Abstract
The classical combiner \(\mathsf{Comb}_{\text{class}}^{H_0,H_1}(M)=H_0(M)|| H_1(M)\) for hash functions H 0,H 1 provides collision-resistance as long as at least one of the two underlying hash functions is secure. This statement is complemented by the multi-collision attack of Joux (Crypto 2004) for iterated hash functions H 0,H 1 with n-bit outputs. He shows that one can break the classical combiner in \({{n}\over{2}}. T_0 + T_1\) steps if one can find collisions for H 0 and H 1 in time T 0 and T 1, respectively. Here we address the question if there are security-amplifying combiners where the security of the building blocks increases the security of the combined hash function, thus beating the bound of Joux. We discuss that one can indeed have such combiners and, somewhat surprisingly in light of results of Nandi and Stinson (ePrint 2004) and of Hoch and Shamir (FSE 2006), our solution is essentially as efficient as the classical combiner.
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Fischlin, M., Lehmann, A. (2007). Security-Amplifying Combiners for Collision-Resistant Hash Functions. In: Menezes, A. (eds) Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2007. CRYPTO 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4622. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74143-5_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74143-5_13
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