlated equilibrium -— is equivalent to the unique Nash equilibrium itself, is also equivalent to the equilibrium refinement, for the standard n-firms Bertrand competition model with linear demand and symmetric, linear costs in the most special and simplest case, and compares some wonderful and remarkable differences of the existence, uniqueness, stability, connectivity, and strategic property of Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium between Cournot and Bertrand model. We also propose some open questions.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Business, East China Normal University, 200241, Shanghai, China

    John Wu

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  1. John Wu
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Division, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    Christos Papadimitriou

  2. Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong

    Shuzhong Zhang

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Wu, J. (2008). Correlated Equilibrium of Bertrand Competition. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5385. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92184-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92185-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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