Skip to main content

Verifying the SET Protocol: Overview

  • Conference paper
Formal Aspects of Security (FASec 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2629))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

The project to verify SET, an e-commerce protocol, is described. The main tasks are to comprehend the written documentation, to produce an accurate formal model, to identify specific protocol goals, and finally to prove them. The main obstacles are the protocol’s complexity (due in part to its use of digital envelopes) and its unusual goals involving partial information sharing. Brief examples are taken from the registration and purchase phases. The protocol does not completely satisfy its goals, but only minor flaws have been found. The primary outcome of the project is experience with handling enormous and complicated protocols.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Anderson, R.: Why cryptosystems fail. Comm. of the ACM 37(11), 32–40 (1994)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Bella, G., Massacci, F., Paulson, L.C.: The verification of an industrial payment protocol: The SET purchase phase. In: Atluri, V. (ed.) 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 12–20. ACM Press, New York (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Bella, G., Massacci, F., Paulson, L.C.: Verifying the SET registration protocols. IEEE J. of Selected Areas in Communications 21(1) (2003) (in press)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Bella, G., Massacci, F., Paulson, L.C., Tramontano, P.: Formal verification of cardholder registration in SET. In: Cuppens, F., Deswarte, Y., Gollmann, D., Waidner, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2000. LNCS, vol. 1895, pp. 159–174. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Bella, G., Paulson, L.C.: Kerberos version IV: Inductive analysis of the secrecy goals. In: Quisquater, J.-J., Deswarte, Y., Meadows, C., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 1998. LNCS, vol. 1485, pp. 361–375. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Cohen, E.: TAPS: A first-order verifier for cryptographic protocols. In: Proc. of the 13th IEEE Comp. Sec. Found. Workshop, pp. 144–158. IEEE Comp. Society Press, Los Alamitos (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Lowe, G.: Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using CSP and FDR. In: Margaria, T., Steffen, B. (eds.) TACAS 1996. LNCS, vol. 1055, pp. 147–166. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Mastercard & VISA. SET Secure Electronic Transaction Specification: Business Description (May 1997), Available electronically at http://www.setco.org/set_specifications.html

  9. Mastercard & VISA. SET Secure Electronic Transaction Specification: Formal Protocol Definition (May 1997), Available electronically at http://www.setco.org/set_specifications.html

  10. Mastercard & VISA. SET Secure Electronic Transaction Specification: Programmer’s Guide (May 1997), Available electronically at http://www.setco.org/set_specifications.html

  11. Meadows, C.: Analysis of the Internet Key Exchange protocol using the NRL Protocol Analyzer. In: SSP 1999, pp. 216–231. IEEE Comp. Society Press, Los Alamitos (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Nipkow, T., Paulson, L.C., Wenzel, M.T. (eds.): Isabelle/HOL: A Proof Assistant for Higher-Order Logic. LNCS, vol. 2283. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. Paulson, L.C.: The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. J. of Comp. Sec. 6, 85–128 (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Paulson, L.C.: Inductive analysis of the internet protocol TLS. ACM Trans. on Inform. and Sys. Sec. 2(3), 332–351 (1999)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Paulson, L.C.: Relations between secrets: Two formal analyses of the Yahalom protocol. J. of Comp. Sec. 9(3), 197–216 (2001)

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  16. Ryan, P., Schneider, S.: An attack on a recurive authentication protocol. a cautionary tale. Inform. Processing Lett. 65(15), 7–16 (1998)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Paulson, L.C. (2003). Verifying the SET Protocol: Overview. In: Abdallah, A.E., Ryan, P., Schneider, S. (eds) Formal Aspects of Security. FASec 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2629. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40981-6_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40981-6_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20693-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-40981-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics