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A Formal Analysis for Capturing Replay Attacks in Cryptographic Protocols

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 4846))

Abstract

We present a reduction semantics for the LySa calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks.

This work has been partially supported by the project SENSORIA.

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Iliano Cervesato

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Gao, H., Bodei, C., Degano, P., Riis Nielson, H. (2007). A Formal Analysis for Capturing Replay Attacks in Cryptographic Protocols. In: Cervesato, I. (eds) Advances in Computer Science – ASIAN 2007. Computer and Network Security. ASIAN 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4846. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-76927-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-76929-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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