Skip to main content

Property-Based Attestation without a Trusted Third Party

  • Conference paper
Information Security (ISC 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 5222))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has proposed the binary attestation mechanism that enables a computing platform with a dedicated security chip, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), to report its state to remote parties. The concept of property-based attestation (PBA) improves the binary attestation and compensates for some of its main deficiencies. In particular, PBA enhances user privacy by allowing the trusted platform to prove to a remote entity that it has certain properties without revealing its own configuration.

The existing PBA solutions, however, require a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to provide a reliable link of configurations to properties, e.g., by means of certificates. We present a new privacy-preserving PBA approach that avoids such a TTP. We define a formal model, propose an efficient protocol based on the ideas of ring signatures, and prove its security. The cryptographic technique deployed in our protocol is of independent interest, as it shows how ring signatures can be used to efficiently prove the knowledge of an element in a list without disclosing it.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Abe, M., Ohkubo, M., Suzuki, K.: 1-out-of-n signatures from a variety of keys. In ASIACRYPT 2002, LNCS vol. In: Zheng, Y. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2501, pp. 415–432. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Bender, A., Katz, J., Morselli, R.: Ring Signatures: Stronger Definitions, and Constructions without Random Oracles. In: Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds.) TCC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3876, pp. 60–79. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Brickell, E., Camenisch, J., Chen, L.: Direct anonymous attestation. In: Pfitzmann, B., Liu, P. (eds.) Proceedings of ACM CCS 2004, pp. 132–145. ACM Press, New York (2004)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Brickell, E., Chen, L., Li, J.: A new direct anonymous attestation scheme from bilinear maps. In: Lipp, P., Sadeghi, A.-R., Koch, K.-M. (eds.) TRUST 2008. LNCS, vol. 4968. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Brickell, E., Li, J.: Enhanced Privacy ID: A direct anonymous attestation scheme with enhanced revocation capabilities. In: Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2007), pp. 21–30. ACM Press, New York (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Camenisch, J.: Better privacy for trusted computing platforms. In: Samarati, P., Ryan, P.Y.A., Gollmann, D., Molva, R. (eds.) ESORICS 2004. LNCS, vol. 3193, pp. 73–88. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Camenisch, J., Michels, M.: Proving in Zero-Knowledge that a Number Is the Product of Two Safe Primes. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 107–122. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Camenisch, J., Stadler, M.: Proof Systems for General Statements about Discrete Logarithms. Technical Report TR 260, Dep. of Computer Science, ETH Zürich (March 1997)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Chandran, N., Groth, J., Sahai, A.: Ring Signatures of Sub-linear Size Without Random Oracles. In: Arge, L., Cachin, C., Jurdziński, T., Tarlecki, A. (eds.) ICALP 2007. LNCS, vol. 4596, pp. 423–434. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Chaum, D., van Antwerpen, H.: Undeniable signatures. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 212–216. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Chen, L., Landfermann, R., Löhr, H., Rohe, M., Sadeghi, A., Stüble, C.: A Protocol for Property-Based Attestation. In: Proceedings of ACM STC 2006, pp. 7–16. ACM Press, New York (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Dodis, Y., Kiayias, A., Nicolosi, A., Shoup, V.: Anonymous identification in ad hoc groups. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 609–626. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Fujisaki, E., Okamoto, T.: Statistical Zero Knowledge Protocols to Prove Modular Polynomial Relations. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 16–30. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Kühn, U., Selhorst, M., Stüble, C.: Realizing Property-Based Attestation and Sealing on Commonly Available Hard- and Software. In: ACM STC 2007, pp. 50–57. ACM Press, New York (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Micali, S., Rabin, M.O., Kilian, J.: Zero-Knowledge Sets. In: Proceedings of the 44th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2003), pp. 80–91. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  16. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Secure Hash Standard (SHS). FIPS PUB 180-2 (August 2002)

    Google Scholar 

  17. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Digital Signature Standard (DSS). FIPS PUB 186-3 (Draft) (March 2006)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Pedersen, T.P.: Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 129–140. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  19. Poritz, J., Schunter, M., van Herreweghen, E., Waidner, M.: Property Attestation – Scalable and Privacy-friendly Security Assessment of Peer Computers. IBM Research Report RZ 3548 (# 99559) (October 2004)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Rivest, R., Shamir, A., Tauman, Y.: How to Leak a Secret. In: Boyd, C. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 552–565. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  21. Sadeghi, A., Stüble, C.: Property-based attestation for computing platforms: Caring about properties, not mechanisms. In: Proceedings of NSPW 2004, pp. 67–77. ACM Press, New York (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  22. Schnorr, C.P.: Efficient Signature Generation by Smart Cards. J. Cryptology 4(3), 161–174 (1991)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  23. Shacham, H., Waters, B.: Efficient Ring Signatures without Random Oracles. In: Okamoto, T., Wang, X. (eds.) PKC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4450, pp. 166–180. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  24. Shoup, V.: Sequences of games: a tool for taming complexity in security proofs. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/332 (2004), http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/332

  25. Trusted Computing Group. TCG TPM Specification, Version 1.2, https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Tzong-Chen Wu Chin-Laung Lei Vincent Rijmen Der-Tsai Lee

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Chen, L., Löhr, H., Manulis, M., Sadeghi, AR. (2008). Property-Based Attestation without a Trusted Third Party. In: Wu, TC., Lei, CL., Rijmen, V., Lee, DT. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5222. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85886-7_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85886-7_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85884-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85886-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics