Abstract
Much of the legal argument on the reform of investment law and dispute settlement has until now been marked with preference bias, with partial truths and, on the part of investment practitioners, with some elitism and arguments of authority. Data collection and quantitative research may assist in getting the debate back on track on verifiable grounds, but investment lawyers should also make use of their capacities as guardians of procedural fairness and as legal engineers to optimize their contribution to the debate. The main challenge however is to diversify participants in the debate, in particular beyond the legal scene, and to systematically and constructively confront their views. Overcoming these weaknesses will be a major challenge for the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in its forthcoming work on the possible reform of ISDS. UNCITRAL should take great care in defining the scope of its work so as to avoid any impression of bias. The success of its work will further depend on the largest possible consultation of all possible stakeholders, well beyond UNCITRAL’s technical and commercial profile. Negotiators must also improve the legibility of investment treaties. In particular, the actual treaty provisions should be complemented with official stated reasons setting out in plain language the ambit and the underpinnings of the various provisions of the treaty.
The author should disclose that he acted as counsel to the Walloon Region of Belgium in the period preceding the signature of the CETA. He is very much indebted to his associate at Liedekerke law firm in Brussels, Maria-Clara Van den Bossche, for her comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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Notes
- 1.
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, signed 30 October 2016, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ L 11, 14 January 2017, pp. 23–1079.
- 2.
See the definitions of “debate” and “argument” in the Oxford Online Dictionaries: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com.
- 3.
See i.a. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1998).
- 4.
United Nations, Human Rights Council, Thirtieth session, Agenda item 3, Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, A/HRC/30/44 of 14 July 2015.
- 5.
Ibid., p. 9, para.16.
- 6.
For certainty’s sake, it is not my position that the unilateral nature of ISDS is unproblematic, nor that it is legitimate in the same way as the unilateral nature of proceedings before the ECHR etc. The only point addressed here is that this comparison must be discussed in detail so as to determine whether and how the unilateral nature of ISDS is problematic or not.
- 7.
European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA), Aim of EFILA, http://efila.org/about-efia/.
- 8.
European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA), A response to the criticism against ISDS, 17 May 2015, http://efila.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EFILA_in_response_to_the-criticism_of_ISDS_final_draft.pdf, p. 4.
- 9.
European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA), Task Force Paper regarding the proposed International Court System (ICS), draft dated 1 February 2016, http://efila.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/EFILA_TASK_FORCE_on_ICS_proposal_1-2-2016.pdf.
- 10.
Ibid., pp. 59–60, paras. 4–5.
- 11.
Such questions include: (1) Is there any reason in law or policy why foreign investors bringing an investment dispute against a state, including between Canada and the EU, should have the right to have their dispute adjudicated by arbitration with party-appointed arbitrators? (2) Isn’t there a risk, in disfavour of arbitration, that arbitrators who are paid at hourly rates for services effectively rendered, might wish to perpetuate or expand their practice, which should cause them to interpret and apply investment law in favour of investors, since they are the only parties capable of bringing a claim, that is, work to the arbitrators? Etc.
- 12.
Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13541-2016-INIT/en/pdf.
- 13.
Schwebel (2016), p. 6.
- 14.
- 15.
Alschner et al. (2017).
- 16.
Ibid., p. 221.
- 17.
Ibid., p. 222.
- 18.
Ibid., p. 224.
- 19.
Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, A/HRC/30/44 of 14 July 2015, p. 9, para.15.
- 20.
To be sure, this strategy is not necessarily to be found only on the side of foes of international dispute settlement. For instance, participants in the debate who are full-time investment arbitrators have no personal interest in contributing to the creation of an investment court either—lest of course they have a very good chance of being appointed to the court.
- 21.
See Roberts (2017).
- 22.
Reisman and Schreiber (1987), p. 7.
- 23.
Reiss and Sprenger (2017), section 2.2.
- 24.
See Salmon (1983), pp. 297–298.
- 25.
Reiss and Sprenger (2017), section 3.3.
- 26.
Ibid., Section 3.2, referring to Longino (1996).
- 27.
- 28.
On trust, see Reiss and Sprenger (2017), section 6 and passim.
- 29.
Compare Eberhardt and Olivet (2012), p. 64 et seq., and in particular p. 66.
- 30.
ICJ, Case concerning the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, United Kingdom v. Iran, ICJ Reports 1952, Section B, Oral Proceedings concerning the preliminary objection, p. 660. My translation from the French original: “[…] s’il est vrai que, dans une certaine mesure, comme avocat l’on se trouve dans l’infériorité de subir le danger d’avoir des opinions influencées par les intérêts que l’on défend, on a d’autre part cette supériorité d’envisager une décision sous des aspects concrets que l’on pouvait avoir méconnus lorsqu’on l’examinait de manière abstraite […].”
- 31.
Ibid., p. 668.
- 32.
Tienhaara (2011), pp. 606 and 627.
- 33.
Compare Barton (2007).
- 34.
- 35.
Waldron (2008), Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence?, New York University School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-35, November 2008.
- 36.
- 37.
See i.a. UNIS/L/250, 14 July 2017 (UN Information Service); A/CN.9/917 of 20 April 2017, Possible future work in the field of dispute settlement: Reforms of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), Note by the Secretariat.
- 38.
Ibid., p. 4, para. 14.
- 39.
Ibid., p. 5, para. 16.
- 40.
Ibid., p. 7, para. 22.
- 41.
UNIS/L/250, 14 July 2017.
- 42.
Ibid., p. 4, para. 13.
- 43.
Ibid., p. 3, para. 7.
- 44.
Ibid., p. 228.
- 45.
Ibid., p. 229.
- 46.
See http://hyperdebat.net/pourquoi-ce-site.html. Free translation from the French original text: “prendre rapidement connaissance de l’état d’un débat, de ses différentes options et de leur logique, et donc rejoindre sans difficulté un débat déjà commencé, […] apporter sa contribution avec l’assurance qu’elle sera retenue si elle apporte un élément nouveau. […] Du point de vue du débat public, il revendique une amélioration de l’égalité d’accès au débat, l’objectivité, l’exhaustivité, la lisibilité, et la traçabilité avec un accès à tous les matériaux bruts.”
- 47.
See d’Argent (2016), CETA: qui a lu le texte? La Libre Belgique, 20 octobre 2016, http://www.lalibre.be/debats/opinions/ceta-qui-a-lu-le-texte-5808e282cd70fdfb1a553733.
- 48.
The definition of natural person in turn determines the definition of “investor” in Art. 8.1 CETA: “investor means a Party, a natural person or an enterprise of a Party […]”.
- 49.
Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, 30 October 2016, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13541-2016-INIT/en/pdf.
- 50.
See above regarding Section 6(a) of the Instrument.
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Angelet, N. (2019). CETA and the Debate on the Reform of the Investment Regime. In: Mbengue, M.M., Schacherer, S. (eds) Foreign Investment Under the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98361-5_1
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