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An African View on the CETA Investment Chapter

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Foreign Investment Under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)

Part of the book series: Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation ((SEELR,volume 15))

Abstract

Investments form a substantial portion of Canada-European Union (EU) economic relations. The CETA’s Investment Chapter is designed to give investors greater certainty, stability, transparency, and protection for their investments, and to secure access for Canadian and European investors to each other’s respective markets. In the course of negotiation of the CETA, Canada and the EU agreed to incorporate certain reform approaches to investment protection and investment dispute resolution provisions. This chapter seeks to discuss and contextualize these approaches from an African perspective by comparing it to the specific and innovative features enshrined in African international investment agreements (IIAs) and model treaties including, inter alia, the Pan-African Investment Code (PAIC). The latter is the first continent-wide African model investment treaty elaborated under the auspices of the African Union (AU).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    European Commission, Overview of FTA and other Trade Negotiations, 9 April 2013, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf.

  2. 2.

    Council of the European Union, Press Release, 12 September 2011, p. 13, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/EN/genaff/124579.pdf.

  3. 3.

    Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, signed 30 October 2016, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ L 11, 14 January 2017, pp. 23–1079.

  4. 4.

    Joint statement of EU Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, and the Minister of International Trade of Canada, Chrystia Freeland, “Malmström met Minister Freeland of Canada”, Brussels, 21 April 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1483.

  5. 5.

    The Pan-African Investment Code, Version of 26 March 2016, https://repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/23009. Makane Mbengue has been the lead expert and negotiator from 2014 to 2015. The views expressed in this chapter do not necessarily reflect the views of the African Union or of other negotiators involved in the negotiation and drafting of the PAIC. For a detailed analysis of the PAIC and its elaboration, see Mbengue and Schacherer (2017).

  6. 6.

    Dolzer and Stevens (1995), p. 20.

  7. 7.

    UNCTAD, “Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development” (2015) (hereafter: IPFSD), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf. The term sustainable development is understood here as development, which relates to economic development, social development and the protection of the environment as interdependent and mutually reinforcing components.

  8. 8.

    See for instance, CETA, Art. 22.1(2).

  9. 9.

    CETA, preamble, para. 9.

  10. 10.

    See Model BIT of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Commentary p. 8, http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf.

  11. 11.

    PAIC, preamble, para. 8.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., para. 10.

  13. 13.

    The SADC Model BIT (n. 10), preamble, para. 6.

  14. 14.

    PAIC, Art. 1.

  15. 15.

    CETA, Art. 8.2.

  16. 16.

    PAIC, Art. 2.2.

  17. 17.

    CETA, Art. 8.1.

  18. 18.

    SADC Model BIT (n. 10), Commentary, p. 13.

  19. 19.

    PAIC, Art. 3.4.

  20. 20.

    An investment under the PAIC may possess the following assets: “shares, stocks, debentures and other equity instruments of the enterprise or another enterprise; a debt security of another enterprise; loans to an enterprise; movable or immovable property and other property rights such as mortgages, liens or pledges; claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value; copyrights, know-how, goodwill and industrial property rights such as patents, trademarks, industrial designs and trade names, to the extent they are recognized under the law of the host State”.

  21. 21.

    See Indian Model BIT (2015) Art. 1.4 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3560; Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Malawi (signed 25 June 2015, not yet in force) Art. 2, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4715.

  22. 22.

    The SADC Model BIT contains three options for the definition of an investment: an enterprise-based definition, an asset-based definition with a closed list and an asset-based definition with an open list, see SADC Model BIT (n. 10) Commentary, pp. 12–13.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., Commentary, p. 13.

  24. 24.

    CETA, Art. 8.1.

  25. 25.

    CETA, Art. 8.1.

  26. 26.

    The definition of a portfolio investment under the PAIC is the following: “portfolio investment refers to any investment where the investor owns less than 10% of shares in a company or through stock exchange, or otherwise does not give the portfolio investor the possibility to exercise effective management or influence on the management of the investment”.

  27. 27.

    Alike Brazil-Malawi CIFA (n. 21) Art. 2.

  28. 28.

    PAIC, Art. 4.

  29. 29.

    Salini et al. v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, para. 52.

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    See US Model BIT (2012), Art. 1, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. See also EU-Singapore FTA (2014), Art. 9.1(1) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/tradoc_152844.pdf.

  32. 32.

    German Model BIT (2008), Art. 1.1 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2865; UK Model BIT (2008), Art. 1(a); http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2847; French Model BIT (2006) Art. 1.1 www.italaw.com/documents/ModelTreatyFrance2006.pdf; Agreement between Japan and the Islamic Republic of Iran on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment (signed 5 February 2016, not yet in force), Art. 1.1, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3578; Agreement between Japan and Ukraine for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (signed 5 February 2015, not yet in force), Art. 1.1, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3324. One exception in Japanese treaty practice is the Agreement between Japan and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment (signed 26 January 2015, not yet in force).

  33. 33.

    Indian Model BIT (n. 21), Art. 1.4.

  34. 34.

    CETA, Art. 8.1.

  35. 35.

    PAIC, Art. 4.5.

  36. 36.

    Dolzer and Stevens (1995), p. 35.

  37. 37.

    CETA, Art. 8.1.

  38. 38.

    PAIC, Art. 4.1.

  39. 39.

    CETA, Art. 8.6.

  40. 40.

    CETA, Art. 8.7.

  41. 41.

    PAIC, Arts. 7.1 and 9.1.

  42. 42.

    Reinisch (2015), pp. 846 and 859.

  43. 43.

    See Investment Agreement of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Art. 17.2, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3092.

  44. 44.

    PAIC, Arts. 7.3 and 9.3.

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    SD Myers v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 251; Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tat & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award, 21 November 2007, para. 198. Extreme approaches were taken by the tribunal in Methanex v. USA taking into account only identical comparators as well as by the tribunal in Occidental v. Ecuador by stating to compare all investors that are in a comparative relationship. See Methanex v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award, 3 August 2005, pt IV (ch. B) and Occidental v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Award, 1 July 2004, paras. 173 et seq.

  47. 47.

    CETA, Art. 8.15.

  48. 48.

    PAIC, Art. 8.2.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., Art. 8.3.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., Art. 8.5.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., Art. 10.2.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., Art. 10.3.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., Art. 10.7.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., Art. 10.4.

  55. 55.

    CETA, Art. 8.16.

  56. 56.

    PAIC, Art. 10.6.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., Art. 10.8.

  58. 58.

    UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, United Nations 2015, p. 106.

  59. 59.

    For a more detailed conceptualization, see Schill and Jacob (2015), pp. 700–763.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., p. 717.

  61. 61.

    Sornarajah (2015), p. 247. Schreuer held that the lack of precision might be a virtue rather than a shortcoming, since in practice it would be impossible to anticipate in the abstract the range of possible types of infringements upon investor’s legal position, see Schreuer (2005), p. 365.

  62. 62.

    For greater detail, see Kläger (2011), pp. 241–259.

  63. 63.

    Ibid., p. 251.

  64. 64.

    Schill and Jacob (2013), p. 142. Consider e.g. Indian Model BIT (n. 21), Art. 3, as well as COMESA Investment Agreement (n. 43), Art. 14.

  65. 65.

    CETA, Art. 8.10(2).

  66. 66.

    Hoffmeister (2015), pp. 357 and 366.

  67. 67.

    CETA, Art. 8.10.4.

  68. 68.

    Indian Model BIT (n. 21), Art. 3.

  69. 69.

    Recommended by SADC, see SADC Model BIT (n. 10), Commentary, p. 22.

  70. 70.

    Promotion and Protection Investment Act of South Africa, 2013; Brazil-Malawi CIFA (n. 21).

  71. 71.

    SADC Model BIT (n. 10), Commentary, p. 22.

  72. 72.

    Dolzer and Stevens (1995), p. 86.

  73. 73.

    The German Model BIT contains such absolute free transfer clause, German Model BIT (n. 32), Art. 6.

  74. 74.

    CETA, Art. 8.13(1).

  75. 75.

    Ibid.

  76. 76.

    CETA, Art. 8.13(3).

  77. 77.

    PAIC, Art. 15.

  78. 78.

    Ibid., Art. 16.

  79. 79.

    SADC Model BIT (n. 10) Commentary, p. 29.

  80. 80.

    PAIC, Art. 16.1.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., Art. 16.3.

  82. 82.

    Ibid., Art. 16.4.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., Art. 16.5.

  84. 84.

    UNCTAD (2003).

  85. 85.

    Collins (2016), p. 10.

  86. 86.

    For an illustrative list, see Nikièma S, Performance Requirements in Investment Treaties, IISD Best Practice Series, December (2014), pp. 2–3, www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-performance-requirements-investment-treaties-en.pdf.

  87. 87.

    Ibid.

  88. 88.

    Newcombe (2015), pp. 202 and 207; US Model BIT (n. 31), Art. 8.

  89. 89.

    Indian Model BIT (n. 21); Brazil-Malawi CIFA (n. 21).

  90. 90.

    CETA, Art. 8.5.

  91. 91.

    PAIC, Art. 17.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., Art. 17.2(c).

  93. 93.

    More specifically on investors’ obligations, see Mbengue (2017).

  94. 94.

    Nowrot (2015), pp. 1154 and 1155. It is important to remember that foreign investors have always had legal obligations under the national law of the host State or under the investor-state contract.

  95. 95.

    International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development (2005), www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf. pt. 3.

  96. 96.

    Art. 19 of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC) Investment Code (1982) requires, inter alia, “respect and ensure staff rights, establish and keep to a program for training manpower and promoting the advancement of managerial staff who are national of the member country, as well as to the protection of the environment”.

  97. 97.

    Charter on a Regime of Multinational Industrial Enterprises of Eastern and Southern African States (signed 23 November 1990) Art. 17 (1991), 30 ILM, p. 696.

  98. 98.

    COMESA Investment Agreement (n. 43), Art. 13; SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (2006), http://www.sadc.int/files/4213/5332/6872/Protocol_on_Finance__Investment2006.pdf, Art. 10, Annex 1.

  99. 99.

    COMESA Investment Agreement (n. 43), Art. 16.

  100. 100.

    PAIC, ch. 4.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., Art. 19.1.

  102. 102.

    Ibid., Art. 19.3.

  103. 103.

    Ibid., Art. 20.1.

  104. 104.

    Ibid., Art. 20.2.

  105. 105.

    Ibid., Art. 21.

  106. 106.

    Ibid., Art. 24. This provision is the only provision in the chapter using non-binding and only encouraging language.

  107. 107.

    The drafters of the PAIC opted for the possibility of counterclaims to be submitted by host States.

  108. 108.

    Such as the establishment of a permanent tribunal in EU treaties, see EU-Vietnam FTA (2016), ch. 8, s. 3, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437; The Indian Model BIT (n. 21), Art. 14 prohibits investors to threaten the State to use ISDS in order to obtain benefices, limits the scope of claim, and foresees the exhaustion of local remedies.

  109. 109.

    Such as South Africa and Brazil. See for the ombudsman system, Brazil-Malawi CIFA (n. 21), Arts. 4 and 13.

  110. 110.

    CETA, Art. 8.19(6)(b).

  111. 111.

    CETA, Art. 8.20(5).

  112. 112.

    CETA, Art. 8.19.

  113. 113.

    CETA, Art. 8.19(6)(a).

  114. 114.

    CETA, Art. 8.22(1).

  115. 115.

    CETA, Art. 8.23.

  116. 116.

    CETA, Art. 8.27(2).

  117. 117.

    CETA, Art. 8.27(6).

  118. 118.

    CETA, Art. 8.27(5).

  119. 119.

    CETA, Art. 8.27(12).

  120. 120.

    CETA, Art. 8.32.

  121. 121.

    CETA, Art. 8.33(1).

  122. 122.

    CETA, Art. 8.35.

  123. 123.

    CETA, Arts. 8.30 and 8.36.

  124. 124.

    CETA, Art. 8.30(1).

  125. 125.

    CETA, Art. 8.36.

  126. 126.

    CETA, Art. 8.28.

  127. 127.

    CETA, Art. 8.28(7).

  128. 128.

    CETA, Art. 8.44(1).

  129. 129.

    CETA, Art. 8.29.

  130. 130.

    The European Parliament passed a resolution in July 2015 endorsing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) but rejecting ISDS in the form as under CETA (European Parliament 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0252+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. Key politicians in some EU Member States had expressed serious concerns about ISDS in the 2014 text.

  131. 131.

    Most EU Member States have indicated that they will support ratification despite continuing protests.

  132. 132.

    See European Commission, Investment Provisions in The EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf.

  133. 133.

    CETA, Art. 8.22(1)(f).

  134. 134.

    NAFTA, Art. 1126 was relied upon to consolidate three claims against the United States brought by Confor Corporation, Tembec et al. and Terminal Forest Products Ltd. See Joint Order on the Costs of Arbitration and for the Termination of certain Arbitral Proceedings, 19 July 2007, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/90177.pdf.

  135. 135.

    Steger (2013), pp. 247–264.

  136. 136.

    Schill (2009).

  137. 137.

    CETA, Art. 8.28(2).

  138. 138.

    CETA, Art. 8.29.

  139. 139.

    UNCTAD (2014), p. 18.

  140. 140.

    Promotion and Protection of Investment of South Africa (2015). The Bill has not yet entered into force. The current draft is available at www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39514.pdf.

  141. 141.

    SADC recommends the exclusion of ISDS, see SADC Model BIT (n. 10), Art. 29.

  142. 142.

    PAIC, Art. 42.1.

  143. 143.

    Recent trends show that umbrella clauses are no longer included into IIAs.

  144. 144.

    PAIC, Art. 42.3.

  145. 145.

    A number of IIAs require pursuing local remedies for a period of time, see e.g. Agreement between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Republic of Botswana on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (signed 7 June 2006, not yet in force) Art. 12.2 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/331; Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of Argentina on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (signed 17 May 1994, entered into force 24 September 1996) Art. 8.3(a) http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/102.

  146. 146.

    See Sornarajah (2015), p. 190.

  147. 147.

    IISD Model (n. 95), Art. 45; SADC Model BIT (n 10), Art. 29.4(b).

  148. 148.

    Indian Model BIT (n. 21), Art. 14.3.

  149. 149.

    PAIC, Art. 42.3.

  150. 150.

    Ibid., Art. 42.3.

  151. 151.

    Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill of South Africa, (n. 140), Art. 13.

  152. 152.

    ICSID Convention, Art. 46; see also Rule 40 ICSID Arbitration Rules. Yet, Art. 46 of the ICSID Convention does not, by itself, vest a tribunal with competence over counterclaims, the requirements of Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention as well as of the applicable investment treaty must also be satisfied. See Urbaser v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, 8 December 2016, para. 1117.

  153. 153.

    See Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, 7 December 2011, paras. 859–877 and Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, 7 May 2004.

  154. 154.

    COMESA Investment Agreement (n. 43), Art. 28.9: “A Member State against whom a claim is brought by a COMESA investor under this Article may assert as a defense, counterclaim, right of set off or other similar claim, that the COMESA investor bringing the claim has not fulfilled its obligations under this Agreement, including the obligations to comply with all applicable domestic measures or that it has not taken all reasonable steps to mitigate possible damages”.

  155. 155.

    SADC Model BIT (n. 10), Arts. 19 and 29.19.

  156. 156.

    Indian Model BIT (n. 21), Arts. 14.11 and 14.2(i)(b).

  157. 157.

    PAIC, Art. 43.1.

  158. 158.

    There are other ways of enforcement of investors’ obligations, such as by creating a monetary liability in domestic courts of the host State for a breach of the treaty obligations by an investor, SADC Model BIT (n. 10), Commentary, p. 39.

  159. 159.

    See COMESA Investment Agreement (n. 43), Art. 28.9; SADC Model BIT (n. 10), Art. 19.2; Indian Model BIT (n. 21), Art. 14.11.

  160. 160.

    Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, OJ L 11, 14 January 2017, pp. 3–8, para. 6.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

    Makane Moïse Mbengue

  2. Science Po Paris, School of Law, Paris, France

    Makane Moïse Mbengue

  3. Ministry of Justice, State Lawsuits Authority, Cairo, Egypt

    Mohamed H. Negm

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    Makane Moïse Mbengue

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Mbengue, M.M., Negm, M.H. (2019). An African View on the CETA Investment Chapter. In: Mbengue, M.M., Schacherer, S. (eds) Foreign Investment Under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98361-5_10

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