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Truth in English and Elsewhere: An Empirically-Informed Functionalism

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Book cover Pluralisms in Truth and Logic

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

Functionalism about truth, or alethic functionalism, is one of our most promising approaches to the study of truth. In this chapter, I chart a course for functionalist inquiry that centrally involves the empirical study of ordinary thought about truth. In doing so, I review some existing empirical data on the ways in which we think about truth and offer suggestions for future work on this issue. I also argue that some of our data lend support to two kinds of pluralism regarding ordinary thought about truth. These pluralist views, as I show, can be straightforwardly integrated into the broader functionalist framework. The main result of this integration is that some unexplored metaphysical views about truth become visible. To close the chapter, I briefly respond to one of the most serious objections to functionalism, due to Cory Wright

We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one concept, but with several different concepts[.] [W]e should try to make these concepts as clear as possible (by means of definition, or of an axiomatic procedure, or in some other way); to avoid further confusions, we should agree to use different terms for different concepts; and then we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study of all concepts involved, which will exhibit their main properties and mutual relations. (Tarski 1944, p. 355)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In what follows, I’ll use italics to denote properties and relations and small caps to denote concepts.

  2. 2.

    Cf. Lynch (2009, p. 7).

  3. 3.

    For further illuminating reflections on this distinction, see Asay (2013, Chap. 1; 2018); Bar-On and Simmons (2007); Eklund (2017, § 2); and Lynch (2005, 2009, Chap. 1).

  4. 4.

    For a canonical account of Ramsification, see Lewis (1970).

  5. 5.

    (2009, Chap. 1). I’ve altered the wording of the sentences, though this won’t influence the concern that I’ll develop for functionalism in § 2. In making these alterations, I’ve been guided by the assiduous study of Lynch’s functionalism by Marian David (2013).

  6. 6.

    More specifically, this metaphysics of truth amounts to what Künne (2003, pp. 3–4, Chap. 2) calls “nihilism,” or what I prefer to call pure deflationism . Not all deflationists (e.g. Horwich 1998) are pure deflationists in this sense, but some (e.g. Quine (1948, 1970) and Strawson (1949, 1950)) have endorsed or would endorse the view. According to the taxonomy here, deflationists such as Horwich who commit to the existence of a single property truth should be classified as monists. Thus to fully flesh things out, we’d need to distinguish between deflationary monists and substantivist monists (and between deflationary and substantivist pluralists). Doing so requires a good bit of effort; for details, see Wyatt (2016).

  7. 7.

    As I’m using the expressions ‘pluralism about truth’ and ‘truth pluralism’, one may endorse what is often called ‘alethic pluralism’ without thereby endorsing truth pluralism. I take truth pluralism to be the view that more than one actual property realizes FT. In other words, truth pluralism is the view that more than one actual property fits the job description for truth—full stop, and hence not merely relative to some domain or other (on this distinction, see David (2013) and Edwards (2011, pp. 34–7)). Extant alethic pluralists—strong and moderate alike—thus stop short of endorsing truth pluralism. Strong alethic pluralists (e.g. Cotnoir (2013) and Kim and Pedersen , this volume) take no actual property to realize FT simpliciter and moderate alethic pluralists (e.g. Edwards (2011) and Lynch (2009)) take exactly one such property to do so. This, I would stress, isn’t a criticism of these views, only an observation about their structure.

    It’s also worth noting that truth pluralism, in the present sense, is structurally similar to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism, insofar as the properties that would realize FT would do so with respect to all domains.

  8. 8.

    In his most recent work (2009, 2013), Lynch has elected to not rely explicitly on Ramsification, thereby departing from the strategy in his earlier, pathbreaking work on functionalism (2000, 2001, 2004b, 2005). However, I would point out that in his recent work, Lynch still speaks of properties playing the ‘truth role’. The truth role is supplied by PT and playing it looks to be nothing over and above witnessing RT, so it seems that Lynch is still loyal at heart to Ramsification, even though he chooses not to wear the badge.

  9. 9.

    Lynch (2009, p. 84; 2013, p. 27) and Wright (2005, n. 14) also allude to this point (see also Devlin (2003)). However, other authors are a bit too quick in assimilating functionalism to pluralism. I have in mind here the otherwise illuminating critical discussions by Caputo (2012); Horton and Poston (2012); Newhard (2013, 2014, 2017) and Wright (2005, §§ 4.1, 4.2). What I would point out is that the criticisms advanced by these authors affect the functionalist only if they commit to some sort of alethic pluralism—a move that Lynch does make, but which is nevertheless entirely optional.

  10. 10.

    Lynch (2004a, Chap. 1; 2009, p. 8).

  11. 11.

    Lynch (2009, pp. 10–14; 2013, p. 24).

  12. 12.

    Cp. Barnard and Ulatowski (2013, 2017); Fisher, et al. (2017); Kölbel (2008); and Mizumoto (ms). See especially Ulatowski (2017, pp. viii, ix, 2, 8–9).

  13. 13.

    I say ‘provisionally’ because it is at this point that we should look for underlying similarities among the concepts that speakers deploy when they use alethic vocabulary. If we detect such similarities, we should then—and only then—advance a general account of what makes a concept a truth concept. To do otherwise would amount to gratuitous theory building in the absence of sufficient data.

  14. 14.

    Moltmann’s investigations (2015, 2018) into truth predicates, and related kinds of predicate, in various natural languages also look to bear significantly on intralinguistic pluralism. The same goes for the work of Dzobo (1992, pp. 79–83) and Wiredu (1985, 1987, 2004) on the Ghanaian languages Ewe and Akan.

  15. 15.

    2013, p. 621.

  16. 16.

    Ibid. p. 631.

  17. 17.

    Ibid. p. 633.

  18. 18.

    Ibid. Figs. 2 and 3.

  19. 19.

    I include the parenthetical qualification to flag a further sort of variance that Barnard and Ulatowski (ibid. Fig. 1) found among their subjects. They found that their subjects (male and female alike) were more likely overall to agree with (1) when presented with the Bruno case than when presented with a case involving a simple arithmetical calculation. We might call this kind of variance topic-sensitivity. What I would point out is that this topic-sensitivity is independent of intralinguistic pluralism, insofar as the former may be present across the community of English speakers. For further investigation of topic-sensitivity , see Ulatowski (2017).

  20. 20.

    That said, Mizumoto (ms) has gathered interesting data pertaining to Japanese and English that do look to support interlinguistic pluralism. I should also note the fascinating collection of papers surveyed by Maffie (2001). By contrast, Matthewson and Glougie (forthcoming) investigate interesting cross-linguistic uniformities in the use of alethic vocabulary.

  21. 21.

    I take (WC1) to be a conjecture that Wiredu would be willing to make, although he doesn’t explicitly advance it. He comes extremely close to doing so at 2004, pp. 47–9. Cp. 1985, pp. 47–8, 49–50; 1987, p. 28.

  22. 22.

    Bourget and Chalmers (2014, § 2) note that in principle, anyone was allowed to take their survey, though the target group about which they mainly report are the professional philosophers from the mentioned departments.

  23. 23.

    Bedu-Addo argues that the best Akan expression to use is ‘nokware’, a view with which Kwame looks to be sympathetic.

  24. 24.

    My thinking here has been influenced by some suggestive remarks due to Wright (2005, pp. 18–21).

  25. 25.

    The grades of pluralism in (b)–(d) are notably different from the mainstream pluralist truth theories that have been developed thus far. One major difference is that the pluralisms in (b)–(d) make no reference to the notion of a ‘domain’, which figures prominently in mainstream pluralist theories. Rather, these pluralist views integrate Ramsification with conceptual pluralism, an approach that hasn’t been attempted by mainstream alethic pluralists.

  26. 26.

    (2010, p. 8). Cp. (2005, pp. 21–2).

  27. 27.

    Cp. Lewis (1970, p. 429).

  28. 28.

    In this way, my reply to Wright differs from that of Lynch (2013, n. 12), who grants that functionalism is viciously circular, but insists (less than convincingly, to my mind) that every other theory of truth is viciously circular in the same respect.

    I should also note that my reply on behalf of functionalism differs from the reply that Wright (2010, § 6) finds most convincing. I lack the space to examine this reply, but my basic concern is that it rests on a mischaracterization of the functionalist’s ambitions.

  29. 29.

    Admittedly, it seems to me that the functionalist need not do so. By way of analogy, think of a non-racist psychologist studying the race-related concepts used by ordinary, racist subjects. It would be consistent for them to analyze these concepts along functionalist lines while refraining from commitment to the truth of their postulates. It would seem that the alethic functionalist enjoys a similar sort of freedom when analyzing ordinary thought about truth.

  30. 30.

    (4) is grounded in (one direction of) what is sometimes called the transparency of the word ‘true’, as that word applies to sentences. It should also be helpful to remember the importance of the concept-property distinction in truth theory, as discussed in §1.

  31. 31.

    There is admittedly a further issue that must be explored—namely, how the functionalist could know that S1, that S2, and that S3. Though I can’t pursue this issue at length here, it’s plausible that the functionalist can acquire this knowledge in a rather familiar way. They can do so by reflecting on cases that pertain e.g. to the objectivity of truth or to the connections between A’s belief being true and its being correct for A to hold that belief. Put a bit more generally, the functionalist could come to know that PT is true by competently deploying the truth concept for which PT is the postulate in reflecting on cases that pertain to PT’s conjuncts.

  32. 32.

    I am grateful to audiences at the University of Bologna, Hong Kong University, Texas Christian University, and Yonsei University for their feedback on this chapter. Those who have helped me in developing the chapter include Wes Cray, Filippo Ferrari, Max Deutsch, Richard Galvin, Will Gamester, Patrick Greenough, John Harris, Blake Hestir, Ole Hjortland, Michael Lynch, Kelly McCormick, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Shyam Nair, Francesco Orilia, Giorgio Volpe, and Crispin Wright. I owe particular thanks to Jamin Asay, Teresa Kouri, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, Joe Ulatowski , and Cory Wright. Also, while working on this paper, I received support from the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF 2013S1A2A2035514 and 2016S1A2A2911800). This support is gratefully acknowledged.

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  1. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, South Korea

    Jeremy Wyatt

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  1. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Jeremy Wyatt

  2. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen

  3. University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

    Nathan Kellen

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Wyatt, J. (2018). Truth in English and Elsewhere: An Empirically-Informed Functionalism. In: Wyatt, J., Pedersen, N., Kellen, N. (eds) Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_8

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